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Summary and Recommendations  
Summary  
This study focused on the effects of federal funding policies and structures 
on transportation investment. Several recent policy developments in highways, 
airports, and transit were analyzed toward this end. 
Procedurally, the work progressed by performing six discrete transportation 
analyses and then drawing together insights gained from these to suggest basic 
funding principles. These principles were then investigated through interviews 
on the 1978 Surface Transportation Act with 21 transportation professionals 
(plus less formal consideration of possible 1980 Airport legislation - see the 
Airport analysis). Our overall recommendations were then advanced in light of 
the interview feedback. 
This report is structured with each of the discrete analyses available sep-
arately, and the underlying philosophy presented as an overview report. As the 
overview report is not merely a summary of the appendices, a brief synopsis of 
each of these is included here. 
A. Mass Transit: Statistical analysis of Urban Mass Transportation Admin-
istration (UMTA) financial assistance projects from 1965-1977 notes 
increasing transit needs (especially for operating expenses), an increasing 
federal role, and the key differentiation between rail and bus activities 
(with rail concentrated in some seven cities, but representing 70% of 
current capital obligations). The distribution of UMTA funds per transit 
commuter is found to be quite uniform. Large cities are determined to be 
more responsive to federal aid opportunities, but the increase in matching 
share to 80% in fiscal 1974 appears to have stimulated broader partici-
pation. The states are seen as providing increasing transit assistance 
to localities, but we could not document state influence on the distribu-
tion of federal funds. An intriguing comparative situation involving four 
possible sources of federal aid for a community considering a capital 
improvement suggested logical preference for available discretionary funds 
over one's formula allocation, subtle differences due to matching ratio, 
and little danger to the highway program from transfers to transit. Con-
siderations of the funding structures and of the proposed 1978 legislation 
(not passed at the time of the analysis) conclude the piece. 
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B. Highway Matching Requirements and Funding Levels, A Preliminary Model  
of State Response: This study first describes the patterns of federal 
and state highway expenditures from 1950 through 1975. Interesting 
findings include a trend of decreasing federal and state levels of 
support for highways (in constant dollars), increasing emphasis on the 
ABCD (Primary, Secondary, Urban Extensions, and Urban System) highways 
relative to the Interstate, and a trend toward increasing maintenance 
expenditures. Significant dispersion among the states is demonstrated 
on such measures as user tax rates and per capita tax burden. Four 
different measures of state highway needs are explored. An attempt to 
model the response of states to the increased federal matching share for 
fiscal 1974 postulated that some states act as "builders" (construction 
in excess of matching requirements), while others tend to be "matchers." 
It proved difficult to predict state responses to the policy change on 
the basis of needs and fiscal capabilities. 
C. Statistical Analysis of the Impact of Federal Highway Aid on State  
Allocative Decisions: The focus here is on the relationship between 
changesin federal aid funding structures and expenditure patterns of 
the 48 states over the time period 1957-1975. Regression analysis 
findings include the observation that each dollar per capita of federal 
aid was associated with an increase in states' own capital expeditures 
by about 7 to 8 cents for both the Interstate and ABC programs. This 
implies that states invest at near the required matching share on the 
Interstate, but at a much lower level on the ABC (e.g., at a 50% matching 
share, a federal dollar nominally requires a dollar of state funds). 
Analysis of subsets of the states found striking variations, indicating 
that federal matching share is not a dominant factor in state allocation 
decisions. Various contextual factors, especially the extent to which a 
federal program matches perceived state needs, appear very important. 
D. The Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS): This multi-billion 
dollar categorical aid program established in 1965 is assessed. A com-
parative analysis emphasizes five core Appalachian states (of the thirteen 
total) in contrast to nine states similar in highway and socio-economic 
character, but without ADHS activity. Results indicate stimulation of 
overall state highway efforts, with relatively minor shifts in level of 
effort on other highway programs. Regression and time series analysis 
complement each other, with particularly interesting interpretations of 
an apparent increase in state outlays to make up for decreasing, constant 
dollar, federal ABC Systems aid levels. The effects of a sizable federal 
matching share differential are seen to be outweighed by state interests. 
In general, the ADHS appears to be contributing to regional development as 
a viable categorical aid program. 
E. Analysis of State Highway Projects by Federal Aid System and Type of Work: 
This project level analysis looks at changes in funding patterns over time 
on the federal aid systems. It shows a dramatic shift in emphasis during 
the 1970's from building new roads to improvement of existing roads. Miles 
of new roads built annually have declined by 64 percent between 1960 and 
1977 while road improvements have increased by 98 percent. As an exception 
to the national trend, new road construction continues at a high pace in 
the Appalachian states, attributable to a stimulative effect of the Appala-
chian Development Highway System. Roads on the Primary and Urban Systems 
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and bridges are receiving greater attention (in comparison with the 
high point of the highway construction era in 1965) at some expense 
to the Interstate and Secondary roads. Capital investment has not 
kept up with inflation. Indications are that federal funds will 
increasingly become a dominant factor in capital investment decisions. 
Road preservation and bridge improvement are programs of growing impor-
tance, yet the federal role here seems to be financial relief in that 
the states had already shifted emphasis in these directions in the 1970's. 
F The Airport Development Aid Program: Implications of a Changing Federal  
Aid Program: Basic statistical descriptions of this program from its 
begininning in FY71 through FY77 are offered. These show a growing level 
of federal investment accompanied by decreasing local investment. The 
major uses of the funds are for land acquisition and construction site 
preparation at existing airports, but a notable increase in safety and 
environmentally motivated outlays takes place. Comparisons among the 
different size airport hub categories as federal matching provisions 
changed for some in FY74, and again in FY76, failed to show definitive 
effects of matching ratio on investments. We found ADAP investment levels 
per passenger enplaned to be considerably higher at smaller airports, 
raising the issue of who should subsidze them, and how much. Consideration 
of funding intent in the choice of funding structures leads to some com-
ments on the proposed 1980 legislation. 
Overview Report: The overview report first puts forth the implications of 
manipulations of matching ratios, allocation mechanisms, and categorial restric-
tions on federal aid programs. Recommendations regarding the specification of 
these funding structures are cast as a function of funding intent (which is 
distinct from such general objectives as increased mobility and decreased auto 
usage). It is clear that in attempting to assess the implications of federal 
policies one must consider program intents. The ultimate test of funding struc-
tures is in measuring the extent to which they further these intents and objec-
tives. The four intent categories used here are: 
1. Compelling national interest in the program per se. 
2. Regional development. 
3. Aim of motivating the recipient to expend more of his own 
funds on the program. 
4. Provision of financial relief on this program to the recipient. 
Particular funding parameter specifications are given in the Recommendations 
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section of this summary. 
Secondly, the overview paper reports on interviews with transportation 
professionals. The following are some of the perceived effects of the 1978 
Surface Transportation Act as regards funding parameters: 
. ABCD and ADHS program increases in matching ratio will result in 
an overall decrease in program sizes. (However, fiscally stripped 
states, such as Pennsylvania, should increase their program size.) 
An indirect effect may be the subsequent requesting of increased 
federal fund levels. 
. The transit shift of routine, capital needs (buses) to a formula 
program is expected to aid in administration and planning. 
. The bridge program provision of some discretionary funding is 
also seen as helpful. 
. The appropriateness of federal funding of non-federal-aid bridges 
(through a categorial program in particular) is questioned. 
. The increased number of subcategories in transit should reduce 
recipient flexibility and is therefore also questioned. 
Suggestions for future legislation include the easing of categorial restrictions 
by using more block grants and also the easing of transfers between categorical 
programs. Future critical issues in the transportation arena which must be 
addressed include the inflation drain on revenues and the growing role of main-
tenance and operations. Three other problems are also very notable: energy 
saving, rail revival, and enhancement of mobility. 
Recommendations  
The specification of recommendations for transportation funding parameters 
requires clearly defined national policies and delineated intergovernmental 
funding roles. Therefore, the scope of the recommendations here must include 
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the proper context for our specific funding parameter suggestions: 
1. The establishment of national, intermodal transportation policies, 
priorities, and plans is essential. These must be developed con-
sonant with energy, environmental, and urban concerns. All levels 
of government should be involved. 
2. The funding roles of the federal, state, and 	al governments 
should then be defined in light of the national policies, priori-
ties, and plans. Clear distinctions should be made between those 
programs that serve compelling national funding intents and those 
that do not. 
3. Only when the first two recommendations have been effected can 
sensible funding parameter policies be successfully implemented. 
These policies should take the following form: 
a) with respect to the setting of matching ratios and program 
levels: 
if the federal funding intent is to provide fiscal relief 
to the states or localities, then the matching ratio should 
be relatively high so as to decrease leverage on, and pro-
vide associated flexibility to, recipients. 
if the federal funding intent is to provide a program of 
national interest, then the federal match should again be 
relatively high (as, by definition, the program is national). 
if the federal funding intent is "stimulation" of a region, 
then the matching ratio should be set with respect to market 
conditions to assure the desired effect. 
note that the notion of a particular program's "stimulation" 
at the expense of other recipient program expenditures is 
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discouraged here. The approach advocated is the setting 
of agreed-upon priorities and attempting to meet those. 
. the funding level should be that necessary to maintain 
each program's priority ranking. 
b) with respect to the determining of allocation type (either 
formula or discretionary): 
. formula allocations should in general be specified due to 
their more assured nature and easier administration, except 
when large portions of recipients' budgets must be spent on 
single projects. In this case sufficient flexibility (e.g., 
through multi-year carry-over provisions, transfer authority, 
or discretionary funding) should be provided to fund these 
projects. 
c) with respect to the specifying of programs as categorical or 
block: 
if the funding intent is national interest, then a categorical 
grant should be specified to insure that the national priority 
is met. 
if the funding intent is fiscal relief, then block grants 
should be used to allow recipients maximal discretion in 
meeting local needs. 
in either case, program restrictions should be minimized 
if possible 
d) with respect to the closed-or-open-endedness of a program: 
if a program is of national interest, then sufficient closed-
endedness of a program should be specified at its inception 
to guarantee that the national interest is fulfilled. If 
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the funding intent of the program changes over the life 
of the program, then open-endedness should be considered. 
This study has focused on the specification of desirable transportation 
funding parameters. Over the course of this work, however, we have become con-
vinced that it is of the utmost importance to relate funding parameter specifi-
cations to the intent of the aid program. Hence, we suggest that implementation 
of all three recommendations together is necessary to rationalize transportation 
funding structures and policies. 
I. A Perspective on the Study  
A. Focus  
It seems most important for the reader to understand what we have, 
and what we have not, addressed. The federal role in transportation is 
obviously an issue of immense scope. Figure 1 portrays a portion of this 
complex system. Highlighted in the figure are the "federal funding struc-
tures." As noted therein, and defined in Table 1, these include matching 
share (or ratio), allocation mechanism - formula or discretionary, and 
whether a grant program is categorical or block in nature. We have 
emphasized study of these structures and their effects in the context of 
highway, transit, and airport aid programs. We have also considered 
whether a program is closed- or open-ended in scope or time. 
Most significantly, we have found (to no one's surprise) that we had 
to address other facets of the system if we were to comprehend the implica-
tions of the funding structures. Parallel to the funding structures in 
Figure 1, we have noted the level of federal aid as obviously important to 
any program. In some cases, level interacts importantly with funding 
structures in influencing the behavior of a program. State and local 
financial decisions have been of prime interest as immediately affected by 
funding structures and policies. We have tried to understand how these 
will change as a result of changes in matching ratio, formula vs. discre-
tionary character, and categorical or block nature of federal aid programs. 
We learned quite a lot during the course of the research (we think). 
One of the striking indications of this is the contrast in our view of 
federal program funding intents vis-a-vis evaluation of the effects of 
funding structures. Readers familiar with our July 1978, draft, Phase I 
report may recall our emphasis on the "stimulation" vs. "substitution" 
implications of funding structures. As reflected in Figure 1 and Table 2, 
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Figure 1. The Role of Federal Funding Structures in the Transportation System 
Table 1. Some Definitions 
Federal Matching Ratio - That percentage of the program effort 
which the federal government will pay until its appropriation 
limit is reached. (Beyond that limit, recipients must pay 
100%.) 
Program Matching Ratio (g) - The required amount of recipient 
plus federal money required for every dollar of f'rieral money 
(i.e., g > 1). 
Program Effect - The total (recipient plus federal) program 
amount which must be expended if the state is to capture all 
federal funds, expressed as a fraction of what the total pro-
gram amount was last year. 
Formula Programs - Funds are apportioned among the recipients on 
a prescribed basis, e.g., population density. 
Discretionary Programs - Funds must be applied for on a project-
by-project basis, and they are not set aside for each 
recipient. 
Block Grant - A grant given chiefly to general purpose govern-
mental units in accordance with a statutory formula - intended 
for use, largely at the recipients' discretion, in a variety 
of activities within a broad functional area. a 
Categorical Grant - A grant which can be used only for a specifi-
cally aided program and usually limited to narrowly defined 
activities. a 
Closed-ended Program - A program that has federal commitment of 
funds limited to some prescribed amount, location, and/or time 
(e.g., the Interstate highway system on route location and 
system completion date). 
Open-ended Program - A program that does not have a specified 
limit to federal involvement in certain respects (e.g., the 
"ABCD" highway system is not generally limited in route loca-
tion or completion date). 
a
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Catalog of  
Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs to State and Local Governments: 
Grants Funded FY1975, Washington, D.C., 1977. 
Table 2. Transportation Capital Programs Classified by Program Intent 
TRANSPORTATION 
CAPITAL PROGRAM 
Program Funding Intent Packaging 
1. High National Interest 
2. Regional Development 
3. Motivate Recipient to 
Expend More of His Own 
Funds on This Program 
Provide Financial Relief
on This Program to 
Recipient (Support) 
Matching Ratio Type of Allocation Type of Grant 
(Federal Share)a 
F = Formula 
= Discretionary 





















































- mid 50's to early 70's 
- mid 70's to present 
2. Federal aid primary, 
secondary, urban extension, 
urban system (ABCD) 
- "early'  
- "later' 	(50's to 
present) 
3. Appalachian Development 
Highway System (ADHS) 
4. Bridges 
URBAN MASS TRANSIT 
5. UMTA Section 3 
6, 	UMTA Section 5 
7. Transfers from Hwys. 
(Urban Sistem/Interstate) 
AIRPORTS 
8. Airport Development Aid 
Program (ADAP) 
- Air Carrier 
- General Aviation 
aThe percentages, unless otherwise indicated, are as of 1-1-79. Also, the percentage is 
somewhat higher to the Public Land States in highway and airport programs. 
b50% from 1952-54; 60% from 1954-56. 
c50% until FY1974; 70% until FY1979. 
our view has changed to now consider four basic funding intents (as dis-
tinct from general objectives; see Figure 1): 
1. Compelling national interest in the program per se. 
2. Regional development. 
3. Aim of motivating the recipient to expend more of his own 
funds on the program (.z; stimulation, but see Section II). 
L. Provision of financial relief on this program to the 
recipient (support). 
We did not infer "stimulation" (Intent 3) as currently a dominant aim for 
any of the eight major aid programs studied (Table 2). Reflecting this 
alteration in our perception, some of our policy recommendations are 
changed from the preliminary analysis. 1 
Tc reiterate then, our focus is on federal funding structures, with a 
heavy emphasis on their relationships with program funding intents and state 
and local financial decisions. In the course of analyzing these facets of 
the system, we necessarily address programmatic investment levels (Figure 1) 
and consider levels of federal aid. We have not generally tried to go 
beyond these fiscal matters to consider direct physical effects and the 
broader implications in substantive detail. Nor have we gone back to pon-
der national objectives in any depth. Again, we have not addressed the 
issues attendant to revenue generation and financial arrangements (e.g., 
trust funds), other than as issues arising in the discourse on tunding 
A fifth funding intent has been suggested, namely the provision of 
a suitable mechanism by which users can aid in financing the development 
of desired programs (e.g., as with the Highway Trust Fund). However, this 
revenue-generating intent is different from our other four intents, which 
are more program-focused. Furthermore, there is no a priori theoretical 
reason to assume that such trust funds could not be established on other 
than a national basis, or that the funds raised could not be directly 
returned to states or localities without any programmatic or categorical 
restrictions. Thus, we omit this fifth intent. 
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structures. Since performance of the transportation system depends on 
many related features (e.g., technical standards associated with federal 
aid programs, related regulations, and planning), we do not attempt to 
"evaluate" the effects of federal funding in a total sense. Furthermore, 
we recognize that the system is not simple and linear. Feedback of infor-
mation, both technical and political in nature, is very important. 
Political factors are likely to be vitally important to the determination 
of funding policies; hence, we recognize the inherent limitations in any 
technical analysis. We have attempted to at least consider such factors 
in making suggestions. 
B. Approach  
In general, this study draws on statistical analyses complemented by 
insights gained through interviews with a number of transportation off i-
cials. The research process was iterative--initial hypotheses were refined 
through literature review and preliminary interviews; basic statistical 
analyses were performed; and further interviews and more refined analyses 
were conducted. 
In particular, a limited set of examples was selected to provide 
useful evidence of the implications of key structural funding parameters. 
These examples include the introduction of the Interstate system program 
and the Appalachian Regional Commission's (ARC) highway programs; changes 
in the funding provisions for the "ABCD" highway programs
1 
occurring in 
fiscal year 1974; changes in mass transit funding provisions for fiscal 
year 1974; and Airport Development Aid Program shifts in fiscal 1974 and 
1, 'ABCD" programs are the Federal-Aid Primary (A), Federal-Aid 
Secondary (B), Urban Extensions of the Primary and Secondary (C), and 
the recently created (1972) Urban System (D). 
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1977. The useful contrasts arising from the special treatment given in 
federal programs to both Appalachian and Public Land states (i.e., those 
with substantial areas of national forests and nontaxable Indian lands) 
are also exploited. For example, in the case of the Public Land states, 
the non-Public Land states are the (obvious) contrast. (Table 4 provides 
one example of the different treatment given the two groups.) With respect 
to the Appalachian states, a comparison group had to be contrived. First 
a core group of five Appalachian states was defined; then a comparison 
group of nine states (chosen on similarity of size, urbanization, state 
highway capital investment characteristics, and socio-political behavior 
patterns) was formed. (See Figure 2 and Appendix D for details.) 
The data base on which the statistical analyses were drawn covers the 
time span from roughly 1950 to 1975 for the 48 contiguous states. Over 200 
variables are included, spanning programmatic, economic, political, techni-
cal, social, organizational, and physical characteristics. It also includes 
files on Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) grants, selected 
socioeconomic characteristics of urbanized areas, Federal Highway Adminis-
tration (FHWA) projects, and Airport Development Aid Program projects. For 
highways, both expenditure and obligation data are in-hand; for transit and 
airports, only obligation data are generally available.
1 
Due to a recognition of the highly complex nature of the transporta-
tion funding process, the quantitative (data base) work was buttressed by 
1Legislation authorizes funding; a separate appropriations bill makes 
this available during a given fiscal year. In the Appalachian program, the 
ARC allocates these appropriations to the states (resulting in their 
entitlements). An obligational ceiling is the maximum amount of funds a 
state can commit in a fiscal year. Obligated funds are those actually 
approved to be expended for specific work. Lastly, actual outlays or 
expenditures result to pay for that work. (Based on Appalachian Regional 
Commission, Highway Policy Issues Report, Washington, D.C., June 1974, 
pp. 11-21. 
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Figure 2. Groups of States for Analytical Purposes 
conversations with transportation experts. One particularly important 
aspect of this phase of the study was obtaining the views of 21 transpor-
tation professionals of diverse backgrounds (see Acknowledgements). The 
professionals commented on general funding policies, the 1978 Surface 
Transportation Act (STA), and future transportation funding issues. We 
then tried to draw these perspectives together with our understanding of 
federal funding structures developed from the analytical efforts. 
C. Structure of the Report  
We believe that this study can prove useful in two distinct ways. 
First, we hope we have promoted careful analysis of various attributes of 
the system of federal aid for transportation. Section II sets forth con-
ceptual points and substantive conclusions worthy of further analytic 
attention. Second, we offer a number of pointed recommendations which 
we hope will have practical value. These recommendations basically relate 
to the manipulation of funding structures toward fulfilling various intents. 
We do not address the merits of the intents themselves. For instance, 
recommendations typically have the flavor of "if the intent is such, 
then . . ." 
The total report is structured as follows. 
1. Section II presents a distillation of the principal Lessons 
learned from the conduct of the discrete analyses presented 
as Appendices. It does not summarize those analyses, but 
rather puts forth our understanding of the implications of 
manipulations of matching ratio, allocation mechanism 
(formula vs. discretionary), and categorical restrictions 
(vs. block grants) of federal aid programs. Specific recom-
mendations are derived. 
2. Section III presents transportation professionals' perceptions 
of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978. A syn-
thesis of these views with the analysis of Section II follows. 
3. Section IV formulates conclusions and delineates future critical 
issues likely to exacerbate the present situation. 
4. The Appendices contain the individual technical analyses that 
underlie the interpretations of Section II. These are intended 
to stand alone, and each leads to conclusions in its own right. 
Synopses are provided in the preceding Summary section. 
D. Other Sources of Project-Related Information  
Several other sources of project-related information should be noted. 
Choon Y. Park prepared a Master's Thesis entitled "Analysis of the 
Appalachian Development Highway Program as a Policy Intervention." 1 This 
formed the basis for Appendix D. It provides in-depth treatment of the 
analytical considerations in the quasi-experimental "non-equivalent con-
trol group design," upon which conclusions were based. The approach may 
be of interest to others attempting to weigh the effects of a policy 
intervention when a comparison group not directly affected by the policy 
change exists. Loren P. Rees is presently working on a Ph.D. Dissertation 
entitled "Statistical Methods for Public Policy Analysis." The thrust of 
this effort is to investigate the use of statistical analyses to inform 
the policy process. An in-depth examination of the transportation funding 
literature (as well as a survey of other policy areas) will lead into 
development of techniques perceived to offer special promise for useful 
application. We have also endeavored to disseminate our findings in the 
open literature and through participation in conferences, as follows. 
Porter, A. L. The Role of Information in Perpetuating Urban Highway 
Dominance Over Transit. Urban Systems, 3, 211-221, 1979. 
1
Park, C. Y., Analysis of the Appalachian Development Highway Program  
as a Policy Intervention, School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, August 1978. 
Porter, A. L., Rees, L. P., Rao, S., Larson, T. D., and Park, C. Y. 
Transportation Funding Structures and Policies. Submitted to 
Transportation Research. 
Park, C. Y., and Porter, A. L. Effects of the Appalachian Development 
Highway Program: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis. Submitted to 
Growth and Change. 
Park, C. Y., Porter, A. L., and Connolly, T. Implications of the Air-
port Development Aid Program (ADAP). To be submitted to Traffic  
Quarterly. 
Porter, A. L. Transit Funding: Implications of Federal Aid Strategies. 
To be submitted to Transportation.  
Porter, A. L., Rao, S., and Larson, T. D. Effects of Federal Funding 
Policies on State and Local Transportation Performance: Preliminary 
Findings. Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, 
Washington, D.C., January, 1978. 
Porter, A. L., Rao, S., Larson, T. D., Park, C. Y., and Rees, L. P. 
Effects of Federal Transportation Funding Policies and Structures. 
Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., 
January, 1979. 
Porter, A. L. Federal Transportation Funding Policies: Five Recommenda-
tions. TIMS International Meeting, Honolulu, June, 1979. 
Park, C. Y., and Porter, A. L. Economic Impacts of Federal Transportation 
Policy on Regional Development: The Case of the Appalachian Develop-
ment Highway System. TIMS International Meeting, Honolulu, June, 1979. 
II. Toward an Understanding of Transportation Funding Structures and 
Policies 1 
A. Background 
Recent experience and current concerns point to the importance of a 
careful consideration of federal funding parameters for transportation aid 
programs. Increases (and decreases) in federal shares in the airport 
development program, provision of federal aid for operating expenses of 
urban transit authorities, the proliferation of federal aid highway pro-
grams, and stresses placed on highway funding sources by shortfalls in 
state revenues since the oil embargo of 1973 illustrate the dimensions 
of the issues involved. Recently enacted legislation has changed highway 
and transit matching provisions, provided more flexible highway -transit 
fund interchange, increased the use of formula program funding in transit, 
and placed critical deadlines for eligibility of Interstate projects. 
These issues all relate to federal funding policies and structures. 
(Terms are defined in Table 1.) The intent of this section is to assess 
implications of such policies and structures. 
Federal support of state and local transportation efforts has been 
a primary means of pursuing the broad national objective of "good" and 
"low cost" transportation. Various funding structures have been used in 
this context. One effort that can assist the formulation of future fed-
eral funding policies is an analysis of how past policies have affected 
state and local transportation investments. In practice, the cause- 
1. This section is closely based on a manuscript entitled "Transpor-
tation Funding Structures and Policies" by Alan L. Porter, Loren P. Rees, 
Srikanth Rao, Thomas D. Larson, and Choon Y. Park, submitted to 
Transportation Research. That, in turn, was based on the first phase 
project draft report. 
effect relationships are extremely difficult to determine because of 
limitations in available data and the presence of complex, confounding 
factors. Nonetheless, helpful insights can be gained with regard to 
such questions as: 
(1) How do recipients respond to the spectrum of matching ratios 
offered by competing programs? 
(2) What happens to total program area effort when the federal 
matching share is increased? 
(3) When should programs be structured as categorical? Which 
programs should be packaged as less restrictive block grants? 
(4) What differences arise from using an apportionment formula 
rather then awarding discretionary grants? 
B. Program Intent  
By intent we do not refer to such transportation objectives as 
increased mobility and decreasing auto usage. Rather we refer to the 
reason for federal involvement in a program. For instance, is the intent 
of this funding to stimulate a region of the country economically, or is 
it to aid some states who are strapped for funds to maintain their programs? 
Determining the intent of the different federal aid programs is a 
difficult undertaking, as previous attempts demonstrate. One study 
classified the purpose of grants according to a "support, stimulate, or 
demonstrate" scheme. 1 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions - ACIR - found this trichotomy inadequate
2
and subsequently classified 
1. Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, "Federal Programs of 
Grants-In-Aid to State and Local Governments," U.S. Congress, Senate, 91st 
Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print, 1969. 
2. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Categorical 
Grants: Their Role and Design, Washington, D.C., 1977. 
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442 grants according to six purposes "to arrive at a roughly accurate pro-
file of Congressional intent or emphasis." These purposes are support, 
stimulative, capacity building, training, complementary grants, and 
national programs. 
With a spirit of caution, we set forth our view of intent for eight 
transportation programs. We specify four different categories of federal 
intent (leaning heavily on the ACIR concepts), ranging from the pursuit 
of highly national purposes to provision of financial relief to a recipi-
ent (Table 2). The terms "stimulate" and "substitute" roughly correspond 
to intents 3 and 4, respectively. Note that no program is currently clas- 
sified under intent 3, although an argument could be made that programs 
such as transit stimulate as well as support.
1 
For instance, we have 
included transit programs as intent 4 rather than intent 1 because it is 
difficult for us to picture a particular locality's transit needs as of 
national importance; however, as the energy crisis escalates, transit 
intent may well change to intent 1. 
Not only is the transit intent dynamic, a case may be made for other 
modes as well. Perhaps the ABC program has progressed and the Interstate 
program will progress through time from programs of national interest 
(intent 1) to motivational inducement (intent 3) to programs providing 
financial support (intent 4). On the other hand transit programs may 
proceed from intent 4 to intent 1. In any event, however, the point to 
be emphasized here is that funding intent is a dynamic factor; hence, pro-
gram aid structures should be expected to vary over time. 
1Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Catalog of  
Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs to State and Local Governments: Grants  
Funded FY1975, Washington, D.C., 1977. 
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Federal aid packages seem to come in an inexhaustible number of 
sizes and shapes; the only common element seems to be the strings attached. 
Nonetheless, we have tried to unwrap aid packages along five dimensions: 
level of aid, matching ratio, formula versus discretionary allocation, 
categorical versus block restrictions, and closed versus open-endedness. 
We discuss each dimension in turn, attempting when possible to "partial 
out" the effects of the other dimensions. 
C. The Level of Federal Aid  
We briefly illustrate the obvious importance of the amount of federal 
aid. The highest level of federal aid to transportation historically has 
been to highways, although mass transit programs increased in volume 
in the 1970's. The level of aid to many transportation programs increases 
over time; it appears that once federal aid has begun, it may be "counted 
on" to increase. As an example, the average federal highway expenditures 
over time are shown in Figure 3. However, when inflation is considered, it 
is seen that the constant dollar expenditures have been decreasing over 
the last 10 or 15 years (Figure 4). Also, highway costs are escalating at 
a rate greater than the consumer price index (Figure 5). Thus federal aid 
is increasing but is meeting less and less of the real costs. From the 
state perspective, these factors, plus increasing traffic volume, deterior-
ating highway systems, and increased vehicle fuel efficiency, are causing 
severe revenue problems. As Cooper observes,
1 
states are turning to novel 
approaches to re-establish revenue growth. 
1
Thomas W. Cooper, The State Highway Finance Outlook, U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Program and 
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D. Matching Ratio  
1. Matching Ratio - "Within Program Comparisons" 
Potential recipients face a variety of program matching ratios and 
the choices among them are complex, to say the least. Therefore we first 
attempt to examine recipient response to matching ratio on an individual 
program basis, then proceed to an across-programs analysis. Within the 
individual program subsection, we first provide an example. We follow 
that with a discussion of matching ratio as a function of intent and 
then of level. Finally, we consider matching ratio in terms of "stimu-
lation" and "substitution." 
A beautiful example of matching ratios changing over time and their 
effect is provided in the airport sector. Air carrier airports are clas-
sified as large, medium, small, or non-hubs (based on enplanements). The 
Airport Development Aid Program (ADAP) has reflected changed matching 
ratios for various sized hubs in fiscal years 1974, 1976, and 1979, as 
shown in Table 3. The corresponding expenditure effects are also shown in 
the same table. We see that, in this case, an increase in matching ratio 
is associated with an increase in federal support level and usually total 
program effort - but not sponsor funds! We ask, therefore, how, in 
general, may the federal government expect recipients to respond to match-
ing ratio changes? And at what level should matching ratios be set? 
Philosophically, the level of the matching ratio should be a func-
tion of program intent. Intent 1 of Table 2 would be expected to have a 
high federal matching ratio (quite close to 1.00) as the programs are 
national in nature. Intents 2 and 3 both entail attempted motivation 
(either of a region generally or a recipient programmatically), and as 
such must be sufficiently high to be fiscally attractive. The level of 
20 




FISCAI YEAR PFRiOnb 
3971-73 	74-75 	76-77 
LARGE HUBS FEDERAL MATCHING SHARE C 50% 50% 757 
(20) FEDERAL AID FUNDS/ENPLANEMENT d 0.57 0.60 0.79 
SPONSOR FUNDS/ENPLANEMITd 0.60 0.60 0.36 
TOTAL FUNDS/ENPLANEMENT 1.17 1.20 1.15 
FtDIUM HUBS FEDERAL MATCHING SHARE 50% 75% 75% 
(30) FEDERAL AID FUNDS/ENPLANEMENT 1.07 1.43 1.94 
SPONSOR FUNDS/ENPLANEMENT 0.95 0.45 0.64 
TOTAL FUNDS/ENPLANEMENT 2.02 1.88 2.58 
SMALL HUBS FEDERAL MATCHING SHARE 93% 75% 90% 
(71) FEDERAL AID FUNDS/EN PIANEMENT 1. 28 2.29 4.30 
SPONSOR FUNDS/ENPLANEMENT 1.12 0.74 0.60 
TOTAL FUNDS/ENP LAN EMENT 2.43 3.03 4.90 
aTHESE ARE TdE AIRPORTS THAT CONSISTENTLY FIT THE THREE CATEGORIES, OVER THE TIME PERIOD 
CONSIDERED (EXCLUDING AIRPORTS THAT CHANGED CATEGORIES; AND AIRPORTS THAT THEMSELVES 
FIT A LOWER CATEGORY, BUT WERE OWNED BY A LARGER SPONSOR AND HENCE WERE CONSIDERED LAR -
GER FOR FEDERAL AID DURING THE FIRST TWO PERIODS). LARGE HUBS ARE THOSE AIR CARRIER 
AIRPORTS THAT ENPLAN 1% OR moRg OF THE NATION S PASSENGERS IN A GIVEN YEAR; MEDIUM 
HUBS, THOSE FROM 0.25% TO 0.910; AND SMALL HUBS, THOSE FROM 0.05% TO 0.2L!%. IN 
ADDITION THERE ARE NON-HUB AIR CARRIER AIRPORTS, RELIEVER AIRPORTS, AND GENERAL AVI-
ATION AIRPORTS. 
bTHESE PERIODS CORRESPOND T0,,,CHANGES IN FEDERAL AID PROVISIONS. No FEDERAL AID WAS 
RELEASED IN FISCAL YEAR (LI) 76 UNTIL THE TRANSITION QUARTER. 
CTHE FIGURES REPRESENT GENERA I_ CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT AID SHARES. CERTAIN AIRPORTS 
(ESPECIALLY THOSE IN PUBLIC LN1D STATES) WERE ELIGIBLE FOR HIGHER FEDERAL AID SHARES. 
CERTAIN PROJECT CATEGORIES WERE ELIGIBLE FOR HIGHER FEDERAL SHARES AS WELL, INCLUDING 
LANDING AIDS, CERTAIN _NAVIGATION AIDS, AND REWIRED EQUIPMENT. PROVISIONS FOR bY /8 
WERE THE SAME AS FOR 11 76-17. HOWEVER, FOR FY 79-80, THE FEDERAL SHARE FOR SMALL 
HUBS HAS BEEN REDUCED TO E0/0. 
d 
THE FY 7(-77 PERIOD), DIVIDED BY THE YEARS IN EACH PERIOD. THE FIRST Pmiop WAS 3 
YEARS; THE SECOND, 2 YEARS; THE THIRD, 2 YEARS (NO AID RELEASED DURING ri 7b UNTIL THE 
FIGURES ARE DOLLARS/ENPLANEMENT/YEAR. TOTAL DOLLARS TO ALL OF THE INCLUDED AIRPORTS 
TRANSITION QUARTER). SIMILAR TABULATIONS, YIELDING THE SAME PATTERN, WERE MADE USING 
IN A HUB CATEGORY WERE DIVIDED BY TOTAL ENPLANEMENTS IN A TYPICAL YEAR (ESTIMATED FOR 
DOLLARS/ENPLANEMENT/YEAR CALCULATED FOR EACH AIRPORT, THEN AVERAGED FOR THE HUB CATE -
GORY. 
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attractiveness is a function of other federal program ratios and current 
economic conditions, to mention only two parameters. The size of the 
matching ratio under intent 4, the provision of financial relief, would 
be expected to be high. This may be lowered if there is a mutual desire 
to leverage a decision-making body (e.g., a state legislature) into advanc-
ing more funds for the program in question. 
One must be careful not to infer program effort from the matching 
ratio; for example, an inexperienced observer might think that the higher 
the matching ratio, the higher the program level is likely to be. That 
this is not the case, we demonstrate in the following hypothetical 
example; 
--at a 50 percent match, $63 federal aid requires $63 state 
outlay, for a total fort of at least 	 --$126. 
--at a 70 percent federal share, $63 federal aid requires 
$27 state outlay, for a total effort of at least 	--$ 90. 
--at a 90 percent federal share, $63 federal aid requires 
$7 state outlay, fdr -- -a total effort of at least 	 --$ 70. 
If the total effort is unlikely to greatly exceed the minimum required to 
use up all federal aid, then, compared to a 50 percent match, a 70 percent 
federal share will yield 29 percent less total effort; a 90 percent 
federal share will yield 44 percent less total effort. Or, to obtain the 
same level of total effort from a 90 percent program as from a 50 percent 
program would require a 79 percent increase in federal aid level ($113 of 
federal aid to generate $126 total effort)! 
The same type of situation occurs when there is a change in matching 
ratio. Just because the matching ratio increased does not imply that the 
program size should have increased. Again the change is intimately tied 
to level. Consider the following argument. (First note that, tradition-
ally, states do not forego federal monies.) Program effect is defined as 
the total (state + federal) program amount which must be expended if the 
state is to capture all federal funds, expressed as a fraction of what 
the total program amount was last year. For example, if this year's pro-
gram must be $20 million to get all federal money, and last year's was 
$10 million, then the program effect is 2.0. Note that the program effect 
may be less than, equal to, or greater than unity. Now consider, as an 
example, the fiscal 1974 change in matching ratio from 50% to 70% for the 
ABCD program. Table 4 shows the program effect which resulted from the 
matching ratio and level changes. Note that most program effects are 
less than 1.0. This type of result would be potentially disastrous for 
a program with intent 2 or 3, but may be fine for a type 4 intent. In 
any event, the point is that an increase in matching ratio does not neces-
sarily effect (or even encourage) an increase in program size. 
2. Matching Ratio - "Stimulation or Substitution" 
The issue of "substitution" and "stimulation" is often brought up 
in the literature in connection with matching ratios. Although we do 
noc favor policy-makers thinking in such terms as "maximizing stimula-
tion" without regard to program intent, we examine the concepts, using 
Gramlich's (1969) terminology to add precision to our discussion. 
Let E represent expenditures on the program (federal + recipient), 
G be the size of the matching grant, and g be the legal matching ratio, 
where here we define the ratio as the required amount of recipient plus 
federal money required for every dollar of federal money (i.e., g > 1). 
Figure 6 clots the ratio of marginal expenditures to marginal grants, 
yielding important definitions. 
Substitution is hereby defined to be that range for which BE is 
BG 
between 0 and 1, for in this range an increase in grant is spent in such 
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Table 4. ABCD "Program Effect" of the 1973 Federal Aid Highway Act Changes 
Pre-Change 	 Post-Change 	 Post-Change 
State 	Matching Ratio 	Matching Ratio "Program Effect" 
Mote: In computing the "program effect," expenditure data were used and 
one-and-a-half year time lag was assumed between the appropria- 
tion and its expenditure (i.e., to evaluate the "post-change" 
program effect, federal aid was assumed to be the 1975 calendar 
year (CY) expenditure, and the last-year program level was 
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FIGURE 6: STIMULATION AND SUBSTITUTION 
a way that not only does the program size not increase, but another pro-
gram gets some of the grant money (or the citizens get a tax break). 
The limited stimulation range is that region for which DE  is between 1 
DG 
and g; here all federal money and some recipient money is spent on the 
program. The complementary range is that part of the axis for which 
aG 
exceeds g, for in this case the federal money is complementing an 
otherwise ambitious non-federal program. And finally we add the cutback  
compensation region to Gramlich's definitions as that negative portion of 
the axis which represents increased recipient expenditures in the face of 
federal cutbacks [e.g., as occurred with the decline in real dollar 
federal "ABC" support in the late 1960's; see Porter and Park 
(Appendix D)]. 
In the highway arena, Rao (Appendix C) has demonstrated that for 
the Interstate system over the years 1957-70, g. This is a case 
of perfect matching and is not logically inconsistent with the national 
purpose of the program. On the other hand, he found that for the same 
time period the ABC program has fit the limited stimulation situation, 
with -5- z 1.07 < 2 z g. This too is not at variance with the federal 
intent of fiscal relief. At no recent time, to our knowledge, was the 
intent of the ABC program to aggressively stimulate state spending. 
Of interest is the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS) pro-
gram. Porter and Park (Appendix D) report that this program acts in the 
complementary range. Besides effectively "overmatching" on the program 
itself, five "core" ADHS states (KY, NC, TN, VA, WV) appear to have increased  
not only the total capital outlay (state and federal funds), but also state--
only (exclusive of federal aid) highway outlays. There has been a widening 
gap between the ADHS states and the comparison group from essentially equal 
26 
capital outlays on all roads (1955-1959) to about 65 percent greater outlay 
in 1972. Perhaps, the most striking evidence of the stimulation of the high- 
way effort in the five core ADHS states is the increase in their bonded indebt-
edness and gas tax rates relative to the comparison states. The ADHS program 
is thus associated with a general boost in the state highway effort, in 
line with the intent of regional development through increasing highway 
mobility. (This does not demonstrate that the ADHS program was the only 
cause of this increase, but it is obviously contributory. The establish- 
ment of the ARC involved the states in the first place, so it would be 
improper to assume that the enhanced state highway effort was just a 
response to the federal aid program.) Observations by ARC and Federal 
Highway Administration personnel support the premise that the level of 
construction activity would decline in the absence of the ADHS program. 1 
High federal matching shares are politically popular, and recent and 
proposed policy changes tend to increase the federal portion for airports, 
transit, and highways. There is evidence that increasing the federal share 
can broaden participation in programs. For instance, the increase in the 
federal matching share from a flexible 66.67% to a mandatory 80% in fiscal 
year 1974 for the UMTA Section 3 (discretionary grant) and Section 9 (tech-
nical assistance) programs broadened participation in terms of the size of 
participating urbanized areas. As indicated in Figure 7, fiscal years 1974 
and 1975 show a relative increase in the percentage of smaller cities receiv-
ing grants. The same holds true for proportionate number of grants received, 
and proportionate total and average grant amounts. 
However, high federal shares may distort recipient priorities and 
1. Appalachian Regional Commission, Highway Policy Issues Report, 
Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 31. 
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induce less economic investments. For instance, what community would not 
"need" the economic benefits associated with constructing an airport, or 
whatever, at 5c on the $1.00 (i.e., where a state contributes half of the 
non-federal match when general aviation airports received 90% federal sup-
port). This is not to say that foolish investments will necessarily be 
induced (for "need" must often be demonstrated, particularly in the case 
of discretionary projects). Rather, the implication here is that a net 
social cost will be incurred if priorities are obviated in the face of 
irresistible matching ratios. Therefore, at the very least, it seems that 
the federal government should not unilaterally determine high matching 
ratios in order to effect increased recipient investment in a program 
(intent 3). 
We add (in passing) that once a matching ratio is set, it is diffi-
cult politically to cut back. This is the case whether one is a proponent 
of "winding down" a program or "beefing one up." 
We now summarize our main points on individual program matching 
ratio analysis: 
(1) The setting of the matching ratio should not be considered 
apart from the federal graat level and intent. 
(2) An increase in matching ratio does not necessarily effect 
(or even encourage) an increase in program size. 
(3) "Stimulation" is not a desirable, end-all goal for federal 
grants in the sense of "the more stimulation of recipient 
investment the better." 
(4) High federal shares can broaden participation, but at the 
risk of distorting priorities. 
(5) Since it is politically difficult to lower the matching ratio. 
and it is sometimes desirable to raise it, federal planners 
should consider "low" ratios initially to limit unwanted over-
commitment. However, should a consistent pattern of raising 
the federal share ensue, this proposal would be self-defeating 
as a lag in investment would be likely; overall program costs 
could then rise due to inflation. 
3. Matching Ratio - "Across Programs Comparison" 
We now proceed with an analysis of matching ratio across programs, 
noting that recipients are sometimes faced with many different program 
alternatives. Perhaps most interesting is the situation for transit 
capital users. 
Four sources of federal aid were potentially available from 
fiscal 1974-1977
1 
to the community interested in transit capital improve-
ments (and minimal investment took place unless there was aid from one 
of these sources). 
(1) UMTA Section 3 funds provided an 80% federal share, but these 
funds were discretionary and as such could be obtained above 
the formula allotment. 
(2) Transferred Urban System funds gave a basic 70% federal share, 
but the use of these funds for transit was a substitution for 
their use on urban highway projects (also a 70% share). 
(3) Transferred Interstate funds offered a basic 80% share, but 
with loss to the state of that amount of 90% federal aid. 
(4) UMTA Section 5 formula funds could be used at an 80% federal 
1
Note that this period is before the Surface Transportation Act of 
1978, and hence some matching and transfer percentages may differ from 
those shown in Table 2. 
Ly 
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share for capital improvements or at a 50% federal share for 
operating assistance. 
Which did communities choose? The federal obligations from the four 
sources tally roughly as follows for fiscal years 1974-1977: 
(1) Section 3 - 405 capital grants, for some $1,643,000,000 
(2) Urban System transfers - 17 projects, for some $75,000,000 
(3) Interstate transfers - 10 projects, for some $640,000,000 
(4) Section 5 capital projects - 95 projects, for some $57,000,000. 
The observed preference for Section 3 funds was obviously complicated by 
many factors (eligibility for funds, federal funding level, ease of approval, 
etc.). Nonetheless, two interpretations appear appropriate
1
: 
(1) Communities obtained the most federal money by using allocated 
Urban System funds for highways (i.e., not transferring the 
funds for transit use) and then using other federal funds for 
mass transit ("competition" between a formula program and a 
discretionary one). 
(2) More local money was usually required for a mass transit pro-
ject funded through the Urban System program than through UMTA 
(unequal matching ratios). 
The first argument seems compelling; other things being equal, a 
rational recipient of federal aid should request a discretionary grant 
instead of drawing on allotted (formula) monies that can be used for other 
purposes (in this case, urban highways). 
The Interstate alternative has not been overly popular - some 10 pro-
jects in all: one for Philadelphia, two for Washington, D.C., and the 
1
General Accounting Office, Why Urban Funds Were Seldom Used for  
Mass Transit, Washington, D.C., 1977. 
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rest for Boston. In terms of matching ratios, the Interstate option 
trades "10c" highway dollars for "20c" transit dollars, clearly disadvan-
tageous from local and state perspectives. 
The use of Urban System funds for transit instead of highways was 
less attractive to most states and their local authorities. The federal 
share at 80% for Sections 3 and 5 was more generous than the 70% for 
transferred Urban System funds. However, for ten Public Land states the 
higher federal Urban System share exceeded 80%. If matching share were 
a significant consideration, we might expect to have seen a preponderance 
of Urban System transfers in these ten states (although they tend to be 
rural states). The few instances of transfers do proportionately cluster 
in these ten states - about 43% of the non-rail projects for only 22% of 
the urbanized area population, excluding New York City. This is by no 
means conclusive evidence, but it is consistent with the premise that 
state and local officials sometimes take cognizance of small differentials 
in federal matching share. 
Additional testimony for the importance of matching requirements 
comes in the form of state support and program participation by locali-
ties. For instance, Nevada provides all the matching funds for Urban 
System highway projects but none for mass transit projects (due to Nevada 
law). This is a strong inducement for a community to favor highway pro-
jects which cost them nothing directly over transit projects for which 
they must pay 20c on the dollar. Of the 23 states that had used, or 
planned in the next year to use, highway funds for transit projects, 15 
contributed to transit capital matches. ' In contrast, of 24 other states 
1. According to American Association of State Highway and Transpor-
tation Officials, Survey of State Aid to Urbanized Areas for Transportation, 
Washington, D.C., 1976. 
fog which information is at hand, only nine provide such aid. 
While the preceding argument indicates that the matching share can 
make a difference in the selection of the federal aid source, especially 
in times of fiscal scarcity, it should be noted that the issue of a 
required matching share can be outweighed by other considerations. For 
example, the response of the Public Land states to federal highway aid 
is not dissimilar to that of the other states, despite their more favor-
able matching terms. A more striking example of the states' disregard 
for more favorable matching terms appears in the case of the ADHS two-
lane versus four-lane choice. The Appalachian Regional Development Act 
authorized, and the ARC initially implemented, a 70% federal share (i.e., 
30% state match requirement). In 1966, however, due to a perceived 
shortfall in available funds to construct the ADHS, the four-lane share 
was reduced to 50% (although preliminary engineering and right-of-way 
remained at 70%). In 1974, all ADHS construction was again authorized 
at 70% federal share because the ABCD system was so funded. Thus, for 
the main ADHS construction effort to date - August 1966 through February 
1974 - there was a substantial inducement to construct two-lane instead 
of four-lane ADHS roads. However, the evidence indicates that the states 
generally ignored this matching differential and predominantly built 
four-lane roads, assuming higher highway taxes and capital debt in the 
process. 
We summarize: 
(1) Under conditions of fiscal scarcity, even small differentials 
in federal matching share can have an impact on state and 
local response to federal programs. 
(2) However, matching ratio differentials can be outweighed by 
other considerations. 
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It is of interest to note that the Surface Transportation Assistance 
Act of 1978 has increased the matching ratios of several programs, not-
ably ABC, ADHS, bridges, and transfers between programs. The current 
situation is depicted in Table 2. Note that from the recipients' point of 
view, a change from 70% to 85% is not seen as a 21% increase in federal 
share, but rather as a 50% decrease in their share (from 30c on the dollar 
to 15c per dollar). 
E. Formula Versus Discretionary Allocation  
The prime distinction between the formula/discretionary dimension and 
the categorical/block dimension (see next section), as we use the terms, is 
that the former entails varying degrees of latitude by the grantor agency, 
whereas the latter involves latitude on the recipient's part. That is, with 
the formula/discretionary case the grantor agency's freedom to distribute 
funds as it elects is the key; the degree of discretion may range from 
(almost) complete allocation freedom (as with project grants with no geo-
graphic requirements specified by the authorizing legislation) down to 
(almost) no discretionary latitude (as with allotted formula grants with the 
formula specified in the legislation). On the other hand, the categorical/ 
block dimension does not deal with how the recipients get their money; it 
deals with how they may spend it when they get it. Thus, a strongly cate-
gorical program might specify that funds be spent only on a narrowly-defined 
program; block grants would allow the recipient more freedom to spend the 
money as wished re-,ardless of how it was obtained. 
From the recipient's viewpoint, therefore, formula funds are received 
on a prescribed basis (e.g., based on population and population density for 
UMTA Section 5, through FY78), whereas discretionary grants must be applied 
_)4 
for on a project-by-project basis. Hence, a main advantage to formula 
allocations is their relatively assured nature. This eases the uncertain-
ties of planning and can have beneficial secondary effects. For one, state 
and local transportation people recognize their own job security as greater 
in association with the reliable highway program than with the transit pro-
gram. This has influenced the development of program staffs. Another 
advantage of formula programs is their simplified administration; it is not 
necessary to determine who is to receive what grant amounts. 
A look at transportation programs in the light of the degree of dis-
cretion available to grantor agencies is informative. The Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has specified 11 different types 
of grants
1 
along the continuum "degree of discretion exercised by grantor 
agency." A superposition of transportation programs along this continuum 
shows the following: major highway programs have traditionally occupied 
the least discretionary of the 11 slots; transit programs the most discre-
tionary; and airport programs have exhibited a hybrid behavior, appearing 
at both ends of the range simultaneously. There has been very little 
activity in the middle 7 or 8 slots. However, recent transportation fund-
ing shows departures from these traditional approaches. Both the airport 
and transit aid programs have moved to include or increase established 
formula-based apportionments for recipients, while highways are venturing 
into discretionary programs (with the changeover of the priority primary 
system to a discretionary program and the funding of $200 million per year 
as discretionary on the bridge program). 
1Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Categorical  
Grants: Their Role and Design, Washington, D.C., 1977, p. 110. 
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One may attempt to relate these shifts in discretion allowed grantor 
agencies to shifts in funding intents. (As our purpose here, however, is 
not the hard-and-fast delineation of funding intents, we proceed only at 
the speculative level.) An argument was made previously suggesting that 
the different highway programs have progressed through time from programs 
of national interest (intent 1) to motivational inducement (intent 3) to 
programs providing financial support (intent 4). On the other hand transit 
programs seem to be following the opposite path (due to energy problems): 
support to inducement to national interest. Can one therefore infer an 
underlying philosophy of funding national interest programs by formula 
grants and more supportive programs by discretionary allocations? 
Although an interesting conjecture, we think the above is not (and 
should not be) the case. A simpler, and quite different, rationale seems 
to be at work here. Define R as the ratio 
R = 	
project $ size  
recipient annual program size 
Note that a "large" R is obtained when a large portion of one's annual 
program must be spent on a single project. Such is the case with rail 
transit capital investments and airport runways, for example. On the other 
hand a "small" R is obtained in cases such as incremental highway improve-
ments and the relatively small cost of bus purchases. It appears sensible 
to reduce red-tape by allocating the smaller R-valued projects by formula. 
However, one should probably only incur the extra federal attention and 
uncertainty concomitant with discretionary funding in the case of those 
projects which consume a large proportion of one's annual program size. 
Although discretionary funds seem best suited to situations with 
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"large" R's, a key concern with this type of allocation is the equita-
bility of distribution among recipients and potential recipients. While 
this is always subject to debate, our analyses indicate a remarkably even 
distribution of UMTA Section 3 and Section 9 funds (and also Section 5) 
across urbanized areas on a per transit commuter basis (Table 5). 
Our interviews indicate that,all things being equal, recipients pre-
fer formula grants. But we must add that this does not preclude the use 
of available discretionary funds. A potential recipient may be expected 
to try for discretionary funds before spending his allotted funds. 
In summary we observe that: 
(1) Program intent relates only indirectly to type of allocation. 
(2) The ratio R seems to provide sensible guidance in the choice 
between use of formula or discretionary allocations. 
(3) Formula allocations have a relatively assured nature and are 
easier to administer than discretionary programs. 
(4) UMTA discretionary funds, at least, appear to be rather equit-
ably distributed (on a per transit commuter basis). 
F. Categorical Versus Block Grants  
As mentioned in the last section, the categorical/block dimension 
does not deal with how recipients get their money; it deals with how they 
may spend it when they get it. A strongly categorical program might imply 
a narrowly-defined program, whereas a block grant would allow the recipient 
more freedom. 
The ACIR has defined a general continuum
1 showing the range of 
1 


















A. Number of Projects 2512
b 
574 203 418 626 
B. UMTA Funds 
($ million) a 3850 3150 250 280 170 
C. Non-Rail UMTA Funds 
($ million) 2498 1805 250 274 170 
D. Total Costs (UMTA + 
Local)/Project 
($ million)c 4.37 13.29 2.32 2.58 0.48 
E. Average UMTA Funds/ 
UA ($ million) 14.41 126.00 11.90 4.81 1.04 
F. Average Non-Rail 
UMTA Funds/UA 
($ million) 9.36 72.19 11.90 4.73 1.04 
G. Average Non-Rail 
UMTA Funds per 
Capita ($)d 13.22 29.86 17.21 15.21 9.45 
H. Average Non-Rail 
UMTA Funds per 
Transit Commuter 
($)e, 	f 2.17 1.90 ( 2.23 
f 
2.26 2.17 
I. Average Section 3 
Non-Rail Funds per 
Transit Commuter 
($)e 1.44 1.36 1.45 1.49 1.42 
J. Average Section 9 
Non-Rail Funds per 
Transit Commuter 
($) e 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 
K. Average Section 5 
Non-Rail Capital 
Funds per Transit 
Commuter ($)e 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.13 




Commuter ($) e 0.51 0.38 0.52 0.60 0.49 
aThis analysis primarily uses an UMTA projects tape which includes 2512 
projects funded through June, 1977. These total to about $5.5 billion in 
UMTA funds and $11.0 billion total costs. Of the $5.5 billion in UNTA 
funds, $3.85 billion is attributed to specific UAs (and $1.35 billion of 
that is for rail projects). Of these, the analyses usually focus on 
762 Section 3 projects numbered Oxxx, excluding 6 numbered 7xxx (operat-
ing expenses), 5 numbered 8xxx (to UMTA itself), 7 numbered 9xxx (loans), 
and 1 numbered Oxxx which appeared irregular; 95 Section 5 capital pro-
jects and 494 Section 5 operating projects, excluding 1 numbered 8xxx 
(to UMTA itself); and 1024 Section 9 technical studies. In addition 
there are 76 Section 16 (elderly/handicapped) grants, 37 Section 23 
grants (highway transfers - discussed in the following section of this 
report), and 4 Section 83 grants (Appalachian Regional Commission funds 
involved). Categorization as "rail" or "non-rail" reflects our judgment 
from UMTA tape description. 
b
691 projects were not attributable to a specific UA, based on listed 
recipient and project description- 
cThis tally reflects allocation of the $11.0 billion in total costs by 
UA category; it does not correspond to the various breakdowns of UMTA 
costs which are aggregated by UAs. 
d
Computed for each UA based on 1970 population, then averaged over the 
UAa in a size category. 
eTransit commuters are for each UA based on the percent in the SMSA (standard 
metropolitan statistical area) who used public transportation to work during 
census week, 1970, multiplied by the UA population, and by 52 weeks/year. 
The ratios are computed for each UA, then averaged over the UAs in a size 
category. Data on transit commuters was missing for 24 cities who received 
UMTA funding; 23 in the smallest size category, 1 in the 200,000-500 cate-
gory. Within rounding, categories I, J, K, and L sum to category H. "Tran-
sit commuters" does include rail which we exclude from these tallies. 
(Inclusion of rail funds raises the amount for UAs over 1,000,000 to $2.37; 
the amount fn.- !um 2no_non-snn rn ? ?A 
recipient's discretion in use of funds. At the low end of usage discre-
tion, the ACIR lists project, formula-project, formula, and open-end reim-
bursement grants; in the middle are placed block grants; and at the high 
end is general revenue sharing. In actuality, the continuum is not as sim- 
ple to operationalize as it might seem. First, the wide scope of categories 
legislated in transportation makes direct rankings difficult, although it 
is agreed that the preponderance of programs is categorical.
I 
Second, it 
is the absolute amount of user leeway that provides flexibility; this lati-
tude may be clouded by the context (or even semantics) of the program. For 
example, one could postulate a "strongly categorical program" (say, allocat-
ing funds on a strict formula basis for the purpose of advancing "only the 
maintenance aspect of surface-only transportation systems") which would 
allow for more flexibility than most any presently existing block grants. 
But regardless of how programs get classified or ranked, one must not over-
look the sentiment among recipients that the easing of program restrictions 
is very desirable and will likely result in more effective overall usage 
of federal funds. 
The strictly specified focus of a categorical program may well be 
necessary to achieve strictly specified goals. For example, a study per-
formed by Charles River Associates concludes that bus purchases in 1974-
1975 were approximately double what they would have been absent the federal 
1There are programs specifying that highways should be built, but some 
are for Interstates and others for ABCD. Some are for capital construction; 
others are for rehabilitation. One program is for a part of highways -
bridges; 16 others (in effect in the 70's) are for safety. Some programs 
are for mass transit: UMTA Section 5 is for either capital construction or 
operating assistance, but at different matching ratios. And another program 






and Rao (see Appendix C) have argued that the federal 
aid program for the Interstate system stimulated state expenditures. Park 
and Porter conclude that the five core ADHS states increased capital outlay, 
as a result of the ADHS program, relative to nine comparison states. Even 
bonded-indebtedness and gas tax rates were increased (see Figure 8 and 
Table 6 and Appendix D). But the question is, should buses double, should 
the ADHS program stimulate the region, and should UMTA stimulate capital 
investment in preference to maintenance, and rail in preference to bus? 
The implication is that, particularly with no agreed-on intermodal 
national transportation plan, strong categorical programs should be 
advanced with caution. Hany transportation people (and we, too) 
agree with the conclusion of John Wells et al. that it is desirable to mini-
mize the federal influences constraining local decision-makers in the 
absence of a clear-cut national objective.
3 
We add three further notes. First, a program of national interest may 
warrant a restricted user focus initially, but as the program matures and 
funding intent changes, user discretion should be increased. This appears 
to be happening, for example, with the provision of increased transfer 
percentages among ABCD programs. Second, we note the existence of "hybrids," 
1
Charles River Associates, Inc., Subsidies, Capital Formation and  
Technological Change: Mass Transit, prepared for Experimental Technology 
Incentives Program, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C., 
November 1977, p. 177. 
2
L. Sherman, The Impacts of the Federal Aid Highway Program on State  
and Local Highway Expenditures, U.S. Department of Transportation, 
February 1975. 
3
John D. Wells et al., An Analysis of the Financial and Institutional  
Framework for Urban Transportation Planning and Investment, Institute for 
Defense Analysis, Arlington, VA; prepared for the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Policy, Plans, and International Affairs, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, June 1975 (PB-265-245). 
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Figure 8. Total Capital Outlay for All Highways 
Table 6. State Highway Bonds - Outstanding Debt 
at the End of Year ($ Million) 
Year 
Mean 1961 1965 1969 1972 
ADHS Core 
States 216.6 254.6 348.2 488.2 
Comparison 
States 97.1 144.9 171.3 224.3 
Difference 119.5 109.7 176.9 263.9 
Source: U.S. DOT, Highway Statistics; Summary to 1975, 
Washington, D.C. 
where a program is nominally categorical, but in reality acts somewhat like 
a block grant due to relaxed transfer provisions (again, the ABCD programs 
provide an example). The rationale for loosened categorical constraints 
appears to be mainly political - the nominal categoricality is useful for 
Congress to demonstrate to the constituents back home that they have been 
active in meeting a particular need. The loosening caters to the preferences 
of state and local transportation professionals for flexibility in allocat-
ing fiscal resources to areas of greatest perceived need. Third, the sub-
ject of red tape is often associated with discussions of user freedom. One 
interpretation of the upsurge in non-federal aid highway system activity in 
the 1970's is that states were taking that route as a recourse from federal 
red tape, e.g., environmental impact statement requirements. Regression 
analyses show a striking increase in administrative costs between 1957-1961, 
when $1.00 of federal highway aid was associated with $0.04 additional 
administrative expenses, and 1971-1975 when $1.00 corresponded to about 
$0.14 additional cost (Appendix C). (The increase in cost may be an accept-
able price if it results in better planning or improvement in state 
highway construction design standards.) 
In summary, we note that: 
(1) Categorical grants should be specified with national orienta-
tion (intent 1). 
(2) Block grants should be used when the intent is fiscal aid 
(intent 4). 
(3) The reduction of red tape is obviously desirable. 
As mentioned, the 1978 legislation includes changes along this dimen-
sion. Among these are the formation of a new categorical program with the 
separate appropriation for the Interstate 3-R program (maintenance); and an 
increase in the percentage transferable between A and B funds (from 40% 
to 50%) and between A and C programs (from 20% to 50%), thus making the 
ABC program act more like a block grant. 
G. Open- Versus Closed-endedness  
We oaly briefly touch on this dimension by noting that closed-
endedness of a program, by which we mean limited, 'DLit specific, federal 
commitment to the program, can be a plus from the recipient's viewpoint. 
This helps the recipient planner in obtaining local funds (say from the 
state legislature), besides making long-range planning and administration 
easier. Such was the case in drumming up support for the early Interstate 
program and for the ADHS. However, closed-endedness is not without its 
"strings." As capital investment in the Interstate program is decreasing, 
states are finding tighter federally-imposed deadlines and obligation time 
limits that may cause problems in some cases. 
A closely specified commitment for programs with nationally oriented 
intent (intent 1) or with a regional commitment (intent 2) seems logical, 
whereas such a commitment to intent 4 programs appears unnecessary, in 
general, to us. But this issue of open and closed funding commitments goes 
beyond just program planning and project administration. It also relates 
to funding sources, fund delivery mechanisms, fund allocation systems, and 
fund availability. These areas are left for future research, except to 
note that the time aspect can be quite important here. For example, the 
provision of contract authority, which enables recipients to obligate funds 
as soon as they are allocated, has given states a six-month head start in 
the highway program. And of considerable importance for airport alloca-
tions is that sufficient duration of availability of funds for obligation 
be allowed for accumulation for larger projects. 
H. Further Issues: Fiscal Scarcity and Equity  
Federal policy takes effect through the actions of state and local 
governments. Not surprisingly, their role can be highly influential in 
determining the effects of federal funding policies. This poses a diffi-
culty for the analyst. On one hand, it is desirable to generalize on a 
national basis; on the other hand, one recognizes the idiosyncrasies of 
each state or locality. We suggest that the most suitable and most useful 
level of analysis is intermediate in nature. Focusing primarily on the 
states, we attempt to categorize their responses in a manner that will be 
helpful in understanding the effects of past policies and essential in for-
mulating new ones. Toward this end we now focus on highways and then will 
turn back briefly to transit. 
Discussions with state officials identified two items worthy of study. 
One was that a new era of fiscal scarcity arrived in 1973 (due to gasoline, 
conservation following the oil embargo), replacing a prior extended time of 
abundance. The second was to distinguish among the states with respect to 
the extent to which they rely on federal highway aid. Together, these 
notions of distinctions over time (pre- and post-1973) and among states can 
help to explain the effects of federal aid policies. 
The notion of a lasting period of fiscal constraint is of great con-
cern in its implications for federal aid strategies. State officials sug-
gested that this has led to a major change in their responsiveness to 
federal aid policies, particularly with ABCD programs. In previous years, 
federal aid was a useful contribution, but not a major force in determining 
the relative scale of construction activities. With fiscal constraints, 
however, states attempt to maximize their construction by taking full 
advantage of available federal funds and the most advantageous matching 
features. Since 1975, at least one state has stopped providing aid to 
local governments for highways other than to match federal aid; several 
have clear t- at,3 policies to build only federal aid projects. Some 
states have even foregone allocated federal highway aid (an unheard-of 
happening in the past). 
However, upon searching for statistical evidence to corroborate the 
specific instances of state fiscal scarcity generally and within the lim-
ited time frame for available data, we encountered a different picture. 
For instance: 
1. The percentage of state capital outlay going to nonfederal aid 
roads was 13 percent in 1975, down only slightly from 14 percent 
in 1973, and up from the 6 to 8 percent level of the 1957-1969 ' 
period. 
2. The ratio of capital outlay to total highway outlay was 52 per-
cent in 1975, versus 51 percent in 1973, down only slightly 
from the peak Interstate years at 57 percent in 1965. 
3. The rate of obligation of federal aid apportionments slipped 
somewhat in 1973 and 1974, but it had recovered for the 
Interstate system by 1975. 1 
4. States were able to respond to a massive release of impounded 
funds on a few months notice in 1975. 
The picture is markedly unclear and deserving of further analysis. 
One way to begin to clarify the recent financial picture is to classify 
states according to fiscal scarcity. As an illustration consider that in 
spring 1978, Illinois announced a three-fold increase in fiscal year 1979 
highway expenditures, while at the same time Pennsylvania was completing 
an entire year without obligating any federal aid funds. There are any 
1. On average, states had fully obligated all their current year 
Interstate apportionments and were about 19% into their upcoming year ones 
by June 1975; whereas in June 1973, they had about 29% of that fiscal year's 
apportionment unobligated. 
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number of dimensions on which one could attempt to group the states to 
understand their patterns of response to federal aid programs. We have 
focused on two: reliance on the federal aid and extent of highway needs. 
Table 7 illustrates the extremes of state dependence on federal funds. 
The highly dependent states tend to be the western, sparsely populated 
ones (nine of the 12 Public Land states are included in the 13 "dependers"). 1 
As mentioned earlier, the measurement of transportation needs is diffi-
cult and controversial. We attempted a simple framework for understanding 
state response through the two dimensions of reliance on the federal govern-
ment and extent of highway needs, looking at a number of need measures in 
the process (Appendix B). Additional work needs to be done here. This 
work may be informative, for instance in indicating which states may dis-
regard federal aid unless the terms are highly attractive (e.g., low needs 
case, especially for highly self-reliant recipients), or which states may 
minimally match the available federal aid (e.g., highly dependent recipi-
ents, especially when their needs are low). Attempts to predict each 
state's performance after the '73 oil embargo based on such factors as 
"fiscal capability" and "need" have proved unsuccessful (Appendix B). 
Similar work by Miller
2 
resulted in relatively little variance 
Pxplain?A; perhaps Cooper's classification of states 3 will resu!L in 
1
In Rhode Island's case, a large share of the federal funds received 
in the past four years was for advanced construction of the Interstate 
System. These funds essentially reimburse Rhode Island for the federal 
share of Interstate projects which the state financed in the 1960's 
through special bond issues. See Cooper, op. cit., p. 37. 
2
E. Miller, "Effects of City Size and Population Density on Highway 
Usage and Needs," The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 37, 
No. 3, 1978, pp. 295-307. 
3
Cooper, op. cit., pp. 37-49. 
47 Table 7. Fiscal Capability Measure 1: State 
Dependence on Federal Funds 
State 
"Dependers" 
















































































Note: % dependence is computed by dividing federal aid by total state 
highway expenditures on all roads, including construction and main-
tenance. Only relatively extreme states are listed and those states 
below dashed lines in each category should be considered "marginal." 
Only 39 states are listed. The other states are between 25 
and 30 percent dependence and hence are not placed in either 
fiscal capability category. 
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better predictors in this important matter. 
For transit, the focus shifts to the local government level. As in 
the case of highways, transit needs are growing dramatically, especially 
for operating expenses. The federal role is becoming increasingly dominant, 
especially for capital improvements. There are deep concerns about the 
future ability of cities to support transit. Parallel issues thus arise 
in terms of formulating federal aid programs suitable to the abilities of 
the potential recipients at different points in time. In particular, we 
uncovered indications that large cities are more responsive to federal aid 
opportunities--in rapidity and extent of response (Appendix A). The states 
are increasingly participating in support of transit, adding another degree 
of complexity to the formulation of appropriate federal aid programs. One 
might categorize the states according to the level and type of state support 
provided in assessing the responsiveness to federal aid strategies. 
To summarize, the characteristics of the recipients and the general 
economic situation of the time affect the response to federal funding pro-
grams. When resources are tightly constrained, a high matching ratio may 
be needed to allow participation, and the recipient contribution is unlikely 
to exceed the minimum matching requirement. 
As a "footnote," we briefly consider equity. Equity is invariably 
an issue in the discussion of federal funding provisions; the major focus 
of concern lies in the redistribution of funds. Programs can be questioned 
as to the equitability of shared costs among users (e.g., cost allocation 
among highway or airport users contributing to the respective trust funds) 
or the propriety of support (e.g., general treasury support for a regional 
transportation program). Again, national interest can provide a good ration-
ale for federal aid. In the absence of a strong national interest, one 
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should consider whether federal funding involvement is desirable. It may 
be where non-federal units cannot generate sufficient resources, although 
revenue sharing may be a suitable response then in lieu of discrete federal 
aid programs. The option of no federal involvement, leaving funding to 
lower units of government often deserves consideration. Of course, in some 
cases, federal involvement to redistribute funds may be quite desirable. 
Then a suitable definition of equity must be agreed upon: should it be 
equal average (which is what we have used), or should it be equal absolute 
or equal marginal? 
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III. Perspectives: The 1978 Surface Transportation Act  
A. Background  
This section draws very heavily on comments received from some 21 
parties-at-interest to the Surface Transportation Act and, more broadly, 
future transportation policy (see Acknowledgements). Our purpose here was 
to obtain a wide spectrum of views. Therefore, we do not claim that the 
opinions obtained are necessarily representative of the transportation 
mainstream or in agreement with ours. We try to present a consensus of 
opinion on particular issues whenever possible; in addition, specific 
points of view are noted. We then try to draw these perspectives together 
with the understanding of the implications of federal funding structures 
developed in Section II. Our hope is that this two-stage process will 
enable the interested reader to gain from the perspectives of those sur-
veyed even if they disagree with our conclusions. 
As discussed in Section I, we recognized the limited focus of our work. 
Our emphasis is on the structures used in federal aid transportation pro-
grams. As noted, during the course of our analysis we recognized that 
assessment of the funding structures could not take place without explicit 
consideration of the federal funding intents (Figure 1). As we now move to 
consider the 1978 Surface Transportation Act, we will retain the same per-
spective. That is, our primary focus is on the structural funding features 
of the Act and the intents to which they are directed. We should be very 
clear to indicate that the resultant analysis is by no means comprehensive; 
this is not an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of the Act in meeting 
transportation objectives (again, recall Figure 1). 
Table 8 presents the major changes in funding provisions provided by 
the 1978 Act. These are the aspects to which we direct our attention. 
1 
2 
Table 8. 	Major Changes in Funding Provisions of the 
Surface Transportation Act of 1978 
Provision 	 Change 
Transfers between Primary 
(A) and Secondary (B) 
Highway Systems 
Transfers between Primary 
and Urban Systems 
Ceiling up from 40% to 50% 
Ceiling up from 20% to 50% 
3 Federal matching share for 
funds transferred from 
Increased from 70% to 85% 
Interstate to Highways 
4 Federal matching share for 
funds transferred from 
Increased from 80% to 85% 
Interstate to Transit 
5. Federal matching share for Increased from 70% to 75% 
Primary, Secondary and 
Urban (ABCD) Highways 
6. Federal matching share for Increased from 70% to 80% 
Appalachian Development 
Highway System 
7. Interstate acceleration Environmental Impact Statement and con- 
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8. Bridge Replacement Program 
expansion 
9. Transit Program changes 
10. "3R" (resurfacing, restoring, 
and rehabilitating) Program 
changes 
tract deadlines; no new designations; 
reduced time to obligate from 3.5 to 1.5 
years; allow states to borrow (against 
future obligations) from obligational 
authority not used by other states; 
federal aid applicable to interest too. 
Greatly increased allocations; formula 
based (instead of discretionary) on needs 
survey; also $200 million discretionary 
fund; federal share increased from 75% to 
80%; between 15% and 35% to be spent on 
non-federal-aid system bridges; functional 
as well as structural criteria approved. 
Routine capital investments, such as buses, 
moved to Section 5 (formula) from Section 3 
(discretionary); subcategories defined in 
Section 5; apportionment formula changed; 
rural transit program (Section 18) set 
out. 
Interstate 3R as a separate authorization 
at 75% federal share on a separate for-
mula basis; minimum of 20% of A, B 
funds to be used for 3R work. 
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Following the format of the questions posed to the transportation profes-
sionals, we consider in turn: 
1. Easing of the provisions for transfer of funds among highway 
programs; 
2. Increased federal matching share for funds transferred from the 
Interstate highway program; 
3. Increased federal matching share for the Primary, Secondary, 
Urban Extensions, and Urban System (ABCD) highways, as well as 
for the Appalachian Development Highway System; 
4. Provisions to accelerate completion of the Interstate system; 
5. The greatly expanded bridge replacement program; 
6. Changes in the transit program; 
7. Changes in the 3R (resurfacing, restoring, and rehabilitating) 
programs. 
B. Interview Results  
1. Easing of Transfers Among Highway Programs  
Most impressively, there were essentially no responses (from our 21 
parties-at-interest) damning the move. The sentiment was that the changes 
in the '78 legislation should modestly increase the number of transfers 
(although a number saw essentially no change as likely), creating more 
rational highway systems. The increased flexibility in deciding where to 
allocate funds was likely to be helpful to many states and result in more 
effective overall usage of federal funds. 
Two concerns were expressed, however. One respondent was uneasy about 
possible long-term transfer patterns distorting the overall federal aid sys-
tems, but did not see this as likely. One other was concerned about undue 
transfers away from urban needs, but did not really anticipate significant 
changes either. 
Suggestions included the following. One party noted that reducing 
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federal administrative drag over transfers might be more important than 
increasing the ceilings. Some would like to see changes go much further 
toward easing the transfer restrictions. Bruce Campbell of Fay, Spofford, 
and Thorndike, Inc., states 
The obvious federal philosophy behind the ABCD allocations is 
that 'the states would not be competent to allocate properly or 
might shortchange the rural or other roads, so we the Congress 
will have to do it for them.' This type of thinking should 
have died a long time ago. . . . Many thousands of dollars and 
man-days are wasted in each state to keep the books on federal 
funds. . . . Behind all this bookkeeping, the states have 
learned how to get around any federal limitations by allocating 
state funds as they wish. . . . In short, it is time for the 
Congress and FHWA to justify the need and reasons for alloca-
tions. It is very doubtful they can. 
Broadening the critique to draw in issues about allocations between high-
ways and transit, Gary Nelson of the Sierra Club adds: 
As I see it, the existing categorical restrictions are still 
very serious regarding transit vs. roads and construction vs. 
maintenance of both transit and roads. The (ABCD) modifica-
tions are just placebos really. Until a revenue-sharing 
approach is used, requiring only geographic and no program-
matic restrictions, federal policy will continue to be an 
unwarranted distortion of local decision making. 
2. Increase in Federal Matching Share for Funds Transferred from  
the Interstate Program  
In general, our respondents foresaw relatively little effect from 
these changes (now an 85% match for funds transferred to either highways 
or mass transit). Only two respondents anticipated much increased trans- 
fer activity due to the increases in federal shares. There are some inter-
esting speculations as to the net effect on the extent of transfers from 
highway to transit projects. Transfers to transit may be inhibited by 
uncertainty in general fund appropriations to cover them. On the other 
hand, energy shortages and gasoline price increases could encourage trans-
fers to transit. Furthermore, the change in provisions could encourage 
political action to make cases for transfer transit projects. 
The rationale for establishing these matching ratios is open to ques-
tion. To quote Nelson: 
The resulting 85% match for non-Interstate programs appears tk: 
me to he a political compromise with no logical basis . . . 
political factors behind the trade-in are relatively so great, 
either way, that the modest increase in the transit match will 
not be a big factor. I do have some concern for raising the 
alternative highway match to 85% up from the previous 70% how-
ever. This is obviously a relatively bigger incentive to build 
roads (i.e., with funds transferred from the Interstate program). 
. . . I feel that some remedial compensation is required so that 
the transit alternative has some edge on the road substitution. 
While this may seem to violate my dictum on trade-in equitability, 
the barrier to the transit trade-in is still operating expense 
and in this sense an equal road/transit trade-in is still a dis-
tortion in favor of the road. 
3. Increase in Federal Share for ABCD and Appalachian Highways  
The perceptions of our transportation professionals on this issue can 
be well accounted for if we consider both the direct and the indirect impli-
cations, both for fiscally prosperous and for fiscally strapped states. The 
dominant perception is that an increased federal share without commensurate 
increase in the level of federal funding implies a decreased "span" of fed-
eral programs. In other words, these changes are likely to result in a 
decreased level of programmatic effort. (We do note a minority view which 
suggests that an increased federal share will lead to an increased emphasis 
on the program involved, but we believe this is better explained in terms of 
interaction with the fiscal condition of the recipient.) 
The majority of states are perceived to be fiscally prosperous today, 
although the future is perceived as fiscally hazardous. An increased fed-
eral aid share on a given program to these states will result in less pres-
sure for the states to invest in that program. (Again, this assumes that 
any increase in federal aid level is insufficient to make up for the lost 
leverage due to the reduced local share.) This implies more flexibility 
with any state funds thereby made "excess" of matching requirements to 
spend where the state wishes. These freed-up state funds may be spent on 
the system in question, on another system, on maintenance, or so on. In 
general the prediction is that there will be a decrease in the iev, I .)f 
construction on the program involved in most instances. 
For fiscally strapped states (e.g., Pennsylvania in recent years), 
the results are almost the opposite. The increased federal share should 
increase pressure to invest in that program. The state (e.g., legislators) 
should be attracted by the high leverage on the state's own funds. 
Some interesting indirect effects of the increase in matching share 
are worth considering. For one, pressure may arise for an increased 
level of federal funding on the program in question as prosperous states 
have "excess" funds without federal dollars available to match with their 
funds. Specific implications may be rather subtle. For instance, in 
Georgia, the increase in federal share for the ABCD system is not directly 
relevant to the state revenue allocation process. Georgia DOT presents the 
legislature with their indicated programmatic needs along with an indication 
of how much funding is available from the federal government in general, and, 
simply, how much they need in the way of state funds. On the other hand 
Georgia uses general funds (rather than motor fuel receipts) for work on 
the Appalachian Development Highway System. As a result of the increase in 
federal share for this system, Georgia DOT may have to "give back" funds to 
the state that are not required for matching purposes. This will result in 
no increase in programmatic effort on the Appalachian system in Georgia, 
although the increased federal share to 80% may help states like Pennsylvania. 
Or from another perspective, Appalachian highways do not compete with the 
ABCD system in Georgia; therefore a differential in federal matching share 
is not particularly relevant. 
Provisions to Accelerate Completion of the Interstate System  
The combination of incentives, deadlines, and the prospect of active 
states gaining obligational authority at the expense of laggard states 
should serve to accelerate completion of the Interstate. However, effects 
are not likely to be uniform across the states and there are some trouble-
some quirks in the arrangement. States that have been lagging in their 
Interstate construction are likely to be stimulated to build or transfer 
funds (to other highway or transit projects) by the deadlines and the threat 
of the loss of obligational authority. Some active states will accelerate 
their Interstate construction as they push ahead to pick up the obligational 
authority from laggards. Other states already going as fast as practical 
will not significantly change their operations in response to the act. It 
is interesting that with one exception, the deadline for preparation of 
environmental impact statements was not seen as a serious barrier. This 
may be a perceived lack of credibility of the deadlines - people almost 
oxpect such deadlines to be extended as necessary. According to the AAA, 
removal of budget constraints on obligations (up to the full capacity of 
the Trust Fund) would do more for accelerating completion than any other 
strategy." 
Secondary effects of the Interstate acceleration are likely. In par-
ticular, as Interstate construction priority increases, the priority of 
other programs (e.g., ABCD, Appalachian Highways) will decrease given finite 
available resources. Gary Ceccucci of UMTA points out a possible untoward 
effect of the reallocation on a "first-come" basis of lapsed Interstate 
funds. This is apt to favor incompleted "rural" segments in fiscally 
conservative states, over "urban" projects. 
The combination of accelerated Interstate work and the prohibition of 
defining new Interstate pieces to take the place of ones unlikely to be 
built and making transfers to other highway or transit projects more attrac-
tive should help wrap up the Interstate system. However, there is a certain 
nominal character to this "completion." As Pat Webster (National Transpor-
tation Policy Commission) sees it, we are simply "redefining it out of 
existence." The sense of this strategy is questioned by Bruce Campbell: 
On this latter point, I for one believe the congress is again 
mixed up on their priorities (as with ABCD allocations). The 
Interstate system is the backbone of our transportation system. 
It should be a dynamic system, with improvements, amendments, 
additions, changes, etc. as needed as time goes on. Yet, the 
Congress says it must be wrapped up immediately (in government, 
dates like 1983 and 1986 are tomorrow). Also, because of popu-
lation growth, we can expect up to a 50 per cent increase in 
car registrations and vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by 1990. 
That's like locking the stable before the horses arrive. What's 
the rush? Why must the Interstate system planning and construc-
tion be rushed? Just so the Congress won't have to talk about 
it? What does the Congress, or anyone else for that matter, 
have in mind to absorb VMT increases or to adjust to new needs? 
5. Changes in the Bridge Replacement Program  
In general, transportation people perceive bridge needs as real and 
that this program will greatly increase work on bridges. The substantial 
scale of the new bridge program can provide a good fit for those states 
winding down their Interstate effort, but it may be tough for those with 
much Interstate work to go as well. The availability of professionals 
needed to conduct the needs inventory and to prepare projects may be a bind 
for some states. Hence, there may have been some advantages in a more grad-
ual buildup of this program. 
In general people approve of the priority needs basis for bridge pro-
gram allocations, even though the inventory procedure will be difficult for 
some states (not so for others). The flexibility to replace or upgrade, for 
structural or functional reasons, is generally perceived as good. This pro-
gram is seen as likely to remedy previous distortions due to categorical 
restrictions. For example, in some cases roads were widened, but bridges 
were not; in some cases bridge work not affiliated with an ABCD road pro-
ject was simply not done. 
The small matching differential (80% for bridges vs. 75% for ABCD) is 
not perceived as very important. It may help some poor localities and 
states to participate in the program. Furthermore, some states will help 
with the local match (i.e., on non-federal aid roads) 
The provision of funds through a large formula allocation program with 
an additional discretionary allocation is perceived as quite appropriate. 
In general, highway people prefer the predictability and incorruptibility 
of formula programs. Yet no one seems to doubt the availability of suitable 
projects for this partially discretionary program. 
Several see great needs off the federal aid system and like the flexi-
bility provided by funding for off-system bridges. Several others seriously 
question the logic of federal aid here in the absence of a significant 
national interest in such bridges. As the AAA puts it: 
Extension of federal aid to off-system bridges, however, can seri-
ously reduce the financial capability to upgrade and preserve the 
most important (from a federal interest viewpoint) road network. 
Roads and bridges which are not on federal-aid systems should be 
funded with state and local funds and not with federal aid. 
We note that the inclusion of off-system bridges is attributed to a politi-
cal decision, resulting, in part, from a major push by the national associa-
tion of counties for such aid. 
A further voice of dissent should also be noted, "As usual, Congress 
has tried to solve the problem in the way that the problem was originally 
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created: by throwing a pot of categorical money at it. I disagree entirely 
with the concept of the program." Indeed, this new categorical program 
will also force state and local priority allocation decisions between this 
and other aid programs. Campbell notes, "Of course, the 'between 15% and 
35%' set up three new funding categories to be tracked by states, bringing 
categories to above 70 in number." 
6. Transit Program Changes  
Changed provisions will allow an easier flow of federal funds for rou-
tine capital needs (buses). Shifting such capital improvements to the 
formula program is generally perceived as good, although some funds may go 
unused because local authorities lack funds for their matching share. 
Furthermore, reductions in the scale of the discretionary section 3 program 
will make it more difficult to start new programs. 
Professor George Smerk of Indiana University points out that the pro-
vision of section 18 aid to help small cities with transit is an important 
change. 1 This may give a real boost to such efforts, or it may just sub-
stitute for state aid. Allen notes that as programs rely more heavily upon 
formula allocations, the precise composition of that formula can become 
very important.
2 
The increased number of subcategories results in dividing a given pot 
of money more finely. This may cause problems in matching the dollars to 
actual needs. Gary Ceccucci points out: 
1G. M. Smerk, "Federal Mass Transportation Policy: The Surface 
Transportation Act of 1978," Transportation Journal, Spring 1979. 
2G. R. Allen, "An Analysis of Subsidy Issues in Public Transportation," 
Traffic Quarterly, October 1976, pp. 595-614. 
Ul) 
It is ironic that the STA Act has made the highway assistance 
program more flexible and discretionary, while increasing the 
number of categorical, formula-based transit programs. 
In addition some people look harshly upon the continued distinction between 
capital and operating expenditures, considering this to be a distortion of 
local transportation priorities. 
7. The 3R Programs and the Issue of Federal Support for Maintenance  
The 3R efforts are generally seen as highly useful. As the American 
Trucking Association puts it, 
In many cases, the broadened 'construction' definition will 
permit '3R' work that was formerly called maintenance to be 
classified as capital improvement, and thus eligible for fed-
eral aid. This is a positive step. . . . 
States approve the 3R program, but don't welcome federal aid on "straight" 
maintenance because of anticipated red tape problems and patronage jobs. 
Several respondents noted that they approved separate status for the 
Interstate 3R program, but strongly disapproved the decreased federal share 
at 75%. In tune with the general objection of undue federal interference 
in local allocation decisions, there was some resentment at the 20% require-
ment for ABCD 3R work. This was perceived as "unnecessary, undesirable, 
and too restrictive." Yet most respondents feel that they will do more 
than the 20% level anyway. 
An intriguing observation was that an increased level of support for 
the railroads could prove an effective way to reduce Interstate 3R costs. 
C. Synthesis  
We now synthesize the funding parameter aspects of the 1978 STA with 
our results from section II. This synthesis will be organized by funding-
package dimensions rather than by features of the act. 
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1. Level and Matching Ratio 
Our respondents believe that the ABCD and ADHS increases in matching 
ratio will decrease overall program sizes. In particular, they feel that 
fiscally-strapped states will increase program size, while more prosperous 
states will decrease their sizes. (As the perception is that there are 
more prosperous states than fiscally-strapped, the national effect will be 
toward decreased program effort.) One interesting indirect effect is that 
states might request increased federal spending to pick up the resulting 
slack in program size. Another indirect effect is related by Gary Nelson 
and reflects concern for the impact of increased federal involvement on 
localities: 
An analysis of mine for NY in 1976 showed that the localities 
were spending $1 billion of their own local revenue bases for 
highways whereas the State was passing back only about 16c on 
the dollar of highway user revenues raised from localities. My 
contention is that making transport more of a state-federal game 
by increasing overall federal amounts will just encourage the 
States to keep more revenues in their coffers for State programs 
and continue to short-change localities. The fiscally tight 
localities will, of course, dominate over a continually deter-
iorating local system. 
Regarding the absolute level desired for federal matching shares, our 
respondents did not present a uniform stance. There was some sentiment for 
uniformity, but they felt it was not a simple matter to determine an even-
handed balance between capital and operating assistance support levels, or 
between highway and transit programs, because of differences in the apparent 
relative cost of operations, for example. (One thoughtful suggestion to 
better take this into account is the notion of providing funding on the 
basis of life cycle costing, to not unduly encourage capital investment. 1 
1
M. Wachs, and J. Ortner, "Capital Grants and Recurrent Subsidies: 
A Dilemma in American Transportation Policy," Transportation, Vol. 8, 1979, 
p. 17. 
Somewhat along these lines, there was considerable sentiment to provide 
Interstate n 3R" aid at the same 90% rate as the Interstate construction.) 
Some of our respondents suggested a smaller federal share in programs that 
did not reflect compelling national interest. In our earlier draft report 
(July 1978) we made a suggestion to that effect as well. Now we disagree. 
Given that the intent of a funding program is not primarily to stimulate 
recipient investment (intent 3, Table 1), a smaller federal share is gen-
erally not going to be appropriate. If the aim is to provide fiscal relief 
to the recipient, the lower federal share may exclude participation by some 
potential recipients. Most importantly, the smaller federal share will 
leverage additional state and local investment in the program in question. 
This is not appropriate since we began by asserting that the program was 
not of compelling national interest; hence there is no rationale for induc-
ing recipients to invest more than they otherwise would choose to do. 
On the other hand, there are pitfalls in high federal matching shares 
as well. While these may indeed broaden program participation, they are 
likely to induce pressure for an increased federal funding level to main-
tain programmatic effort. Most seriously, high federal matching shares 
induce uneconomic, low benefit/cost ratio projects. Simply put, at 5c or 
10c on the dollar, almost any project can be attractive to local decision 
makers. 
Any future study of matching shares ought to consider the role of the 
states as well. Some states provide support to their local communities in 
meeting matching share requirements, on certain sorts of projects. For 
instance, a 1976 survey by the American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation officials found that 24 of 47 states reporting contributed 
to transit capital matching requirements. This could be a major influence 
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on the course of federal aid investments. It would be quite interesting to 
compare the investment profiles across different federal aid programs accord-
ing to the matching support provided by the respective states. 
From our perspective, analysis of the ABCD and ADHS matching ratio 
increases in the 1978 act again rests heavily upon the perceived funding 
intent. As we perceive the intent for the ABCD system to be chiefly finan-
cial relief for the states, decreased leverage and associated increased 
state flexibility in allocating state funds is a good step. The Appalachian 
Development Highway System, on the other hand, is seen by us as reflecting 
regional development intent. We thus support a categorical program in this 
instance, with a matching ratio to be carefully balanced according to recipi-
ent ability to lead to the largest sensible programmatic effort. 
We suggest that it would be valuable to monitor the actual ABCD pro-
gram levels to see how these change from before the passage of the 1978 Act. 
It would be particularly interesting to track the patterns of federal and 
state investment in these programs as a function of state financial condition 1 
 to see if our assessment is correct. 
2. Formula Versus Discretionary Grants  
Concerning formula vs. discretionary allocations, most professionals 
lean toward the formula based on continuity to enhance planning possibili-
ties and the absence of possibilities for corruption of the allocation pro-
cess. However, it is noted that formulas cannot perfectly match all needs, 
thus contributing to under- and over-building at the same time. In some 
cases formula grants may spread the resources so thin that many recipients 
1
T. W. Cooper, The State Highway Finance Outlook, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Program and Policy 
Planning, December 1978. 
don't get enough to make useful investments. Discretionary grants are 
able to handle projects large in scale relative to a recipient's program 
budget. A disadvantage of discretionary allocations is that they tend to 
encourage ad hoc projects. These in turn are more liable to cost overruns 
since there may be less incentive for the recipient to learn or to establish 
credibility with the sponsor for future projects.
1 
With respect to the 1978 changes specifically, we view the bridge move 
to some discretionary funding as good because of the existence of large "R" 
projects in this domain (see Section IIE). Correspondingly, we see the 
shift of routine transit capital needs (buses) to a formula program as wise. 
3. Categorical Versus Block Grants  
In the categorical/block grant dimension, the 1978 STA eased transfers 
among highway programs (as well as transfers from interstate projects to 
highways or mass transit), formed a new categorical program for bridges 
(including aid for non-federal bridges), and increased the number of sub-
categories in a transit program. The sentiment among transportation pro-
fessionals weighs heavily for fewer categorical restrictions. Bruce 
Campbell states: 
As for the Act, reduction in categories (as mentioned before), 
and red tape doesn't seem to happen, despite claims they will be 
reduced. Three categories of highways (Interstate, Safety, Other) 
would be very adequate. Fewer categories would help the states 
juggle Federal and State funds for projects. 
Some would like the easing of intermodal restrictions; others would like to 
remove the distinctions among construction, maintenance, and operations. 
"Faddishness" is a side point of greater concern with respect to categorical 
1M. Wachs, and J. Ortner, "Capital Grants and Recurrent Subsidies: 
A Dilemma in American Transportation Policy," Transportation, Vol. 8, 
1979, pp. 3-19. 
emphases (e.g., federal pressure toward heavy rail transit systems, fol-
lowed by federal opposition a few years later). 
In general, we feel that if a program is in the national interest in 
terms of funding intent, then it should be safeguarded by categorical res-
trictions that insure that national priorities are followed. If this is not 
the case - in particular, if the funding intent is primarily fiscal relief 
on programs of recipient interest - block grants are in order. Alterna-
tively, one might shift the revenue generating burden to the state and 
local entities in such cases. If neither of these options is politically 
feasible, then increased transferability among associated categorical pro-
grams makes sense (e.g., as has been done for the ABCD program). 
With respect to bridges, we believe funding intent is again the criti-
cal issue. There seems to be a bit of a paradox in this situation where 
aid is specified for off-system bridges in the guise of another categorical 
aid program. Why should the federal government be specifying what percent-
age should be spent on these bridges of little or no national consequence, 
and why should a different matching share be provided than for the basic 
ABCD program? As we see the justifying funding intent for this program, it 
must be predominantly fiscal relief for projects of state and local interest. 
In that case, funds should be provided with the minimal strings attached - 
the revenue-sharing model would appear quite appropriate. With respect to 
the additional categorization of transit programs, we are disappointed in 
the recent legislation as we see transit aid as intent 4. 
4. Open- Versus Closed-Endedness  
The winding down of the Interstate program through its accelerated 
completion is the key feature of the legislation in this dimension. Our 
respondents postulated that both laggard states as well as active states 
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will build rigorously; those states more in the middle will not be affected. 
Secondary effects include decreasing the priority of other transportation 
programs where Interstate efforts are increased. 
From our perspective, we believe that the federal commitment to com-
plete the Interstate system from its inception was critical in establishing 
this categorical program as a national priority. On the other hand, it 
seems time to reconsider the national interest in the Interstate system and 
in its quick "completion." For instance, transfers are, by definition, of 
"nonessential Interstate segments." If this is the case, questions could 
indeed be raised about the necessity for rushing completion. Likewise, 
the prohibition of redesignating new Interstate segments will certainly 
encourage completion of the "system." However, in practical terms, what 
is the difference between completion of a system without such new segments 
and delay occasioned by work on such new segments? (In actuality, the com-
bination of the prohibition with the possibility of other states picking 
up unused obligational authority should foster completion of the given 
system.) It would seem that any restructuring of the incentives for Inter-
state acceleration should be based on careful consideration of the national 
interests involved. 
Analysis of the "before" and "after" Interstate program effort atten-
dant to the 1978 legislation would be useful in formulating future policy 
changes. Changes in obligation rates according to whether a state were 
previously active or lagging in its Interstate program, actual lapsing of 
Interstate obligational authority then picked up by other states, and trans-
fers out of the Interstate system to highways and to transit would all be 
extremely interesting. In addition while changes in programmatic activity 
levels on other systems are determined by many factors, it would be 
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interesting to see if there are any apparent relationships to the enhanced 
Interstate priority occasioned by the Act. For instance, one might deter-
mine whether there is correlation between increased Interstate activity and 
decreased Primary, Secondary, or Urban system activity. 
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IV. Conclusions and Critical Issues  
The reduction of federal distortions that promote uneconomic invest- 
ments for no clear national purpose, as called for by an overwhelming major- 
ity of our respondents, must begin with some clarity about those purposes. 
As Professor Smerk states, the Surface Transportation Act of 1978 reflects 
compromise, ) not a plan of action to meet long-term goals:
2 
The key reason for federal funding of anything is that somebody 
did a good lobbying job and a compromise was reached. Without 
the proper framework of goals, objectives, and action plans, 
none of the funding of any of the programs makes sense. As it 
is, we are primarily throwing money at particular programs and 
hoping that something good will come of it without ever really 
knowing what that 'good' is. 
In particular, the setting of funding levels, matching ratios, and 
categorical/block provisions cannot be ascertained without a clearly-defined 
national, intermodal policy. One step towards a basis for establishing 
funding structures is a prioritization of transportation programs.
3 
As an 
input to this type of ranking, we have taken our respondents' comments and 
(roughly) formed a composite ordering from greatest national interest to 
least, as follows: 
- Interstate 
- Interstate 3R 
- Railroads 
- Airport Development Aid Program 
1U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Second Session, Surface  
Transportation Assistance Act of 1978, Conference Report, No. 95-1797. 
2
G. M. Smerk, "Federal Mass Transportation Policy: The Surface 
Transportation Act of 1978," Transportation Journal, Spring 1979, p. 33. 
3Eno Foundation Board of Directors and Board of Consultants, Report 
on Joint Conference, Traffic Quarterly, April 1978, pp. 173-262. 
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- Bridge Replacement Program 
- ABCD Program (with Primary at higher priority than Urban, at 
higher priority than Secondary) 
- Regional development programs such as the Appalachian Development 
Highway System 
- Transit aid. 
Some specific comments add flavor to the ordering. Railroads are 
noted as inherently interstate and of real national interest (again it is 
notable that we did not inquire about them). Some doubt the national inter-
est in the airport program - finding the argument for it interesting but 
not compelling, in that sizeable airports could support themselves. The 
bridge program's priority is elevated by the perceived need being greater 
than state and local ability to pay. Regional development, and also in at 
least one respondent's view, transit, reflect national interests to develop 
our human and natural resources, more than transportation interests per se. 
Some would like to see an urban transportation system (highways and transit) 
supported by a formula block grant program which allows maximum local dis-
cretion.
1 
From our perspective, categorization efforts such as these are 
difficult, but vital. Funding and funding structures should be chosen on 
the basis of what the national interest is.
2 
Gary Nelson suggests that 
1A. E. Bauer, "Solving Transportation Problems in the Federal System: 
Is There a Role for State and Local Governments?," Publius, The Journal  
of Federalism, Vol. 8, Spring 1978, pp. 59-76. 
2
Our analysis has not focussed on the sources of funds. However, it 
should certainly be noted that the rationale for federal funding efforts 
depends on the sources. Namely, the trust funds established for highway 
and airport users to contribute to the development of their respective sys-
tems contrast with programs supported by the general funds. Of course, 
this is no simple distinction - some feel that such modal trust funds 
distort intermodal priorities with serious ramifications. 
the prioritization process must be clarified by discerning two possible, 
national goals: 
One dimension is the priority with respect to national efficiency 
contributions that are uniquely achievable by federal action. 
The other is the federal interest in distributional ends. Let 
me only suggest that rail would head the former list and transit 
aid would be very high on the latter list. You see, the ration-
ale for federal aid to transit is that it redresses the past 
federal transfers out of cities and away from transit. It is a 
distributionist function that is in fact the result of ineffi-
cient federal policy. 
Regardless, however, of how these lists are generated, we emphasize with 
Smerk that national goals and objectives must be integrated with economic 
policy, environmental policy, energy policy, and urban policy. This is an 
extremely difficult exercise but one that would be most worthwhile in terms 
of the long run benefits to the nation and to the transportation system. 
Beyond the issue raised above regarding national objectives, clarifi-
cation is needed of intergovernmental funding roles. In addressing this 
controversial question, it is important to note changing circumstances. 
i For one, as Mills notes
1 
 i , if ndeed there is a declining national interest 
in building transportation's infrastructure, decentralization of decision 
making is a natural consequence. On the other hand, while some question 
the wisdom of increasing reliance on federal aid
2
, many feel the need for 
continued federal aid. The relative roles of the federal and state govern-
ments involve judgments as to which is able to make more effective alloca-
tions and equitable assessments. Do the states still need a strong federal 
hand to build facilities of proper quality, properly cognizant of related 
interests (e.g., environmental protection)? Should the federal government 
1W. R. Mills, "Fiscal Issues in National Transportation Policy," 
Traffic Quarterly, Vol. 33, April 1979, p. 317. 
2
J. L. Weller, "A Perspective of Transport Finance in the United 
States," Traffic Quarterly, October 1975, pp. 481-498. 
71 
be involved in the redistribution of revenues in support of transportation - 
among states, between urban and rural areas, or between modes? Cooper's 
analysisl finds wide state-to-state variations in federal aid, bonding, and 
tax effort suggesting that some states may be overcapitalized and/or some 
undercapitalized. For instance, Indiana and Delaware both derive about 48% 
of their support from federal aid, but Delaware is heavily bonded (44% of 
its revenue vs. 0% for Indiana), and exerts a considerably greater tax 
effort (1.59 on a constructed scale vs. 0.93). 
Similarly, state and local roles can be called into question. For one, 
the relative voice of smaller urbanized areas in programming of urban system 
and transit funds is a point of contention. As one respondent put it (and 
we concur): 
By and large, my personal prejudice would be to finance trans-
portation on the smallest geographic basis that is reasonable. 
I think this promotes a more cautious and efficient development 
of facilities. 
These are critical questions raised about the appropriate federal role 
(no less that of the state and local governments as well). Future policy-
making should not ignore these questions concerning the appropriate extent 
of federal aid and of federal constraints upon transportation decisions. 
The clarification, both of national objectives and of funding roles, 
will become more important as the present transportation situation is 
exacerbated by future developments. The development most mentioned by our 
respondents and others
2 
 is that of adjusting revenues to provide sufficient 
1
T. W. Cooper, The State Highway Finance Outlook, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Program and 
Policy Planning, December 1978, pp. 38-39. 
2
E.g., A. E. Bauer, "Solving Transportation Problems in the Federal 
System: Is There a Role for State and Local Governments?," Publius, 
The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 8, Spring 1978, pp. 59-76. 
/ Z 
funds despite inflation. This is a problem for all levels of government. 
Pressures exist on the federal highway trust fund, on federal general 
funds, on state revenues generated from motor fuel taxes, and so on. 
According to a 1977 survey, most of the states are not generally too bad 
off right now but see their future as questionable.
1 
States have diffi- 
culty in increasing highway funding - 33 of 41 states considering such an 
increase in 1977 were turned down.
2 
The shift from construction toward maintenance, rehabilitation, and 
operations is a significant feature for both highways and transit. In 
particular it requires redefinitions of the federal funding role and care-
ful determinations of equitable funding strategies. The bulk of the fed-
eral aid programs are devoted to capital improvements. However, as trans-
portation moves toward an emphasis on maintenance and operations, these 
programs may exert an undue distortion in favor of continued construction 
activities. In many cases the additional capital improvements may incur 
even greater operational costs in the future. Furthermore, the notion of 
increasing capital plant may run counter to other national objectives, such 
as energy and materials conservation, and the provision of increased employ-
ment opportunities (operations-intensive efforts may be more labor-intensive 
than capital investments, e.g., bus vs. rail transit). 
Bruce McDowell (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations) 
summarizes the three most-cited critical areas: 
1T. W. Cooper, The State Highway Finance Outlook, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Program and 
Policy Planning, December 1978. 
2
W. R. Mills, "Fiscal Issues in National Transportation Policy," 
Traffic Quarterly, Vol. 33, April 1979, p. 314. 
The most critical problems for transportation which I foresee 
over the next few years are (1) shifting programs from an empha-
sis on construction to an emphasis on maintenance, rehabilita-
tion, and operation of transportation systems, (2) adjusting 
revenue sources to a basis which keeps up with inflation des-
pite energy conservation efforts (perhaps a sales tax based on 
price rather than number of gallons of gasoline), and (3) moving 
away from narrow categorical grants toward integrated intermodal 
transportation grants with fewer restrictions on the use of funds 
among not only the modes but also the categories of construction, 
maintenance, rehabilitation, and operations. 
Three other problems are also very notable: energy saving, rail 
revival, and enhancement of mobility. Clear energy policy with respect 
to transportation development is needed. More efficient and more effective 
use of private vehicles is likely to be important. Increased transit 
demand and increased emphasis on transit for the purpose of energy conser-
vation are possibilities that could significantly alter federal priorities. 
Despite the fact that our questions posed to the transportation profes-
sionals focussed on the Surface Transportation Act, several mentioned 
revival of the rail system as a critical problem. (A related critical 
problem is that of user-charge financing.
1
) This has seemed to have 
important multimodal implications in terms of rationalizing the overall 
transportation system. Mobility is seen as being hampered by localized 
congestion and transit inadequacy. 
Strategies to deal with these problems must, above all, respect the 
interactions among them. For instance, tolls may serve to reduce conges-
tion and provide revenues. (However, tolls may be viewed as piracy if 
they are used, as in the case of the New Jersey Turnpike, to promote 
educational systems!) Likewise, increased fuel taxes can provide revenues 
1
Fred Lee Smith, Jr., An Efficiency Assessment of the Highway User 
Charge System." (Internal memorandum, Association of American Railroads, 
Washington, D.C.) 
/3 
and encourage energy savings. Gasoline conservation measures may reduce 
vehicle miles of travel, thereby enhancing mobility, but also squeezing 
state and federal revenues. Demands for energy will also have direct 
effects on transportation systems (e.g., coal-haul roads for out-of-state 
uses). Funding in such cases may be federal, or, as Kentucky is doing, 
state bonds amortized by a severance tax on the coal. 
The reality of these critical issues, in the light of our conclusions 
above, leads us to the recommendations offered (see Summary and Recommenda-
tions section). 
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Summary  
This analysis concerns the manner in which Federal funding structures 
affect mass transit. It focuses on the implications of categorical versus 
block grants, different required local matching shares, and formula versus 
discretionary aid programs. This work is part of a broader study for the 
Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation (P. J. Barbato, 
monitor) that addresses the effects of funding structures across the high-
way, airport, and transit modes. 
The findings presented here reflect a synthesis of statistical analy-
sis, interview, and literature review. The statistical base is the record 
of Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) financial assistance 
projects from 1965-1977, buttressed by socio-economic information on the 
urbanized areas and the states. Interviews with a variety of transporta-
tion professionals at the Federal, state, and local levels augment the 
factual data. 1 A number of recent analyses focused on different aspects 
of public transportation funding contribute to the present conclusions. 
Federal involvement in public transportation funding is significantly 
colored by three features: 
• transit needs are growing dramatically, especially for operating 
expenses; 
• the Federal role is becoming increasingly dominant, especially 
for capital improvements; 
a key differentiation can be made between rail and bus activities; 
rail aid is concentrated in some seven cities but it represents 
about 70% of current capital obligations. 
The distribution of UMTA funds per transit commuter for the capital 
assistance (Section 3), planning (Section 9), and formula grant (Section 5) 
programs has been remarkably uniform across different sizes of cities. Not 
surprisingly, on a total funds or per capita basis, UMTA aid has favored 
the large cities with well-established transit operations. In contrast, 
the Section 5 grants have been proportionately more of a factor for small 
cities; and they have been more inclined to use these funds for capital 
improvements. 
Large cities tend to be more responsive to Federal aid opportunities 
in the transit realm. The increase in Federal share from 66 2/3% to 80% 
in fiscal 1974 did appear to stimulate participation by the smaller urban-
ized areas, especially those who had not previously participated. 
The states are providing more and more transit assistance to locali-
ties. However, this analysis could not statistically document state 
influence on the distribution of Federal transit funds. 
1We deeply appreciate the insights offered on current and future 
policy issues by the many knowledgeable transportation officials acknowl-
edged in our overview report. 
1 
I. Introduction 
The provision of urban public transportation services is a matter 
of deep current concern. This concern has evidenced itself in a vari- 
ety of policy issues at the Federal level, but the key element is that of 
funding. At the heart of the urban transportation dilemma is mass transit. 
This paper attempts to assess the implications of recent Federal funding 
policies upon transit. 
Transit funding is an issue of substantial magnitude, and it is grow-
ing. The 1974 National Transportation Study projected a "need" for $58.2 
billion in capital investment for transit to the year 1990.
1 
This works 
out to some $3 billion per year (a figure probably on the high side, given 
the process of need estimation). The report projects annual operating 
costs at $7.2 billion by 1990. Furthermore, it projects that farebox reve-
nues, which covered 85% of operating expenses in 1972, would only cover 65% 
by 1990. However, this projection appears too optimistic - revenues covered 
only about 50% of the $4 billion operating costs in 1976.
2 
The pattern 
that emerges is thus rather threatening. Capital and operating needs are 
increasing rapidly:
3 
1970: capital outlays = $0.4 billion; operating deficits = $0.3 billion 
1976: capital outlays = $1.3 billion; operating deficits = $1.9 billion 
The Federal government plays a major role in this financial picture. 
1U.S. Department of Transportation, A Study of the Urban Mass Transpor-
tation Needs and Financing, Washington, D.C., July, 1974. 
2
American Public Transit Association, '76-'77 Transit Fact Book, 
Washington, D.C., 1977. 
3Capital outlays for fiscal years are taken from U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Census of Governments, 1969-70 and 1975-76, Washington, D.C. 
Operating deficits are from the '76-'77 Transit Fact Book. 
2 
For fiscal year (FY) 1976, the Urban Mass Transportation Administration 
(UMTA) provided some $1.4 billion in capital assistance and $0.4 billion 
in operating aid. This Federal aid is provided to local transit authori- 
ties to further national urban transportation objectives (see Section IV G). 
Various Federal funding structures are used in this context. The UMTA 
aid program derives principally from the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 
1964 and its extensions, although the 1973 Federal Aid Highway Act has had 
substantial implications too. These Federal provisions affect a diverse 
clientele, ranging from the largest urbanized areas (UAs) with huge fixed 
rail systems to transit authorities operating small bus fleets. 
Transit is most heavily concentrated in the largest UAs. UAs over 
2,000,000 (1970 Census) are anticipated to account for 76% of the 1972-80 
public transit expenditures (and only 31% of the highway expenditure) for 
45% of the urbanized area population.
1 
In terms of passengers, transit 
service is primarily provided by public systems (91% of the revenue passen-
gers in 1976). The 375 public systems represent 39% of the industry total 
number in 1976, versus only 7% in 1964.
2 
The diversity of local legal con-
straints, type and extent of fiscal resources, and political situations 
significantly interact with the Federal aid programs. 
The purpose of this analysis is to elucidate the effects of different 
Federal funding strategies. Toward this end, local investment patterns in 
response to Federal funding structures are the primary focal point. The 
analysis is presented in two sections. First, the patterns of local res-
ponse to Federal transit funding initiatives are described. Second, local 
1
U.S. Department of Transportation, The 1974 National Transportation  
Report, Washington, D.C., July, 1975. 
2
The 1976 data are from the '76-'77 Transit Fact Book, op. cit.; the 
1964 data are from the 1974 National Transportation Report, op. cit. 
3 
preferences among four alternative sources of Federal aid are compared. 
These serve to provide useful insights as to what aspects of Federal fund-
ing policies make a difference, with consequent implications for future 
policies. 
The present intent is to throw light upon the pro's and con's of vari-
ous funding strategies. For instance: 
• What happens to total effort when Federal matching share is 
increased? 
• What are the programmatic implications of tight categorical res-
trictions placed upon the recipient of Federal funds? 
• What differences arise from use of an apportionment formula rather 
than the making of discretionary grants? 
In light of this interest, a limited set of instances are examined to pro-
vide the most useful evidence on the implications of these funding parameters. 
In particular, the changes resulting from the 1973 Federal Aid Highway Act 
and the 1974 National_ Mass Transportation Act are of concern. The intent is 
neither to evaluate these acts, per se, nor to assess the overall UMTA 
program. Rather, it is to clarify what effects are attributable to changes 
in the Federal funding structures. This aims to provide useful information 
as policy-makers ponder further alterations in Federal transportation fund- 
ing strategies. 
II. Patterns of  Response 
There are a number of essential dimensions to a discussion of the res-
ponse to Federal transit aid opportunities. First, of course, are the UMTA 
aid categories, of which this analysis addresses: 
• Section 3 - discretionary capital assistance grants 
4 
• Section 5 - formula grants, some used for capital improvements 
and some to defray operating expenses 
• Section 9 - grants for technical studies
1 
Funds provided through any of these Sections may be devoted to fixed-
rail or other transit endeavors. Most of these analyses separate out the 
rail grants because of their special character - large dollar amounts in 
few projects to very few cities. 
A major concern is the distribution of funds by type of urbanized area. 
This analysis relies heavily on the UA categorization used by UMTA in its 
report on "Transit Operating Performance and the Impact of the Section 5 
Program" (November, 1976): 2 




It 500,000-1,000,000 (21 UAs) 
200,000-500,000 (58 UAs) 
50,000-200,000 (163 UAs) 
The characteristics of the states are investigated to see to what extent 
they affect localities' responses. Geographical distribution of UMTA funds 
is of some interest. In addition, description of the timing of grants is 
helpful in exploring the responsiveness of localities to Federal initiatives. 
Particular note is taken of the timing of grant requests of the smaller UAs. 
1
See Footnote a to Table 1 for an accounting of the data base. 
2
There are presently 278 urbanized areas. We have consolidated six of 
these that are paired in the same SMSA (Tampa, Winston-Salem, Beaumont, 
Salinas, Galveston, and Oshkosh) because we have obtained some data on an 
SMSA basis. In these cases we have used urbanized area statistical data 
for the larger of the two involved. We have not included four urbanized 
areas in Puerto Rico, nor one in Alaska (except for special tabulations). 
Thus, the net talley is 267 UAs. 
A. Rail System Funds  
Rail system assistance from UMTA has been heavily concentrated in a 
few large, Northern cities. By our classification, all but $4.6 million 
out of $1.35 billion attributable to specific cities went to UAs over 
1,000,000 population. )  The 140 rail projects included 100 Section 3 capi-
tal improvements, 3 Section 23 highway transfers, 12 Section 5 formula 
grants, and 25 technical studies. Fifteen were not attributable to a spe-
cific UA; 101 of the remaining 125 went to Boston, Chicago, New York, 
Philadelphia, and San Francisco. The remaining 24 projects attributable to 
other UAs accounted for only $188 million (of which Atlanta received $73 
million and Washington, D.C., $66 million). 
The Congressional Budget Office ("Urban Mass Transportation Options 
for Federal Assistance," February, 1977) summarized the current allocation 
of capital funds as going about 30% for buses, 35% for completely new rail 
systems (i.e., Atlanta, Baltimore, Buffalo, and Miami), and 35% for rail 
improvements and extensions in cities that already have rail networks (i.e., 
Boston, Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, 
and Washington, D.C.).
2 
In sum, rail capital aid dominates bus capital aid, 
and it is highly concentrated in a few cities - but those are the cities 
with the largest numbers of transit users. 
1
We classified projects as rail when the project description clearly 
indicated involvement of rail components. 
2
Classification is ambiguous. Washington's system is new, but operat-
ing. Some systems are heavy rail; some are light rail. Trolley coaches 
are in use in five cities; cable cars in one. The commuter railroads not 
only serve UAs such as New York and Chicago, but also connecting ones 
such as Hartford. There are some eleven cities currently approved for 
downtown people-movers. 
K.) 
B. Distribution Among Urbanized Areas  
The basic statistics comparing the distribution of Federal transit 
funds by size of city are presented in Table 1. Some of the highlights 
are: 
• large cities obtain more projects and more dollars per city 
[See Fund Categories A, E, and F] 
• the bulk (82%) of the funds go to UAs over 1,000,000 (9% of all 
the UAs) [B] 
• essentially all the rail aid goes to the largest UAs, but the 
preponderence of non-rail aid also goes to the largest UAs (72%) 
[C and B] 
• transit projects in the large cities tend to be much larger than 
in smaller cities [D] 
• on a per capita basis, larger cities obtain more Federal transit 
aid [G] 
• on a per transit commuter basis, the distribution of funds is 
remarkably uniform [H, I, J, K and L] 1  
Figure 1 illustrates the city-by-city distribution of non-rail UMTA 
funds on a per transit commuter basis (probably the most viable basis of 
comparison for most purposes). There is no significant relationship between 
UA rank and funds per transit commuter (correlation coefficient, r = .08; 
1
Analysis of variance confirms the significance of the relationship 
between UA size category and the amount of Federal funds received (total 
funds and per capita). It confirms that city size does not relate signifi-
cantly to any of the fund amounts (total or non-rail only) on a per transit 
commuter basis. It should be mentioned that this uniformity does not hold 
up under some related measures. UMTA's Transit Operating Performance and  
the Impact of the Section 5 Program (November, 1976) reported that formula 
grant allocations for UAs under 200,000 were about $0.25 per rider and $0.43 
per transit vehicle mile, while these were $0.06 and $0.18, respectively, for 
UAs over 1,000,000. 
Table 1. Distribution of UMTA Funds by Size of Urbanized Area 
Fund Category 















A. Number of Projects 2512
b 
574 203 418 626 
B. UMTA Funds 
($ million) a 3850 3150 250 280 170 
C. Non-Rail UMTA Funds 
($ million) 2498 1805 250 274 170 
D. Total Costs (UMTA + 
Local)/Project 
($ million)c 4.37 13.29 2.32 2.58 0.48 
E. Average UMTA Funds/ 
UA ($ million) 14.41 126.00 11.90 4.81 1.04 
F. Average Non-Rail 
UMTA Funds/UA 
($ million) 9.36 72.19 11.90 4.73 1.04 
G. Average Non-Rail 
UMTA Funds per 
Capita ($) d 13.22 29.86 17.21 15.21 9.45 
H. Average Non-Rail 
UMTA Funds per 
Transit Commuter 





I. Average Section 3 
Non-Rail Funds per 
Transit Commuter 
($)e 1.44 1.36 1.45 1.49 1.42 
J. Average Section 9 
Non-Rail Funds per 
Transit Commuter 
($) e 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 
K. Average Section 5 
Non-Rail Capital 
Funds per Transit 
Commuter ($)e 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.13 




Commuter ($) e 0.51 0.38 0.52 0.60 0.49 
(cont'd) 
Table 1 (cont'd) 
a
This analysis primarily uses an UMTA projects tape which includes 2512 
projects funded through June, 1977. These total to about $5.5 billion in 
UMTA funds and $11.0 billion total costs. Of the $5.5 billion in UMTA 
funds, $3.85 billion is attributed to specific UAs (and $1.35 billion of 
that is for rail projects). Of these, the analyses usually focus on 
762 Section 3 projects numbered Oxxx, excluding 6 numbered 7xxx (operat-
ing expenses), 5 numbered 8xxx (to UMTA itself), 7 numbered 9xxx (loans), 
and 1 numbered Oxxx which appeared irregular; 95 Section 5 capital pro-
jects and 494 Section 5 operating projects, excluding 1 numbered 8xxx 
(to UMTA itself); and 1024 Section 9 technical studies. In addition 
there are 76 Section 16 (elderly/handicapped) grants, 37 Section 23 
grants (highway transfers - discussed in the following section of this 
report), and 4 Section 83 grants (Appalachian Regional Commission funds 
involved). Categorization as "rail" or "non-rail" reflects our judgment 
from UMTA tape description. 
b
691 projects were not attributable to a specific UA, based on listed 
recipient and project description. 
eThis tally reflects allocation of the $11.0 billion in total costs by 
UA category; it does not correspond to the various breakdowns of UMTA 
costs which are aggregated by UAs. 
d
Computed for each UA based on 1970 population, then averaged over the 
UAs in a size category. 
e Transit commuters are for each UA based on the percent in the SMSA (standard 
metropolitan statistical area) who used public transportation to work during 
census week, 1970, multiplied by the UA population, and by 52 weeks/year. 
The ratios are computed for each UA, then averaged over the UAs in a size 
category. Data on transit commuters was missing for 24 cities who received 
UMTA funding; 23 in the smallest size category, 1 in the 200,000-500 cate-
gory. Within rounding, categories I, J, K, and L sum to category H. "Tran-
sit commuters" does include rail which we exclude from these tallies. 
(Inclusion of rail funds raises the amount for UAs over 1,000,000 to $2.37; 
the amount for UAs 200,000-500, to 2.28. 
• • 	 •  
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Figure 1. UMTA Funds Per Transit Commuter for Each Urbanized Area  
I I 
lu 
slope, (3 = .01). It is interesting to consider the two extremes - those 
cities which received very large amounts and those which received no such 
funds at all. 
Recalling that the mean is $2.17 per transit commuter (Table 1, cate-
gory H), we tallied those UAs that received over $5 of non-rail UMTA funds 
per transit commuter. Twenty-seven UAs comprise this top 10%, of whom none 
rank larger than twentieth in UA size, and seventeen fall in the smallest 
category (less than 200,000 population). Interestingly, on a per capita 
basis, most of these 27 do not rank exceptionally high. Five UAs stood out 
as high on both per transit commuter (PTC) and per capita (PC) bases: 
• Albany, GA ($31 PTC; $157 PC) 
• Tallahassee, FL ($8 PTC; $45 PC) 
• Atlanta, GA ($6 PTC; $108 PC) 
• Honolulu, HA ($6 PTC; $79 PC) 
• Denver, CO ($6 PTC; $48 PC) 
Albany stands out (see Figure 1) because its $12 million in grants accrues 
to a 1970 UA population of only 76,512. Most important is the absence of 
any strong pattern of advantage to a certain size of city. 1  
At the other extreme, 22 cities received no aid at all. All but one 
of these fall into the smallest size category - UAs under 200,000. Search-
ing for any characteristics that these UAs might have shared, we contrasted 
them with the 111 UAs obtaining greater than the median $1.74 of total 
2 
(rail and non-rail) UMTA aid per transit commuter. 	No obvious explanations 
emerged. The 22 had a slightly lower percentage of transit commuters than 
1
This statistical view misses the personnel and management features 
that can certainly make a difference (e.g., Denver has had an aggressive 
transit leader). 
2
Median for 221 UAs - 22 others received no aid and 24 lacked transit 
commuter data. 
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the 111 (median 2.25 vs. 2.72), but eight of the 22 were above the median 
for the 111. Their UA population also tended to be lower (median 78,500 
vs. 191,000). However, they resided in roughly comparable states in terms 
of their emphasis on transit, innovativeness, state population, state urban 
population, and presence of a state department of transportation. And, as 
cities, they were even a bit better at obtaining Federal support as a per-
centage of their revenues (median 3.55% vs. 2.44%). 
The distribution of the Sections 3 and 9 grants is discretionary (that 
is, these are made on a competitive project-by-project basis by DOT), while 
that of the Section 5 funds is by formula (that is, funds are set aside for 
each UA - 50% based on population; 50%, on population density). It is note-
worthy that none of the categories (Sections 3, 5, or 9) show major 
differences by UA size on a per transit commuter basis (Table 1). An 
interesting preference within the Section 5 program does appear. Overall, 
only $56.9 million was devoted to Section 5 capital projects out of $971.0 
million total Section 5 funds (6%). For the smallest cities (under 200,000), 
$8.0 million out of $49.7 million Section 5 funds went to capital projects 
(16%). In the large, transit-intensive cities, Section 5 funds are devoted 
almost entirely to operating expenses and they account for only a small 
portion of the transit budget.' Conversely, in the small cities, Section 
5 funds represent a substantial increment to the transit budget, and could 
contribute to the boom in transit operating deficits (given the present 
arrangement whereby they can be used for operating assistance only to 
1
This amounts to only 9% for 80 urban areas receiving formula grants, 
but 24% of the operating expenses for those under 200,000 (UMTA, Transit  
Operating Performance and the Impact of the Section 5 Program, Washington, 
D.C., November, 1976). 
J_L 
defray revenue shortfalls). 
C. State Influences  
While the cities are the basic recipients of Federal transit assis-
tance, they operate in a transportation environment strongly colored by the 
state government. The actions of the state can affect cities' transit pro-
grams through 
• provision of matching funds to make up a portion of Federal aid 
matching requirements 
• provision of technical aid and program information 
• approval processes - for instance in state department of transpor- 
tation (or other body) review of transit plans and applications 
for funding transfers from the highway system, or in "channeling" 
requirements for Federal funds to pass through the state. 
Several transit professionals conveyed the perception that the states made 
a difference in the response of cities, particularly smaller ones, to 
Federal transit aid opportunities. 
To investigate the role of the states, information was first compiled 
on the most tangible feature - the provision of state financial aid to 
localities. Results of two surveys indicate that many states are support-
ing transit, and the trend is toward increasing support. Carstens et al. 
in a 1974 survey found 17 states providing some capital assistance and 14 
offering operating assistance.
1 
In a 1976 survey, AASHTO found 23 states 
1
Carstens, R. L., Mercier, C. R., and Kannel, E. J., "Current Status 
of State-Level Support for Transit," Transportation Research Record 589, 
"Urban Transportation Finance," 1976. 
providing capital assistance and 23 offering operating assistance.
1 
Des- 
pite a few inconsistencies, the two surveys imply that no states ceased to 
give transit aid and some increased the extent of aid. The strong trend 
for states to get into transit assistance during this two-year period coin-
cides with the beginning of Section 5 formula grant support to localities. 
One can at least conclude that states have not reduced their efforts on 
behalf of transit in the presence of the Section 5 program. 
A variety of state characteristics were statistically arrayed against 
the UMTA fund categories to see if any relationships stood out. Factors 
investigated included: 
• the extent of state matching support for Sections 3, 5, and 9 
projects 
• indicators of state transportation perspectives (percent of 1971 
state transportation expenditures for transit; existence of a state 
department of transportation) 
• demographic measures that appeared potentially relevant to transit 
support (state urban population; region of the country). 
These factors were analyzed in conjunction with measures of the: 
• total UNTA aid received (both including and excluding rail) on 
various bases, but primarily per transit commuter 
• Section 3, Section 5 (capital), Section 5 (operating), and 
Section 9 funds, primarily on a per transit commuter basis 
• Dates of first Section 5 grants, or first Section 3 and Section 9 
applications. 
1
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO), "Survey of State Aid to Urbanized Areas for Transportation," 
Washington, D.C., Fall, 1976. 
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To see if states were chiefly influential on smaller cities, many of the 
above analytical combinations were also studied for the urbanized areas 
under 500,000 population (excluding the larger UAs). 
In a nutshell, no statistical relationships were documented between 
any of the state characteristics and receipt of Federal transit grants. 1 
One transit feature that deserves comment is the ceiling placed on the 
amount any one state can receive. The 1964 act placed a 12 1/2% maximum 
on capital aid (Section 3). This was switched to a $12.5 million limit 
briefly in 1966, to a 15% maximum in 1970, and finally removed in 1974. 
A tally of Section 3 capital improvement aid projects on our UMTA tape 
through FY73 interestingly shows New York receiving 17.4%; California, 
18.4%; Massachusetts, 13.1%; with Illinois close at 11.6%. Following 
removal of the restrictions, Section 3 aid for FY74 through FY77 tallied 
less for the three highest states: New York, 14.4%; California, 8.3%; and 
Massachusetts, 6.2% (with Illinois steady at 11.7%). Apparently, the state 
ceiling was not a critical factor clamping down aid; however, it should be 
noted that new alternative funding sources have become available since 1974, 
probably fulfilling some of the needs of New York and the other states. 
D. Time Patterns of Response to Federal Initiatives  
In FY65, UMTA Section 3 funds became available for transit capital 
improvements. In FY67, Section 9 technical study grants were made avail-
able. In FY75, Section 5 formula monies became available to localities. 
This section focuses on the patterns of response by UAs to these 
opportunities. 
1
An underlying premise was that the city was 
most of the analyses (e.g., analysis of variance) 
size in conjunction with a state characteristic. 
state influence, but these were generally trivial 
tent patterns emerged. 
the basic unit. Hence, 
considered urbanized area 
Some results did show a 
in nature and no consis- 
Based on interviews and observations, we hypothesized that smaller 
cities might be slower to respond to new Federal transit initiatives. 
Possible reasons for such a lag include less transit need, less technical 
capability (e.g., fewer transit planners available), and lower awareness 
of the new opportunities. To separate out the question of transit need to 
some extent, several comparisons were performed among only those cities 
that did obtain aid (under the appropriate UMTA Section). 
Results from several analyses converge to support the conclusion that 
smaller cities do not, on average, respond as quickly. Table 2 shows that 
larger cities submitted their first grant applications more quickly for 
both Section 3 and Section 9 funds, and that they received their first 
Section 5 funds more quickly.
I Figure 2 illustrates the spread of first 
application dates for Section 9 funds for the 203 of the 267 UAs that have 
obtained such funds. The larger UAs tend to respond earlier (r = .55). 
Note that this phenomenon is distinct from the fact that more of the 
smaller cities do not obtain any funds. 
Another indication of a relative response lag for small cities is that 
they had relatively few of the very early grants. Table 3 demonstrates 
this effect for the Section 3 grants made through 1966. 
From still another angle, Figure 3 shows the profile of first grants 
to UAs under 200,000. In addition to noting that these cities did not 
rush to get aboard the transit aid program, it is interesting to observe 
a burst of activity in FY74 and FY75. The most active fiscal years for 
beginning to participate in the Section 3 and Section 9 programs immedi-
ately followed the increase in Federal matching share from a flexible 
1Application and grant dates show very strong correspondence for both 
Sections 3 and 9, implying that UMTA processing has not favored one cate-
gory of cities over another. Application dates are rather incomplete for 
Section 5 grants. 
Table 2. Distribution of Average Date of First Grants  


















Section 3 1970.5 1967.9 1970.3 1970.5 1971.2 
(194) (25) (21) (50) (98) 
Section 9 1971.4 1968.1 1970.3 1971.0 1972.5 
(203) (24) (19) (48) (112) 
Section 5 1976.2 1975.8 1975.7 1976.1 1976.5 
(183) (23) (19) (45) (96) 
Note: Values are the average year of first grant to a given UA, for 
all UAs in a given size category that received grants (number 
in parentheses). For Sections 3 and 9, these are first grant 
application dates; for Section 5, the first date a grant was 
made. For each Section, the differences among the UA size 
categories are significant by analysis of variance (respec-
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Figure 3. First Grants to Urbanized Areas Under 200,000  
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66 2/3% to a mandatory 80% in FY74. The number of grants made to these 
small UAs (whether or not the first to a particular UA) showed a compar-
able pattern. For Section 3, the number increased from 11 in FY72 and 20 
in FY73, to 26 in FY74 and 28 in FY75, then tapered off to 15 in "FY76" 
and 13 in "FY77."
1 For Section 9, the number increased from 12 in FY72 
and 18 in FY73, to 19 in FY74 and 54 in FY75, then continued high at 51 
in "FY76" and 59 in "FY77."
1 
Smaller cities showed similar gains in the 
percentage receiving grants and proportionate total and average grant 
amounts. This is consistent with an interpretation that the reduction in 
local share required made the transit aid program significantly more attrac-
tive for the small cities.
2 
Broadened participation in programs is a major 
rationale for increased Federal share. 
III. A Choice of Four  
An interesting choice faces the community that wants to obtain Federal 
aid for a transit capital improvement project. 3 Four sources are potentially 
available: 
1) UMTA Section 3 discretionary funds, available since FY65; 
2) Urban System funds, available since FY74; 
3) Interstate System equivalent funds, available since FY74; 
4) UMTA Section 5 formula grants, available since FY75. 
1
For comparability, grants were tallied from July through June for 1976 
and 1977 despite the change in the Federal fiscal year. 
2
The reason that Section 3 activity peaked in FY74 while Section 9 
peaked in FY75 is unclear. A plausible interpretation of the dip in 
Section 3 activity since FY75 might be that capital needs of the small UAs 
were now partially met through Section 5 capital grants - up from 1 in 
FY75 to 11 in FY76 to 26 in FY77. 
3
This section describes the situation through FY78, prior to the 
Surface Transportation Act of 1978. It will be interesting to see how the 
new provisions alter local choices. 
Each source has somewhat different requirements and constraints. 
Interstate equivalent funds entail a trade for an Interstate segment; they 
require state, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and UMTA approvals - 
as do Urban System transfers to transit projects. Most intriguing, these 
four alternative sources present a variety of matching requirements and 
1 
implications as to the amount of Federal aid obtainable by a community. 
1) UMTA Section 3 funds provide an 80% Federal share (a flexible 
66 2/3% prior to FY74); 
2) Urban System funds give a basic 70% Federal share, but use of 
these funds for transit is a substitution for their use on 
urban highway projects; 
3) Interstate funds present a basic 80%, but with loss to the 
state of that amount of 90% Federal aid; 
4) UMTA Section 5 funds can be used at an 80% Federal share for 
capital improvements or at a 50% Federal share for operating 
assistance. 
One should note that these constitute virtually the full set of attrac-
tive options. Public transit capital investment relies almost totally on 
tax sources. 2 And despite a strenuous UMTA approval process (Mauro notes 
that it takes at least fourteen distinct steps to buy a bus with UMTA aid), 
minimal capital investment takes place without Federal aid (from one of 
these four sources). For instance, in 1972 state and local capital invest- 
ment amounted to $231 million (U.S. DOT,"A Study of Urban Mass Transportation 
Needs and Financing,"1974), but according to analysis of the UMTA project 
1Note that funding provisions have since been changed by the 1978 Act. 
2Mauro, G. T., "Mass Transit Regulation: Procedure Governs Substance," 
Government Executive, November, 1977, pp. 34-38. 
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tape, the local share on UMTA sponsored projects for that year even 
exceeded that amount ($278 million). A straight comparison is not proper 
because the project data reflect obligations, not expenditures. (Expendi-
tures tend to lag by a year or more and were increasing rapidly in the 
early 1970's.) However, our interpretation is that minimal local funds 
are invested in capital improvements without Federal assistance. Hence, 
this is a situation that figures to be highly sensitive to Federal funding 
structures, unlike the "ABC" highway program where states do so much on 
their own. So, which do communities choose? 
The Federal obligations from the four sources tally roughly as 
follows for FY74-77:
1 
1) Section 3 - 405 capital grants, for some $1,643,000,000; 
2) Urban System - 17 projects, for some $75,000,000; 
3) Interstate transfers - 10 projects, for some $640,000,000; 
4) Section 5 capital projects - 95 projects, for some $57,000,000. 
This strong preference for Section 3 funds is obviously complicated by many 
factors (eligibility for funds
2
, ease of approval, and so on). Nonetheless, 
there are implications about funding structures to be drawn from the com-
parison of Section 3 funding with each of the three alternatives. 
A. Use of Urban System Funds for Transit  
In a study of "Why Urban System Funds Were Seldom Used for Mass 
Transit" (March, 1977), the Government Accounting Office (GAO) noted, among 
other possible reasons: 
1
Tally based on the projects data tape prepared by UMTA for our use. 
2
For instance, in FY75 urban system funds were not eligible for rail 
assistance. 
1) that communities got the most Federal money by using allocated 
Urban System funds for highways and other Federal funds for mass 
transit ("competition" between a formula program and a discre-
tionary one); 
2) more local money was usually required for a mass transit project 
funded through the Urban System program (unequal matching ratios). 
The evidence is strong that localities have made only minor use of the 
Urban System funds for transit - an option made available by the 1973 
Federal-Aid Highway Act. While about $75 million was going to mass transit 
in FY74-77, over $1 billion of Urban System funds was obligated on highway-
related projects. As the GAO report points out, there are several confound-
ing factors behind this disuse. Yet, there is a strong argument that given 
a choice between discretionary funds and allotted funds (with other possible 
uses), a recipient should choose the discretionary funds. In this instance, 
why take away from allotted funds that can be used to improve urban high-
ways when it is possible to request and obtain additional funds for transit 
(UMTA Section 3 grants)? Federal policy-makers should not expect grantees 
to use formula funds when alternative discretionary ones are obtainable.
1 
The second point raised by the GAO is intriguing - given funds avail-
able at different matching ratios, how strong is the preference for a lower 
local share? The use of Urban System funds for transit instead of highways 
is less attractive to most states and their local authorities. The Federal 
share at 80% for Sections 3 or 5 is more generous than the 70% for Urban 
System funds. It is interesting to note that the Federal government adjusts 
the Urban System matching requirement to reflect the extent of public lands 
1
Heinz Heckeroth of California's DOT noted that transfer was not attrac-
tive when Section 3 funds were adequate (personal communication). 
in each state. For ten states the resultant increase in Federal share 
is enough to exceed the 80% for the alternative UMTA fund sources:
1 
Alaska (95%) Nevada (95%) 
Arizona (91%) New Mexico (82%) 
California (83%) Oregon (86%) 
Colorado (81%) Utah (91%) 
Idaho (89%) Wyoming (85%) 
If matching share were a significant consideration, we might expect to 
see a preponderance of Urban System transfers in these ten states. Tally-
ing the projects shows some slight evidence to support this interpretation. 
Despite the fact that most of these ten are not big transit states, six of 
the seventeen transfers took place in them. Excluding the transfers in 
New York City, six of the remaining fourteen (43%) for $6.3 million (44%) 
occurred in the ten public land states. This is by no means conclusive 
evidence, but it is consistent with the premise that state and local offi-
cials take cognizance of small differentials in Federal matching share.
2 
The GAO study notes that the state matching share can be a significant 
influence, also. For instance, Nevada provides all the matching funds for 
Urban System highway projects but none for mass transit projects (due to 
Nevada law restrictions) - a strong inducement for a community to favor "Oe 
highway over "20e transit projects! Of the eight states which had Urban 
System projects, six contribute on transit capital improvements. Of the 
23 states that used, or planned in the next year to use, highway funds for 
non-highway (transit) use, 15 (65%) contribute to transit capital matches.
3 
1
These figures reflect 1976 Public Land state matching requirements. 
2
One state official we interviewed pointed out that transfers were 
impeded by the differential 70-30 Urban System vs. 80-20 UMTA Section 3 
matching ratios. 
3AASHTO survey, op. cit. 
In contrast, for 24 other states that did not use or plan in the next year 
to use, highway funds for transit purposes, only nine (38%) provide such aid 
(no information on the remaining few states' aid provisions). This probably 
implies that states providing matching aid on transit projects are more favor-
ably disposed toward transit and thus more inclined to support Urban System 
transit projects, and that the aid itself helps communities opt for transit 
over urban highways. ' 
B. Interstate System Transfers to Transit  
The Interstate fund transfer alternative has not been overly popular - 
some ten projects in all - one for Philadelphia, two for Washington, D.C., 
and the rest for Massachusetts (Boston).
2 
In terms of matching ratios, the 
Interstate option trades "10Q" highway dollars for "20Q" transit dollars - 
clearly disadvantageous. The disuse of Interstate monies for transit is 
probably most attributable to the perceived need for urban highways. In 
addition to this, though, the drop from 90% Federal aid to 80% has been 
noted as a major factor in opposing the shift for Philadelphia's Cobb Creek 
Expressway.
3 
C. Section 5 Funds: For Capital or Operating Expenses? 
Turning to the distribution of Section 5 grants, it is noteworthy that 
the Section 5 capital grants ($57,000,000 on 95 projects) are only about 6% 
as much as the Section 5 operating grants ($914,000,000 on 494 projects). 
1Note, however, that the analysis of state matching provisions failed 
to show any clear relationship to the extent of cities' participation in 
Federal aid transit programs. 
2
This is consistent with Alan Altschuler's personal observation that 
the Interstate provision was adopted at Massachusetts' urging; that they 
made real use of it to save Federal aid funds for Massachusetts that would 
otherwise have been lost; and that, despite popular attention to "busting the 
Highway Trust," the provision has been of minimal significance to other states. 
3Sims, D., Pennsylvania DOT, personal communication. 
This is despite a sizeable differential in required local match - 50% for 
operating assistance versus 20% local share for capital improvements. As 
in the case for Urban System fund transit use, it would appear that grantees 
find it advantageous to apply for available discretionary funds, rather 
than use their formula funds which have alternative uses.
1 
Or, it may be 
that operating budgets are a higher priority and there are insufficient 
local funds available for capital improvement. The issue of Federal 
operating assistance is a highly controversial one. Local demands for more 
Federal operating aid have risen along with operating deficits. There is 
concern that the Federal operating assistance has encouraged operating 
deficits. It is clear that recipients are not sensitive to matching share 
when it comes to accepting operating assistance in lieu of capital 
assistance. 
IV. Implications of Federal Transit Funding Structures  
A. Overarching Factors  
Federal funding programs do not affect all potential recipients in 
the same way. A variety of influences interact with each Federal aid pro-
gram to determine its effects. These include the characteristics of the 
potential recipients, the economic climate, and the societal priorities of 
the moment. Short of lamenting that each case is unique, it seems useful 
to distinguish certain key factors that seem to play a prominent role in 
determining the responses to Federal aid programs. 
The first of these might be labeled dependence on Federal aid. Quite 
logically, if aid recipients come to depend on a particular program, they 
will be more sensitive to changes in program policies. For example, as 
1
Efforts by UMTA to shut off Section 3 aid whey Section 5 funds were 
available to a city have apparently not been very successful. 
LI 
noted earlier, very little transit capital investment takes place without 
Federal aid. Hence, one would expect local authorities to be more affected 
by changes in transit capital aid programs, than would be most states by 
changes in highway capital aid parameters (since the states muster consider-
able capital investments over and above the Federal highway program).
1 
This 
factor may dominate the character of certain matching requirements. If a 
Federal aid recipient routinely invests more than is required for Federal 
support ("overmatches"), changes in matching requirements may be inconsequen-
tial. The Federal-Aid Primary Highway program and Section 5 transit operat-
ing assistance exemplify this. In such situations, programs that are defined 
for use only on specific categories (categorical programs) may behave like 
unrestricted block grants because they do not affect local priorities. 
A second overriding factor is the potential recipient's ability  to 
respond. This may concern time, information processing, or trained man-
power constraints that preclude a response to a Federal aid opportunity. 
Most commonly the constraint is money. As described previously, smaller 
cities seemed more apt to respond to Section 3 and Section 9 opportunities 
when the required local share dipped from 33 1/3% to 20%. For example, 
arguments that local communities could not raise their matching share 
supported the increases in Federal aid for smaller airports being increased 
from 50% to 75%, then to 90%.
2 
Fiscal constraints on state highway program 
funds associated with the reduction in gasoline tax revenues with the 1973 
energy crisis and super-inflation on construction threatened long-standing 
Federal aid construction programs. As we move to consider the implications 
of funding structures, it is well to remain aware of these overarching influences. 
1States vary considerably in this regard; for instance, Colorado has no 
non-Federal-aid state road system. 
2
Reduced to 80% for 	 FY80. 
B. Categorical vs. Block Grants  
What is the purpose of having a categorical aid program? Presum-
ably, it must be to stimulate effort in an area of national priority, per-
ceived to be of lower priority by the potential aid recipient. The 
Sectional UMTA grants have fostered specific sorts of activities - e.g., 
facilities for the elderly and handicapped, and planning. The capital pro- 
grams may have induced capital investments in preference to operating costs - 
bus purchases in 1974-1975 were approximately double what they might have 
been absent the Federal subsidy.
1 
UMTA grants have stimulated rail sys-
tems investment (63% of UMTA capital aid through 1976 went to rail). One 
reason is that capital represents up to 80% of the total cost of rail 
operations compared to less than 10% for buses. So, an 80% capital grant 
reduces the overall cost of rail systems by 64% to the recipient, versus 
about a 7% reduction for bus systems.
2 
We can conclude that the UMTA 
capital grants favored capital investment in preference to maintenance 
and operating outlays, and rail in preference to bus. 
Many transportation people would agree with the conclusion of John Wells 
et al. that it is desirable to minimize the Federal influences constraining 
local decision-makers in the absence of a clear-cut national objective. 3 
1
Charles Rivers Associates, Inc., Subsidies, Capital Formation and  
Technological Change: Mass Transit, prepared for Experimental Technology 
Incentives Program, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C., 
November, 1977, p. 177. 
2 lbid., p. 175. 
3
John D. Wells et al., An Analysis of the Financial and Institutional  
Framework for Urban Transportation Planning and Investment, Institute for 
Defense Analysis, Arlington, VA; prepared for Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Policy, Plans, and International Affairs, U.S. Department 
of Transportation, June, 1970 (PB 265 245). 
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Indeed, we seem to be in the midst of a trend away from categorical to 
block grants.
1 
If national objectives are not a dominant consideration, 
the objection to block grants seems to be that the increased local flexi-
bility might lead to confusion!
2 
But what is their purpose? Presumably, 
it is to substitute for local funds. This makes redistribution the pri-
mary issue - who benefits and who pays? Setting aside user/non-user dis-
tinctions, why should the nation as a whole pay for intra-city transpor-
tation? One might well ask about the distribution of UMTA block grant 
funds vis-a-vis the distribution of general revenue sources that support 
them. (At this time, the Section 5 funds act like a block grant. 3 ) 
Indeed, one can take the argument a step further to say that if the 
local government needs financial aid, why not allow it free rein to set 
priorities, not limiting those to transportation. Why should Atlanta build 
a subway system at national expense when it would not choose to do so with 
$2 billion of its own funds? Broadly speaking, several degrees of cate-
gorization can be differentiated: 
- specific categorical transit programs (e.g., Section 16) 
- transit block grants (e.g., Section 5) 
- urban transportation block grants (e.g., proposed easing of 
interchange between urban highway and transit uses) 
- total block grants (e.g., general revenue sharing). 
'However, extremes of categorization continue - the 1974 Federal-Aid 
Highway Act Amendments included an appropriation for a specific intersection 
in a specific city. [W. M. Hilliard notes this in Transportation Research 
Board, Special Report 157, Transportation Programming Progress, 
Washington, D.C., 1975.] 
2
Transportation Research Board, Special Report 155, Research Needs for  
Evaluating Urban Public Transportation, Washington, D.C., 1975. 
3
Congressional Budget Office, Urban Mass Transportation: Options for  
Federal Assistance, Washington, D.C., February, 1977, p. 37. 
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The key dimension is the tradeoff between stimulation (categorical 
programs) and substitution (block programs). 
C. Matching Requirements  
Matching shares also strongly relate to the question of stimulation 
versus substitution. At one extreme is the possibility of a Federal grant 
without any matching requirement. These can either be categorical (e.g., 
certain 100% Federal aid safety programs) or block (e.g., revenue sharing) - 
the former stimulate effort on a particular program, but without local out-
lay; the latter, largely substitute for local outlays. Toward the other 
extreme, programs with relatively low Federal share are unlikely to be very 
attractive to potential participants. However, an interesting effect inter-
cedes in the middle-to-high Federal share range. The greatest stLmuLation 
of local program investment may occur with moderate Federal shares (e.g., 
50% Federal share induces equal recipient investment). Very high Federal 
shares lose their leverage to stimulate appreciable local investment (e.g., 
90% Federal programs induce the recipient to invest only 10c of the total 
dollar). As noted previously, high Federal share may enable fiscally- 
strapped parties to participate.
1 
It is worth emphasizing that the matching ratio acts in conjunction 
with other program and situation factors. Urban System and Interstate 
transfers to transit seem quite dependent on small matching differentials, 
but Section 5 recipients allocate most of these formula funds to operating 
expenses at 50% match in preference to capital investments at 80% Federal 
share. However, in the Section 5 instance, most cities do not have to 
1
As discussed in the Overview paper of this study, response to 
Federal funding programs also depends significantly on the fiscal capa-
bility of potential recipients. 
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Hence, these act 
as block grants without matching requirements. 
D. Discretionary vs. Formula Grants  
In considering this dimension of Federal aid structuring, it is cru-
cial to realize the manner in which Section 5 formula grants are confounded 
with a non-matching, block grant character (as discussed in the previous 
paragraphs).
3 
Formula programs apportion funds on a prescribed basis 
(e.g., based on population and population density for Section 5), whereas 
discretionary grants must be applied for on a project-by-project basis. 
Discretionary funds best suit "lumpy" situations - non-routine, large 
projects such as the construction of new heavy rail systems. One of the 
key concerns is the equitability of distribution. While this is always 
subject to debate, our analyses indicate a remarkably even distribution of 
Section 3 and Section 9 funds (and also Section 5) on a per transit com-
muter basis. (One could argue that this favors the status quo, i.e., the 
older, Northern cities with established rail systems. An alternative stra-
tegy would be to provide more aid to the newer, Southern cities which are 
having greater population growth and might benefit greatly from stimulating 
new transit efforts.) 
A main advantage to formula allocations is their relatively assured 
nature. This eases the uncertainties of planning and can have beneficial 
1
Subsidies, Capital Formation, and Technological Change: Mass  
Transit, Charles Rivers Associates, op. cit., p. 70, 82. 
2lndeed, all but 6 of the 46 UAs over 500,000 population overmatched 
according to UMTA, Transit Operating Performance and the Impact of the  
Section 5 Program, Washington, D.C., November, 1976, p. 10. 
3In contrast, note the Federal-Aid Highway Program - a formula program 
with some operationally effective matching demands and categorical features. 
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secondary effects. For one, state and local transportation people recog-
nize their own job security as greater in association with the reliable 
highway program than with the transit program. Another advantage of for-
mula programs is their simplified administration, not having to determine 
who is to receive what grant amounts. 
E. Long Term Surety  
Beyond the formula consideration just mentioned, the assurance of 
program support for an extended period is most strongly linked with the 
trust fund concept. Hilton has called this a key to the prospects for 
transit.' A key point of contention, beyond that of the desirability of a 
trust, is whether it should be unified with the highway trust. Our evi-
dence on these issues is very limited. To date, options for use of high-
way program funds for transit have not caused a serious drain on highway 
resources. Dangers of a drainage in the other direction, from transit to 
highways, in the event of a combined program are perceived as serious by at 
least some professionals. On the other hand, there appears to be a strong 
consensus that long term assured support would be a major asset to transit 
development.2 The effects of extended term Federal aid commitments, begin-
ning with the 1970 UMTA Act, are unfortunately confounded with increased 
levels of support and changes in funding structures. 
F. Hybrids  
Briefly, it should be obvious that the discussions of funding struc-
tures have focused on the "ideal types." In practice, these interact 
strongly with each other. Also, it is quite feasible to design funding 
1
Hilton, G. W., Federal Transit Subsidies, American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 11 
2
Alan Altschular personally argues that a trust fund is evidence of 
public support, no more and no less. 
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policies which capture desirable features of categorical and block grants, and 
discretionary and formula programs - as well as variable matching and 
support period features. Present and proposed Federal transportation poli-
cies do this to a significant extent. 
G. Funding Structures vis-a-vis Public Transportation Objectives  
Manipulation of Federal funding structures should never be an end 
unto itself. Even arguments about simplification or standardization (e.g., 
making a whole series of matching requirements the same) make no sense on 
their own. Transportation programs and financial aid arrangements should 
be based on goals and objectives; the financial structures are only a means 
to those ends. The proper context is obviously to specify the objectives 
first, then to manipulate the funding and other program factors to attain 
those objectives. 
What then are the goals and objectives of the Federal urban transpor-
tation effort? Drawing upon legislation, policy statements, and the 
views of various transportation parties, Table 4 lists candidate goals 
for public transportation (mass transit and public paratransit). 
Possibly the toughest question is how to measure performance. 
Explicit indicators of goal-attainment are largely lacking and basic 
data on transit activities are very weak (the Section 15 reporting sys- 
tem now in place may help considerably). The evaluation of how the vari-
ous funding structures have supported the goals and objectives is outside 
the scope of this research. Our intent is to indicate, to the degree pos-
sible, what the effects of the individual funding structures are; evalua-
tion of composite funding policies is a different question. However, 
Table 4 sketches out some general implications of various funding struc-
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brought together again with the funding structures when we .-onsider the 
implications of current policy proposals in a later section. 
H. Indirect Effects of Transit Funding Structures 
The implications of transit funding programs extend beyond the public 
transportation goals and objectives just discussed. Effects are difficult 
to attribute in any simple fashion to a particular funding program, yet 
several provocative observations can be made: 
- public ownership: the capital grants (Section 3) stimulated public 
takeover of ailing private transit firms. 
- fare stabilization: public ownership and the formula (Section 5) 
grants contribute to low fares. 1 
- capital formation: the capital grants stimulated large increases 
in both rail and bus capital investments in the first half of this 
decade. This is primarily for construction in new rail systems and 
for vehicle replacement for existing rail systems and bus systems. 
Most new technologies are designed to improve the quality of service, 
not to reduce costs. 2 New rail systems, in the short run, have 
proved to be expensive, incur large operating deficits, offer little 
energy conservation, and have little impact on automobile usage. 3 
 The capital grants have promoted increased numbers of competitors 
in the bus manufacturing industry. 
- increased wages: public ownership appears to have contributed to 
wage escalation. From 1967 through 1975 annual earnings of transit 
employees rose 21% faster than the general price level (as measured 
by the GNP deflator) to become the highest of any public sector 
group 
- productivity decline: labor productivity, as measured by the ratio 
of either vehicle miles or passenger trips to number of emplcyees, 
has fallen since expansion of the capital grants program in the 
1Average transit fares have decreased in constant dollars since 1972, 
according to the American Public Transit Association, op. cit., p. 32. 
2Charles Rivers Associates, op. cit. 
3Congressional Budget Office, Urban Mass Transportation: Options for  
Federal Assistance, Washington, D.C., February, 1977, p. xii. 
4Charles Rivers Associates, op. cit., p. 96. 
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1970's. Capital has not substituted significantly for labor. ' 
The formula grants program also provides disincentives for effi-
cient operations. Subsidy of operating deficits has led to main-
tenance, or extension, of service (with no substantial ridership 
boosts), and low fares (or reduced taxes). 2 Restriction of funds 
to public authorities (they can pass funds through) helps to limit 
competition from innovative private firms. Further, most oppor-
tunities for productivity increases in transit lie in system design 
and management. Federal aid programs not only do little to promote 
this, their labor protection requirements inhibit such actions. 3 
A serious problem in judging public transportation funding programs 
is the lack of means to evaluate their effects. In terms of the direct 
goals, the lack of operational criteria has been singled out as a major 
problem. 4 In terms of goals, objectives, and other effects, the absence 
of good information is a problem. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
cost-effectiveness concerns have not been paramount. 
V. Some Observations on 1978 Legislative Proposals  
The proposed Highway and Public Transportation Improvement Act of 
19785 addresses many of the funding issues raised herein. The purpose of 
this discussion is not to pass judgment on the Act, but rather to relate 
the foregoing analytical implications to it. In so doing, the emphasis is 
on urban public transportation and Federal funding structures. This dis-
cussion is not intended to be comprehensive. Several features of the Act 
treated, one-by-one. 
1 
Union work rules and Federal provisions are a factor here. In terms 
of capital itself, cost-effectiveness is not tested because of the 80% 
Federal share which means that additional vehicle features need be worth 
only 20% of their cost to the local buyer to be attractive. (Ibid, p. 180). 
2
Congressional Budget Office, op. cit., p. xiii. 
3
Charles Rivers Associates, op. cit., p. 181, 182. 
4
Transportation Research Board, Special Report 155, op. cit. 
5Contrasts between the proposals discussed and the since enacted 1978 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act remain interesting; hence, this dis- 
cussion has not been removed. 
Uniform 80% Federal Matching Share. This serves to remove the differential 
program matching shares, except for the Interstate Highways. One implica-
tion should be local choices based more on perceived needs and priorities 
than on maximizing Federal aid. Transfers of Urban System and Interstate 
funds to transit projects should be facilitated, although matching differ-
entials are only one factor presently limiting these. Indeed, since Inter-
state transfers will be entitled to 90% Federal aid (from general revenues), 
they will have an edge over other sources of transit capital aid. Because 
of this and the greatly reduced availability of discretionary UMTA capital 
funds (Section 3), it seems likely that increases in transfers to transit 
could result. Given the present limited utilization of Interstate and 
Urban System transfer funds for transit, that does not seem unreasonable. 
While the 80% Federal share represents no change for transit, it is a 
high matching level. This tends to encourage broad participation (i.e., by 
smaller UAs with less local money available for matching requirements). 
However, it also provides little incentive for cost-effective decision-
making given that a project that is worth over 20G on the dollar is locally 
attractive. It also yields low leverage to stimulate transportation invest-
ment. Given the general absence of significant transit investment over and 
above that required to meet Federal matching requirements, a lower matching 
share would prompt considerably more overall effort. For instance, in the 
absence of local overmatching, 80 of Federal aid generates $1.00 of total 
investment at this matching ratio. In contrast, at a 50% ratio, 80G of 
Federal aid generates $1.60 of total investment (i.e., 60% more transpor-
tation effort). 
Changes in Formula. The proposed formula entails several changes: 
operating aid limited to 33 1/3% of expenses instead of 50% of 
deficits, and to 60% of the non-population apportionment factor 
amount; 
• no maintenance of effort provision; 
• apportionment based on commuter rail miles (5%), fixed guideway 
route miles (19%), and bus replacement factor/ratio of number of 
bus seat miles in prior fiscal year (25%) in addition to population 
(25 1/2%) and population weighted by density (25 1/2%); 
• four years in which to obligate funds. 
The new operating aid limits are strongly supported by the present 
analyses of the effects of the old limits. They remove the incentive for 
operating deficits and replace the previous differential matching ratio 
incentive to use formula funds for transit capital investments, which did 
not work (94% of Section 5 funds have gone to operating expenses). Removal 
of the maintenance of effort provision is reasonable given that it was 
largely ineffective in the face of inflation-induced increases anyway. 
The apportionment formula change would favor maintenance of the 
present commuter systems (i.e., old, large, Northern city systems) rela-
tive to stimulation of new ones. Our "per transit commuter" analyses 
indicate no serious problems with the old formula, although other mea-
sures (such as per capita or per 1974-75 revenue riders) show favoritism 
to the small UAs without extensive transit systems.
1 
One's preference 
depends upon whether a dominant goal is to boost transit use in the grow-
ing areas without much transit usage, or to aid the older cities maintain 
transit service. 
1
Some argue that the present system thereby fails to provide ade-
quately for existing transit systems. 
The four-year obligation period along with the formalized letters of 
intent provides better long-term funding flexibility and assurance. This 
is conducive to sensible planning. Given that routine capital expenses 
are to come out of the formula program, the four-year period certainly 
makes sense to give local authorities the ability to accumulate aid for 
sizable investments. 
Reduced Use of Discretionary Funding. As just mentioned, the proposal 
calls for use of discretionary transit aid only for exceptional capital 
investments. This should ease the UMTA administrative chores and red tape 
facing local authorities seeking aid for routine capital investments (e.g., 
bus replacements). It may make things easier for the small cities who seem 
most sensitive to program complexities. The corresponding increase in the 
formula program means more reliable funding prospects which are helpful in 
planning. Most importantly, this change reduces the incentive for over-
capitalization (in lieu of maintenance, etc.). 
More Flexible Highway-Transit Fund Interchange. The provision for up to 
50% transfer in either direction (highway to transit or transit to high-
way) transforms the transportation aiu program toward a block grant pro-
gram, away from a categorical one. The 1973 provisions for Interstate and 
Urban System transfers to transit have not caused damaging fund losses to 
the highway program. However, as discussed, there have been a number of 
factors limiting use of the transfer provision (including differential 
matching requirements). The stronger case for concern of the proposed 
flexibility might be that from transit to highway. Besides tending to 
counter the urban transportation goal of decreasing auto use, it may sub-
ject the funds to unequal lobbying forces inclined toward highways. On 
the other hand it favors the objective of minimizing Federal constraint on 
local choice processes. In a similar fashion, the proposals to consolidate 
Section 9 funding into a composite transportation planning category and to 
combine UMTA and FHWA are intriguing. These proffer prospects of reduced 
modal rivalry and long-term equalization of professional capabilities in 
areas such as planning. But, they raise fears about "swamping" the less-
robust transit institution by its stronger highway counterpart. 
Overall. In terms of simplification and rationalization of Federal funding 
structures, the proposed Act is very attractive. It would push the aid 
program in the direction of a formula, block grant program. In so doing 
along with equalizing matching ratios, it would reduce the Federal program-
matic influences, thereby enhancing decision-making to meet locally per-
ceived priorities. In other words, the Federal role would become more that 
of subsidizing local public transportation efforts than that of stimulating 
efforts in particular programs. 
Insofar as one sees the supposed Federal goals and objectives for 
transit (see Table 4) as rather vague, this is a highly desirable direction 
to go. One can then focus on distributional issues: What is the most 
equitable way to support public transportation? Who should pay and who is 
benefitting? What should the Federal involvement be? 
On the other hand, to the extent that one ascribes to the sorts of 
goals enumerated for public transportation, analysis should focus on the 
implications of the proposed changes for attainment. In most general terms, 
the changes bode well for efficiency and meeting transit needs as those are 
perceived by local authorities. They imply less of a Federal incentive 
toward transit investment per se (stimulation of effort) and toward transit 
in lieu of auto usage. 
These issues deserve serious analytical attention in conjunction with 
policy deliberations. Analyses could be helpful in weighing the "net 
effects" of the Act's composite of funding structure changes. Policy atten-
tion to the relative importance of the national public transportation goals 
and objectives is needed to weigh the desirability of the likely effects 
of the proposed changes. 
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Summary 
The purpose of this research is to understand (and later be able to 
predict) states' responses to changes in Federal transportation funding 
policies. In particular, this analysis focuses on state responses to 
Federal highway matching requirements and funding levels. Both the behav-
ior of and interaction between the Interstate and ABCD1 systems are exam-
ined. Ultimately, this work should be useful in analyzing Federal policies 
as well as states' responses. 
This effort is part of a broader study for the Office of the Secretary 
(P. J. Barbato, monitor). The larger study addresses the effects of dif-
ferential funding structures across highway, airport, and transit modes. 
The approach undertaken to meet the stated purpose is as follows: 
1) Obtain a general overview. This is pursued from three vantage 
points (the Federal, state, and taxpayer perspectives). 
2) Postulate the key factors (variables) influencing state 
response. 
3) Explore the implications with respect to a particular policy 
change - the 1970 Federal Aid Highway Act. 
4) Re-explore, as necessary, and draw conclusions. 
The salient conclusions may be summarized as below. First, from the 
general overview, looking at the period from 1950 on, 
from the Federal perspective: 
• In current dollars
2
, Federal aid has increased with time. 
In constant dollars
2
, Federal expenditures have actually been 
decreasing since 1965. 
• If an extrapolation of the expenditure trends of the past ten 
years can be believed, the ABCD highway program will soon have 
equal emphasis with the Interstate program. 
• The Federal government has invoked level and matching requirement 
initiatives to change state response. These include the 1956 
Federal Aid Highway Act establishing the Interstate System and 
the 1970 Federal Aid Highway Act changing the ABC matching ratio, 
effective fiscal year (FY) 1974. 
1
ABCD refers to the combined Federal-aid primary (A), secondary (B), 
urban extension (C), and urban (D) systems. 
2
All dollar values in this paper are in current dollars unless spe-
cifically expressed as constant (or deflated) dollars. 
from the state perspective: 
• States obtain their highway revenues primarily from highway user 
taxes, with Federal government funds second in importance. 
• In current dollars, the states have increased their level of 
expenditures over time almost linearly. 
• In constant dollars, state expenditures have been decreasing 
since about 1970. 
• In both current and constant dollars, the proportion of the state 
budget expended on highways has been dramatically decreasing since 
about 1965. 
• ABCD expenditures account for a steady two-thirds of the states' 
own expenditures over the period 1955-1975; a decreasing percentage 
of Interstate funds has been replaced by increasing non-Federal 
system expenditures. 
• States currently lay out four to five times the amount of state- 
only capital on the ABCD program as on the Interstate system. 
• For every five dollars spent on highways, more than one dollar 
goes to maintenance. The trend is to even more on maintenance. 
• The states project their 1990 needs to significantly exceed present 
expenditures. Thus, optimum system performance is not obtainable. 
• No big shift in state expenditures occurred in 1974 or 1975 as 
a result of the Federal initiative in FY74. 
from the taxpayer perspective: 
• Highway user taxes, expressed in constant dollars, were fairly 
constant from 1955 to around 1968, but they started dropping at 
that point. 
• Among states there is wide dispersion in the amount of state 
user taxes. 
• Equity measures such as per capita tax burden, miles of travel 
per dollar tax burden, and per capita bond indebtedness also show 
dispersion across the various states. Different states "suffer" 
according to the measure of equity chosen. 
Continuing with the second step of the approach, key variables were 
postulated to be "program effect," state perceived need, and fiscal capa-
bility. (Here "program effect" reflects factors such as matching ratio, 
anticipated Federal funding commitment, and the state's last-year 
vi 
expenditure level.) Existing data (from the 72 NTR1 , 74 NTR
2
) were 
exploited as needs measures: in all, three different needs measures were 
utilized. In addition, two separate measures of fiscal capability were 
employed: survey results from the 72 NTR, and percent state dependence 
on Federal aid. After this study was essentially completed, we became 
aware of new fiscal capability work by Cooper 3 , and new needs measures. 4 
Exploration centered around three aspects of the 1970 Federal Aid 
Highway Act. First, the states' historic ABCD matching tendencies were 
related to fiscal capability; these tendencies were then compared with the 
states' priority preference between the ABCD and Interstate systems. It 
was found that fiscally self-reliant states are "builders" (historically 
exceeding their matching requirements), whereas the more dependent states 
(less fiscally capable) just meet their matching requirements (i.e., they 
are "matchers"). Moreover, it was found that ABCD "matchers" reflect other 
highway priorities than ABCD (such as Interstate). The second aspect of 
exploration considered whether or not the 1970 Highway . Act (which increased 
matching ratios) resulted in a substantial change in state priorities. As 
expected, no such change was found. The third arena of investigation 
involved the prediction of state program expenditure levels across the 
matching ratio change. These state-by-state predictions were based on 
"common sense" expectations depending on whether or not a state was more 
or less needy and more or less fiscally capable. These predictions failed, 
being confounded by funding intent and the weak needs and fiscal capability 
measures available. 
Enhancements of the model likely to result in increased evaluative and 
predictive success include: using the fiscal capability classification sug-
gested 
 
by Cooper, replacing our needs measures with one based on The Status  
of the Nation's Highways: Conditions and Performance, and explicitly incor-
porating funding intent of a given policy into the model. It is recommended 
that these changes be pursued as the next step toward completing "A Model 
of State Response." 
1 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1972 National Transportation  
Report, Washington, D. C., July 1972. 
2
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1974 National Transportation  
Report, Washington, D. C., July 1975. 
3
Cooper, Thomas W., The State Highway Finance Outlook, U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Washington, D.C., December 1978. 
4
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), The Status of the Nation's  
Highways: Conditions and Performance, Washington, D.C., September 1977. 
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I. Introduction  
The purpose of this research is to understand (and later be able to 
predict) states' responses to changes in Federal transportation funding 
policies. In particular, this analysis focuses on state responses to 
Federal initiatives in the form of highway matching requirements and fund-
ing levels. Both the behavior of and interaction between the Interstate 
and ABCD
1 
systems are examined. Ultimately, this work should be useful in 
analyzing Federal policies, as well as states' responses. 
This effort is part of a broader study for the Office of the Secretary 
(P. J. Barbato, monitor). The larger study addresses the effects of differ-
ential funding structures across highway, airport, and transit modes. We 
deeply appreciate the insights offered on current and future policy issues 
by the many knowledgeable transportation professionals acknowledged in our 
overview report. 
The approach undertaken to meet the avowed purpose is first to obtain 
a general overview. This perspective is pursued from three distinct vantage 
points: that of a Federal, state, and taxpayer viewpoint. Insight gar-
nered from the overview is then utilized to postulate the key variables 
influencing state response. This is followed by exploration of implica-
tions of the FY 1974 highway policy changes and conclusions. 
II. Overview: Patterns of Highway Expenditure Over Time  
Our interest lies in understanding the past effects of Federal funding 
policies so as to be able to anticipate likely effects of contemplated 
changes in these policies. It is toward this objective that we examine 
1
ABCD is our notation for the combined Federal-aid primary (A), 
secondary (B), urban extension (C), and urban (D) systems. We must look 
at the aggregate to maintain consistency in the data series. 
the relationships between Federal funding parameters and state responses 
in the next section. The first step in this direction entails a descrip-
tion of the past patterns of highway expenditure behavior. We approach 
these from three distinctive vantage points - those of the Federal govern-
ment, the states, and the "taxpayers." The first aims to visualize the 
pattern of Federal highway funding actions over the past twenty-five, or 
so, years. The second reflects the funding changes in respect to the 
states' own contributions. The third presents some basic equity issues 
with hearing upon the conceptualization of policy points of concern. 
A. scenario:  the Federal Perspective  
We first examine the question of Federal expenditures since 1950. 
Figure 1 shows a plot of current dollar
1 
average Federal highway expendi-
tures per state versus time. As may be seen from this figure, Federal 
expenditures have increased over time, with a large jump in 1956 or 1957 
with the inception of the Interstate system program. Figure 2 shows the 
same data corrected for inflation (using the Consumer Price Index - CPI - 
with 1967 as base); here we see (in deflated dollars) a rising Federal 
commitment through the 50's and a slowly declining level over the past 
decade. When one considers that highway construction costs have been 
inflating at an even greater rate than the CPI, one can see the challenge 
facing highway administrators at all levels of government. 
Figure 3 shows the relative Federal commitment to the Interstate 
versus the ABCD System as measured by the percentage of total Federal 
expenditure, by system, over time. This figure indicates that Interstate 
went from 0% to 50% in the mid-to-late 50's, remained essentially constant 
1
All dollar values in this paper are in current dollars unless spe-
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Figure 3. Relative Federal Commitment to the Interstate vs. the ABCD System 
4 
at about 70% through the 60's, and has dropped through the 70's down to 
about 60% again. The ABCD system is the complement of this. 
How historically has the Federal government attempted to help the 
states through such efforts as changes in matching ratios? Figure 4 
depicts the percentage Federal matching share, by system, over time. Here 
we see that the Federal government currently pays 90% of Interstate capital 
expenditures and pays 70% of ABC capital outlays.
1 
The 1970 Federal Aid Highway 
Act changed the ABC ratio from 50% to 70%,effective fiscal year (FY) 1974 
(calendar year '73). 
In summary of the Federal perspective, therefore, we see that the 
Federal government has increased Federal aid in terms of current dollars 
since 1950; however, when corrected for inflation, these expenditures have 
actually been decreasing since about 1965. Moreover, the Federal govern-
ment showed an early commitment to the Interstate system but is now 
approaching a point of equal emphasis with the ABCD program, if an extrap-
olation of Figure 3 can be believed. Federal decision-makers, through 
policy actions such as the FY1974 change in ABC systems matching require-
ments, have changed the states' highway picture. The question is how did 
the states respond. We now shift to a state perspective. 
B. Scenario: the State Perspective 
We of course realize that the scenario from the state perspective 
will vary from state to state, but our purpose here is to provide a "ball-
park feeling" of the big picture. Therefore, we proceed using the average 
1The Public Land States (PLS) have traditionally gotten higher per-
centages than those shown in both the Interstate and ABC systems (see 
Table 1), but we keep things simple for now. The Surface Transportation 
Act of 1978 changes the ABC share to 75%. 
100% 
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Figure 6. Average State's Constant-Dollar Highway Expenditures vs. Time 
(1967 Base) 
0 
of the 48 continental states. (Later we attempt to capture some of rhi:, 
variation.) 
Figure 5 shows the average state's total highway disbursements in 
current dollars versus time. These disbursements include those on main-
tenance and non-Federal-aid roads, and, of course, include expenditures 
made possible by the Federal aid discussed above. As may be seen from 
this figure, this value has increased almost linearly to its 1975 value 
between 400 and 500 million dollars. The state level in the early 50's was 
about seven times the corresponding Federal expenditure (Figure 1); in 
the early 60's it was down to 3 to 1; in the early 70's the figure was 4 
to 41/2 times. Figure 6 gives the same data as in Figure 5 corrected for 
inflation; here we see a linear increase up until around 1970, w _en a 
decreasing trend began. 
The ratio of the state highway expenditures (of Figure 5) to state 
general expenditures is shown in Figure 10. This figure shows a dramatic 
decline in the proportion of the state budget for highways from about 30% 
in the early 60's to 20% in the early 70's. (The figure is less than 15% 
for the public land and industrial states.) This is in spite of a rising 
Federal contribution. This decline contrasts sharply with the states' 
description of their highway needs. According to calculations based on 
the 1974 National Transportation Report (74 NTR) 1 , state highway needs in 
1990 will be (very) roughly at least twice present expenditures 1r, real  
dollars. The Federal government, recognizing this problem, has changed 
its view of needs to one based on the concept of performance-related 
1
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1974 National Transportation  
Report, Washington, D.C., July 1975. 
investment.
1 
This view recognizes the unrealistic nature of obtaining 
maximum system performance, and instead prioritizes work to meet a level of 
performance specified by available funds. The National Highway Inventory 
and Performance Study (NHIPS) provided data of two types in support of the 
new needs approach: a survey of mileage and travel, and an inventory of 
physical and operating conditions. 
We now look briefly at state highway expenditures after Federal con-
tributions have been subtracted out. (We call these values the "state-only" 
values.) Figure 7 shows the state-only capital outlay commitments to the 
Interstate and ABCD systems relative to each other (i.e., % Interstate + 
% ABCD = 100%). This figure indicates a current ABCD commitment of over 
80%; this value has been slightly increasing since 1956; conversely the 
Interstate value has decreased slightly since 1956 to a value under 20%. 
Thus, roughly speaking, states currently expend four to five times as much 
of their state-only capital funds on the ABCD system as on the Interstate. 
Figure 8 adds in (state-only) expenditures on non-Federal-aid roads and 
thereby illustrates through the use of pie charts the relative import of 
spending on the non-Federal-aid highways. Expenditures on non-Federal-aid 
highways are seen to be a significant and growing part of the pie. It is 
interesting to note that ABCD expenditures have remained constant at about 
2/3 from 1955-1975; the decreasing percentage of Interstate funds has been 
2 
replaced by non-Federal outlays. 
1
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), The Status of the Nation's  
Highways: Conditions and Performance, Washington, D.C., September 
1977. 
2
State highway systems have become substantially larger since the 
1950's. If many local roads have been put on the state highway system, 
this may be the reason for the increase in non-Federal road expenditures. 
..................... 
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Figure 7. Relative State Commitment to Interstate vs. ABCD System 
(% of total state expenditure on Federal-aid highways, 
by system, over time) 
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Figure 12. Average State-Only Constant-Dollar Highway Gasoline Tax, 
Over Time (Base = 1971) 
[SOURCE: '74 NTR, page 465] 
Are the states becoming heavily involved with maintenance or is con-
struction still of primary import? The capital-outlay-to-maintenance ratio 
is used as one possible measure and is plotted in Figure 11. This ratio 
was around 4:1 in 1957, increased and then held at 5:1 over the period 1958 
to 1968, and has been declining since then, reaching the value 3.7 to 1 in 
1975. It should be further noted that the Northeastern states are cur- 
rently very low (around 2:1), whereas the Southern states are high (at 4:1). 
This is not too surprising when one considers the heavy highway usage in 
the Northeastern corridor, the generally worse weather (maintenance-wise) 
there, the fact that these states' highway systems are largely in place, 
and the lower population growth there. 
To round out this scenario and to lay some groundwork for later ques-
tions on fairness and equity, we ask how the states have raised their 
highway revenues. Figure 9 shows the percentage breakdown for the four 
revenue sources: 
• Federal government 
• state general fund 
• user taxes 
• tolls. 
(Other sources are assumed negligible for now.) The breakdown indicates 
that highway user taxes are by far the predominant source, with Federal 
government funds (also based on user taxes) a distant second. It should be 
added that between 5 and 6% of these funds have been diverted to non-highway 
use for each of the pie-chart periods shown. 
Summarizing the state perspective, therefore, we see that states 
obtain their highway revenues primarily from highway user taxes, with 
Federal government funds secondary. The states have increased their level 
11 
uf -xpenditures over time while decreasing the proportion of the state 
budget expended on highways. States currently lay out (roughly) four to 
five times the amount of state-only capital on the ABCD program as on the 
Interstate system; and for every five dollars spent on highways, more than 
one dollar goes to maintenance (with the trend toward even greater main-
tenance expenditures). The states project their 1990 needs to be signifi-
cantly greater than present expenditures, even in constant dollars. 
We pause to take cognizance (in light of our overall objective of 
understanding state response to Federal initiatives) that at a macro level 
the higher Federal matching ratio supplied by the Highway Act of 1970 (tak- 
ing effect FY1974) appears to have had no significant effect on the average 
state's expenditure level. This observation is fairly significant as this 
Act increased the Federal-share matching ratio from 50% to 70% - a substan-
tial change. 
C. Scenario: the Taxpayer Perspective  
Figure 12 shows the average highway gasoline tax in cents per gallon 
(corrected for inflation with 1971 as base) over the last twenty years. 
It is seen that this form of user tax, expressed in constant dollars, was 
fairly constant from 1955 to 1968, at which time it started decreasing 
rather dramatically. 
Figure 13 shows the distribution by state of the same tax for the 
year 1973; in that figure the height of each bar represents the number of 
states at that rate. The dispersion of the states from their average is 
fairly wide, with Connecticut paying twice the rate (10c) as some of the 
residents of Texas (50. 
That the Federal government has long been interested in maintaining 
equity between states can be easily demonstrated. Since the early 1920's 
(6) 
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Figure 13. 1973 State Highway Gasoline Tax in Cents per Gallon 
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13 
those states with large sectors of public land have received advantageous 
Federal-highway-aid provisions. (This is because it would be unfair for 
the citizens of a state to have to pay for large stretches of highway 
across public lands that happen to fall in their state.) Hence, we pre-
sent three different ways of looking at equity. 
Figure 14 gives the distribution of per capita "tax burden" by state 
for 1975; "tax burden" is placed in quotes because we use our own defini-
tion: the sum of state highway user receipts and highway appropriations 
from general funds. The figure indicates that the tax burden varies from 
$40 per capita in New York, Massachusetts, and Utah to $90 per capita in 
Wyoming, Oklahoma, Vermont, and Washington. The distribution of states 
lo , ks approximately normal with a mean of $66/capita. Another var:al 
q?,asure might be a modified "benefit-to-cost" ratio ' 	F , au.e 15 
we show this ratio, where we have defined "benefit" to be vehicle miles of 
travel and "cost" to equal tax burden. Here we see that Utah and Georgia 
get 150 miles of travel per dollar of tax burden, whereas West Virginia gets 
only around 70. And finally, we consider another kind of equity: time 
equity. States with large bond indebtedness imply a burden (and therefore 
a possible inequity) on future generations. This is an important considera-
tion since (as we saw in Figure 12) highway user taxes are not holding 
their own. Thus we depict in Figure 16 inequities on future generations 
based on 1975 bond indebtedness. This figure looks like an exponential 
distribution, with a wide dispersion of inequity. It should be pointed out, 
however, that in some states the burden will be usage dependent; that is, 
1
This ratio is in no way to be construed to be a typical benefit-cost 
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Figure 16. Per Capita Bond Indebtedness (1975) 
15 
the future burden will be paid as tolls by the future users. 
Thus we see from the taxpayer's perspective that, in deflated dollars, 
highway user taxes have actually been declining and that the average high-
way gasoline tax varies quite widely across the country. Equity-wise, 
according to three different measures, wide dispersions are also found in 
the different states. There is no unanimity in "suffering" across the dif-
ferent measures. 
III. Key Variables  
If one proceeds purely on the basis of the results of the above over-
view, one would be tempted to model total state highway expenditures as a 
linearly increasing function of time, with 2/3 of the monies going to ABCD 
and a decreasing percentage to the Interstate system; this "average" state 
model would be postulated regardless of Federal initiatives. For now, we 
ignore this point of view and postulate that states will in fact respond to 
Federal initiatives. We build an intuitive model to predict these re-
sponses, attempting to capture some of the variability between states which 
we have so far ignored. We begin by hypothesizing key factors in the state 
decision-making process. 
We propose that there are four major considerations in a state's deci-
sion regarding its expenditure level on a given system for the upcoming 
year: 
• Last year's expenditure level 
• Fiscal constraints 
• The state's perception of its needs for that system, and 
- Federal initiatives (matching ratio and level of aid). 
We now define a proxy variable which we call the "program effect." The 
program effect is a variable which captures such factors as Federal match- 
Program Effect = Federal aid after  
Matching ratio after 
* 
1 
program level before)  
16 
ing ratio, Federal level of aid, and the state's last-year expenditure 
level. (We elaborate in a moment.) We thus are left with three variables: 
"program effect," fiscal capability, and needs. We now look at each of 
these in turn. 
A. "Program Effect" 
We first note that states historically do not forego Federal highway 
monies. Therefore, we define the "program effect" as the total (state + 
Federal) program amount which must be expended if the state is to capture 
all Federal funds, expressed as a fraction of what the total program amount 
was last year. If this year's program must be $20 million to get all 
Federal money, and last year's was $10 million, then the program effect is 
2.0. It should be noted that the "program effect" may be less than, equal 
to, or greater than unity. Moreover, last year's expenditure level, as 
well as this year's Federal matching ratio and promised level of funds, are 
all subsumed in this new variable. Table 1 lists the "program effect" for 
the states due to the Federal funding policy changes of FY74; observe that 
the "program effect" is less than unity for most of the states. (Therefore, 
spending may be reduced for most states and all Federal funds will still be 
captured.) For example, consider Arizona. It may be shown that 
Or 	P.E.(AZ) {36,430.3K1[ 
 48,659K 
 1 	] 
-0.871 .86  
B. Fiscal Capability  
When including fiscal capability in our model, we really want to 
assess the relative abilities of states to respond to financial stringen-
cies (such as that caused by the early-70's oil crisis or a sudden cutback 
17 
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Note: In computing the "program effect," expenditure data were used and 
a one-and-a-half year time lag was assumed between the appropria- 
tion and its expenditure (i.e., to evaluate the "post-change" 
program effect, federal aid was assumed to be the 1975 calendar 
year (CY) expenditure, and the last-year program level was 
assumed to be the CY 1974 federal t state expenditure). 
18 
in Federal funds). The existing level of fiscal capability is reflected 
in the state's previous year's expenditures. We want to know the state's 
ability to be elastic" in deviations from that existing level. The more 
fiscally capable a state is, the more elastic it will be in stretching 
funds to meet financial strictures. Note that an extra infusion of funds 
to a state represents a different animal than a cutback in funds; therefore, 
the response by a state to an influx of extra Federal funds may not be pre-
dictable from that state's response to a cutback in Federal funds. 
We develop two different measures of fiscal capability. The first 
utilizes the fact that states obtain their revenues primarily from state-
highway user taxes and secondarily from Federal funds (recall Figure 9). 
Wa argue that in a stringency if a state does not raise its user tax, what 
is important is the state's dependence on Federal funds. We therefore 
divide the states into two categories, "dependers" and "self-reliers." 
We do this by looking at percent dependence on Federal aid [dependence = 
Federal aid divided by total highway expenditures in the state: non-
Federal, Federal, and state (including maintenance as well as construction)]. 
Table 2 shows the breakdown by states into the two categories according to 
the average of 1973, 74, and 75 data. 
The second measure appeals directly to the elasticity definition. In 
1972 a needs study was conducted (72 NTR, pages 116; 172). In this study 
each state was asked to develop a Capital Improvement Program under the 
most likely future Federal funding structure (called "Funding Alternative 
II" - FA II); each state was also asked to provide a similar program under 
the stipulation that future Federal funding would be one-half that of the 
most likely case ("Funding Alternative I" - FA I). We chose as our second 
measure of fiscal capability the % change between alternatives [(FA II - FA I) 
Table 2. Fiscal Capability Measure 1: State 
Dependence on Federal Funds 
State 	 Dependence (%) 
"Dependers" 








































Note: % dependence is computed by dividing Federal aid by total state 
highway expenditures on all roads, including construction and 
maintenance. Those states below dashed lines in each category 
should be considered "marginal." 
Note: Only 39 states are listed. The other states are between 25 
and 30 percent dependence and hence are not placed in either 









































* 100% 	FA II]. Table 3 shows a ranking of states by this measure. Here 
we call states "cutters" (they'll cut their own state-only spending if the 
Federal government cuts its funds), "maintainers" (they'll hold their own 
on state-only money even if Federal funds are cut), and "supplanters" 
(the'r'll supplant the cut Federal funds with extra state funds). 
An improved method of classifying states according to fiscal capa-
bility is due to Cooper and has come to our attention since our analysis 
was completed. Cooper uses Federal aid as a percent of capital, bonds as 
a percent of capital, and debt service as percent of revenue to partition 
the states into six groups.' 
C. Needs  
Existing needs-related data from the 72 NTR and 74 NTR were used to 
develop our needs estimates. Discussions with highway-knowledgeable per-
sons disclosed two main criticisms of the data, however. First, the 72 NTR 
data are too "pie-in-the-sky," for the data were developed "without con-
sideration of the availability of funds" (72 NTR, p. 116). And secondly, 
although the 74 NTR data do include considerations of funding availabili-
ties, some states seemed to accept these financial constraints while others 
did not. Recognizing the seriousness of these shortcomings, we proceeded 
nonetheless as this was the best collection of data in hand at the time. 
It was hoped that some meaningful patterns would emerge. 
We defined three distinct needs measures. The first two were derived 
from 74 NTR data, and the third from 72 NTR. The first measure is a per 
capita measure and is the (74 NTR projected value of) 1990 Plan capital 
1
Cooper, Thomas W., The State Highway Finance Outlook, U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Washington, D.C., December 1978. See pages 38-39 in 
particular. 
Table 3. Fiscal Capability Measure 2: % Change Due to Cutback in Funding 
FA II - FA I  
g A = 	 * 100%) FA II 
Rank State % A Rank 	State % A 
"Cutters" "Maintainers," cont'd 
1 MA 50.0% 37 	IL 22.7% 
2 MO 50.0 38 MS 22.3 
3 NY 49.7 39 	WI 21.2 
4 MT 48.2 40 CA 20.0 
5 NM 47.1 41 	VA 19.4 
6 AL 46.7 
7 OK 46.3 
8 VT 46.3 
"Supplanters" 
9 DE 45.8 42 	NV 15.0 
10 CO 45.7 43 MD 12.4 
11 ID 44.3 44 	ND 12.0 
12 KY 44.1 45 LA 7.5 
13 WY 40.6 46 	SD 6.3 
14 TN 39.8 47 NJ 2.5 
15 GA 36.5 48 	IN -1.5%(?) 
16 MN 36.4 
17 KS 36.3 
18 UT 35.9 
19 OR 35.0 
20 WV 34.8 
21 MI 33.8 
22 AZ 33.3 
23 OH 32.9 
24 NC 32.3 
"Maintainers" 
25 NH 29.4 
26 AR 27.7 
27 SC 27.7 
28 TX 27.7 
29 ME 26.6 
30 CT 26.5 
31 IA 26.1 
32 PA 25.8 
33 NE 24.7 
34 FL 23.9 Source: 	Calculations based on 
35 RI 23.5 72 NTR, page 174. 
36 WA 23.2 
costs per capita per year. The second measure is a comparison of the first 
measure with a linear extrapolation of each state's current spending; some 
states thus project a revenue shortfall (and hence are "needers"), whereas 
others project a surplus (and hence are not so needy - they are "havers"). 
And finally, the third measure is taken from 72 NTR, representing each 
state's total highway needs without regard to funding possibilities. All 
of the states were ranked according to each of the three measures; this 
compilation is shown in Table 4. (Supporting data for the three needs 
measures are shown in Tables 5 through 7). 
One does not need to peruse the data for long to realize that the 
three needs measures are not in perfect harmony. The case of California is 
illustrative: need measure 1 states that California is the least needy of 
the 48 states; need measure 3 insists it is the most needy. The correla-
tions among these three measures are
1 
Need 1 	Need 2 	Need 3 
Need 1 	1.00 	.81 	-.01 
Need 2 	 1.00 	.23 
This supports the observation that "needs" vary tremendously depending on 
the estimation procedure, whether on a per capita basis or not, and whether 
or not financial capabilities are considered. 
As mentioned above, the NHIPS study (available after our initial study 
was concluded) provides a way around these difficulties. Because (almost) 
all states have been inventoried according to highway physical conditions, 
travel characteristics, and safety, comfort, and convenience factors, an 
assessment of need priority relative to a total national fiscal posture can 
1
These are rank order correlations - Spearman's rho (p). 
State 
(1990 Plan Annual 












AL 36 30 28 
AZ 7 8 39 
AR 1 1 24 
CA 48 44 1 
CO 34 20 34 
CT 46 43 29 
DE 33 48 47 
FL 11 17 15 
GA 22 15 21 
ID 30 27 45 
IL 13 14 8 
IN 29 42 18 
IA 3 9 19 
KS 17 22 31 
KY 40 34 9 
LA 14 10 27 
ME 38 37 37 
MD 26 25 25 
MASS 44 26 13 
MICH 43 29 6 
MINN 32 38 26 
M'PI 21 18 23 
MO 4 3 16 
MONT 10 11 30 
NEB 25 16 35 
NEV 20 31 48 
NH 42 41 38 
NJ 18 6 7 
NM 27 23 33 
NY 16 12 4 
NC 5 4 14 
ND 12 24 40 
OH 45 36 5 
OK 47 47 32 
OR 41 35 10 
PA 37 33 3 
RI 35 39 42 
SC 23 13 36 
SD 19 28 46 
TN 9 2 22 
TX 6 5 2 
UT 39 40 43 
VT 31 46 41 
VA 24 21 11 
WA 28 45 20 
WV 15 32 12 
WI 8 7 17 
WY 2 19 44 




Need Measure 1 
State Need 
1. AL 70 25. NEB 91 
2. AZ 167 26. NEV 104 
3. AR 263 27. NH 61 
4. CA 40 28. NJ 112 
5. CO 78 29. NM 84 
6. CT 49 30. NY 116 
7. DE 79 31. NC 171 
8. FL 143 32. ND 137 
9. GA 100 33. OH 49 
10. ID 82 34. OK 45 
11. IL 129 35. OR 63 
12. IN 83 36. PA 69 
13. IA 205 37. RI 76 
14. KS 116 38. SC 94 
15. KY 64 39. SD 107 
16. LA 127 40. TN 165 
17. ME 68 41. TX 169 
18. MD 86 42. UT 64 
19. MASS 57 43. VT 81 
20. MICH 59 44. VA 92 
21. MINN 80 45. WA 83 
22. M'PI 104 26. WV 118 
23. MO 194 47. WI 165 
24. MONT 151 48. WY 223 
Note: This need measure = 1990 Plan Hwy. Capital Costs per capita 
per year. 
Source: U.S. DOT, 1974 National Transportation Report, p. 95ff 
(Table III-R-13). 
L4 
Table 6. Need Measure 2 
Surplus of revenues 	(Havers) Shortfall (Needers) 
State State 
Delaware 33 Kentucky 3 
Oklahoma 28 Pennsylvania 4 










Connecticut 20 Michigan 7 
Idaho 19 South Dakota 8 
New Hampshire  17 Indiana 10 rg ma 	inal 
Utah 10 Massachusetts 13 	Needers" 
Rhode Island 7 Maryland 15 
Minnesota 6 Marginal North Dakota 15 
Maine 3 Havers" New Mexico 15 
Ohio 2 Kansas 16 
Oregon 0 Virginia 17 
Colorado 18 
Wyoming 20 





South Carolina 72 
New York 72 
Montana 75 




New Jersey 126 
Texas 128 




Note: This measure derives from an extrapolation of current spending 
compared with states' 1990 projections. (From, U.S. DOT, 1974  
National Transportation Report, p. 478.) 
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Table 7. Need Measure 
(Need Measure 3 = Total State Need in Millions of Dollars) 
Rank State Total Need 	 Rank State Total Need 


















35850.3 26 8208.4 
35425.0 	 27 7974.0 
31292.8 28 7741.5 
26868.5 	 29 7048.8 
25391.9 30 6825.1 
24062.5 	 31 6738.2 
22341.9 32 6382.8 
19421.4 	 33 5569.7 
10 18193.0 34 4971.3 
11 16433.1 	 35 4888.0 
12 15526.2 36 4792.3 
13 14157.9 	 37 4416.5 
14 14071.6 38 4203.4 
15 13541.0 	 39 3657.9 
16 12123.2 40 3612.3 
17 11775.7 	 41 3590.5 
18 11207.7 42 3387.9 
19 10489.1 	 43 2922.1 
20 9789.5 44 2418.8 
21 9715.4 	 45 2413.7 
22 9473.4 46 2372.7 
23 8711.7 	 47 1266.9 
24 8459.2 48 1255.8 
Source: 72 NTR, p. 172. 
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now be made. 
IV. Exploration: Impacts of the FY 1974 Matching Ratio Change  
Our exploration centers around three aspects of the 1970 Federal Aid 
Highway Act, which changed the ABC Federal matching ratio from 50% to 70%, 
effective FY 1974. First, the states' historic ABCD matching tendencies 
are related to fiscal capability; these tendencies are then to be compared 
with the state's priority preference between the ABCD and Interstate sys- 
tems. Second, the '70 Highway Act effects are examined to see if the policy 
change shifted state priorities toward an increased ABCD priority. And 
lastly, state expenditure levels are "predicted" across the matching ratio 
change with only the pre-change expenditure data being used in conjunction 
with the needs and fiscal capability measures. We now examine each of 
these aspects. 
Aspect 1: Matching Tendencies and ABCD Priority Preference  
We first notice that this policy change results in "program effects" 
of less than 1.0 for most states (recall Table 1). Hence, to capture all 
Federal money, states need not spend as much of their own money as before 
the policy manipulation. Now in attempting to select between our two mea-
sures of fiscal capability, we note that this situation does not entail 
fiscal constraint. Thus we propose measure 1 (dependence) as more appro-
priate. Recall that with this measure, states are divided into "dependers" 
and "self-reliers" (Table 2). 
"Dependers" are essentially "matcher" states, whereas self-reliers are 
"builders" (5 of the first 9 states in Table 8 are in the top 13 "self-
reliers"); i.e., "depender" states historically just meet their matching 
requirements, whereas self-reliant states exceed their requirements and 
LO 











































2. 0.65 CT 
3. 0.64 CA 
4. 0.58 FL 
5. 0.57 WV 
6. 0.55 OH 
7. 0.53 PA 
8. 0.53 NY 
9. 0.52 LA 
10. 0.52 VA 
11. 0.48 WA 
12. 0.47 IA 
13. 0.45 MASS 
14. 0.43 WI 
15. 0.42 TN 
16. 0.40 KY 
17. 0.39 TX 
18. 0.39 MO 
19. 0.39 MICH 
20. 0.38 AZ 
21. 0.36 OR 
22. 0.36 DE 
23. 0.36 MN 
24. 0.32 NH 
25. 0.31 M y PI 
26. 0.29 VT 
27. 0.29 AL 
28. 0.28 SC 
29. 0.27 SD 
30. 0.26 NC 
31. 0.26 OK 
32. 0.25 NJ 
33. 0.24 KS 
34. 0.24 AR 
35. 0.20 ME 
36. 0.20 RI 
37. 0.20 GA 
38. 0.19 UT 
39. 0.19 NEV 
40. 0.19 CO 
41. 0.16 WY 
42. 0.14 IL 
43. 0.13 NM 
44. 0.12 IN 
45. 0.11 NEB 
46. 0.09 ID 
47. 0.05 MT 
48. 0.03 ND 
Note: Overmatching Ratio is from Sherman, L. R., The Impacts of the Federal  
Aid Highway Program on State and Local Highway Expenditures,  U.S. DOT, 
Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 199. State classification is from Tables 
2 and 6 (although Table 6 is not needed to draw the conclusions in 
the text). 
hence overmatch historically (thus the name "builders"). Table 8 shows 
the state classification and its historic overmatching ratio as computed 
by Sherman.
1 
We will come back to this in a moment. 
We turn now to questions of priorities. If one assumes that 
Congressional priorities are implied by the percentage of total funds 
given to each program, and that matching ratios affect those priorities, 
one can ask the question, how do Congressional priorities match up with 
state priorities? (Note that we are not suggesting that both priorities 
should be numerically equal; in fact, often Congressional priorities are 
increased to aid "weaker" states with little or no expected state increase. 
We are just attempting to document and understand how both sets of priori-
ties vary.) 










line of matching 
priorities 
In the grid above,Federal priority is measured by % ABCD of total Federal 
highway expenditure, and state priority is measured by % ABCD of total 
program highway expenditure. At any point in time a state has a given 
state and Federal priority (for example, the "x"in the grid above represents 
a state with 30% of its Federal highway aid for the ABCD system, but 20% 
1Sherman, L. R., The Impacts of the Federal Aid Highway Program on  
State and Local Highway Expenditures, U.S. DOT, Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 199. 
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of its total state outlay devoted to the ABCD system. Each state falling 
near the line of matching priorities, then, could be considered to have 
state ABCD system priorities about the same as the Federal government's. 
(This is not necessarily desirable; it is merely a reference point.) We 
observe that due to Federal apportionment schemes, etc., different states 
have different Federal priorities - itself an interesting issue. 
We now postulate that ABCD matchers place relatively higher priorities 
on other highways (such as Interstate), and thus these states lie "to the 
left of" builders as shown in the grid below: 
State Priority for the ABCD 






% of total 
Federal high-
way aid to a 
given state) 








An actual plot showing each state's position as of 1973 is given in Figure 
17. Here each "M" represents a "matcher" state and each "B" a "builder" 
state. The postulate is shown to be substantially correct. 
Aspect 2: The 1970 Highway Act as a Priority Increaser  
We now examine whether the policy changes implemented by the 1970 
Highway Act shifted matcher priorities toward an increased ABCD priority. 
1The presumption is that these states would be more responsive to changes 
in Federal funding policies. ABCD "builder" states are those who have tra-
ditionally invested more in the system than necessary to obtain their Federal 
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Figure 17. Federal vs. State Emphases on the ABCD Systems (1973) 
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Figure 18. Shift of Each Matcher State as a Result 
of the 73/74 Matching Ratio Change 
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We postulate, however, that matchers' priorities did not increase as a 
result of the 73/74 matching ratio change. We use Figure 18 to consider 
this. Each matcher state's position in the priority plane before the ratio 
change is shown by the tail of an arrow; each position after the ratio 
change is shown by the head of the same arrow. Thus the shift due to the 
policy change for each matcher state is indicated by an arrow. Now if the 
policy increased the matcher states' ABCD priority level, then all arrows 
would be directed toward the right of Figure 18. However, Figure 18 shows 
that state priorities shifted very little on the average, and their aggre-
gate direction seems random. (Note also that the Federal priority itself 
increased in some cases, while decreasing in others - it was not a uniform 
shift.) Therefore, we conclude that the 1970 Highway Act did not system-
atically alter states' emphasis on the ABCD systems. This is not in oppo-
sition to the Federal funding intent of the law, which was to support and 
relieve the recipient states. Had the funding intent been motivation of 
individual state spending, these results would have been perplexing. 
Aspect 3: Using Pre-Change Data and Our Key Variables to Predict  
Post-Change Expenditures  
We now attempt to predict state-by-state shifts in expenditure levels 
across the matching ratio change. We divide states into four different 
categories depending on whether they are more or less needy and more or 
less fiscally capable. We then use "common sense" to predict expenditure 
level changes for each of the four categories. For example, we postulate 
that for a "program effect" of less than one, a state with strong fiscal 
capability and yet great ABCD need will take advantage of the more favor-
able matching ratio and at least keep its program level from decreasing. 
On the other hand, a financially strapped state with no great ABCD need 
33 
may be expected (with a "program effect" of less than one) to decrease its 
program level if all it wants to do is avoid foregoing any available Federal 
matching funds on the program in question. 
The above procedure was carried out state-by-state using two different 
sets of key variables. The first set consisted of fiscal capability measure 
1 and need measure 2, and the second set consisted of fiscal capability 
measure 2 and need measure 3. (Recall that NHIPS need data were not avail-
able.) The projected post-change expenditure levels were then compared 
with the actual historic values. The predictions under both cases yielded 
an almost equal number of correct and incorrect prognostications. 
Conclusions on this aspect are difficult. We hope that combining NHIPS 
needs measures, when available on a state-by-state basis, with Cooper-derived 
fiscal capability measures will result in a more accurate predictor. Of 
course, funding intent will be an important consideration. Instances of 
support and relief as funding intent will likely provide little state stimu-
lation. Other policy instruments will have to be examined. 
V. Conclusions and Areas for Further Exploration  
In this work we first examined highway funding from three perspectives. 
These differing viewpoints were used as background to generate a simple 
model of state response to Federal highway initiatives. Three key variables 
were identified: program effect, state highway need, and fiscal capability. 
With respect to the 1970 Highway Act, it was seen that the "depender" states 
historically just meet their matching requirements, whereas "self-reliant" 
states exceed theirs. Furthermore, "matcher" states were seen to act ran-
domly in the priority plane as a result of that act. Attempts to predict 
individual state behavior as a function of the three, key variables were 
unsuccessful. Enhancements of the model likely to result in increased 
34 
success include using fiscal capability classifications suggested by Cooper, 
replacing these needs measures with the more relevant NHIPS data, and expli-
citly incorporating funding intent of a given policy into the model. It is 
recommended that these changes be pursued. 
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Summary  
This analysis is concerned with the effects of the funding structures of 
federal aid highway programs on state allocative decisions. The focus is on 
changes which have occurred over the last 20 years in federal aid funding 
mechanisms and the impact on state highway programs of these changes. This 
work is part of a broader study for the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation (P. J. Barbato, monitor) that addresses the effects 
of funding structures across the highway, airport, and transit modes. 
This study used regression analysis on a highway data base which covers 
the time period 1957-1975 and the 48 contiguous states. In addition to 
analyzing the data base at an aggregate level, particular subsets of the data 
base, such as certain groups of states and certain time periods, were also 
examined. 
The analysis began by examining the relationship of federal aid with 
total state highway expenditures. It was found that one dollar of federal 
aid per capita was associated with an increase in state expenditures for 
all highway purposes by about 24 cents per capita in the case of Interstate 
aid and by about 55 cents per capita in the case of ABC aid. In order to 
talk about federal objectives in aid programs in terms of stimulating or 
financially helping state highway activities (substitution effect), atten-
tion was devoted to the state capital outlays. This analysis showed that 
one dollar per capita of federal aid related to about 7-8 cents per capita 
of state expenditures with both the Interstate and the ABC programs. This 
implies that the Interstate program may have stimulated state capital pro-
grams but by no more than statutorily mandated ratios in the aid program. 
It also implies a mixed effect in the case of ABC aid - there is some stimu-
lation in the sense that state own expenditures are induced to some extent 
but by nowhere near the statutorily mandated ratios in the aid programs. 
By delving into an analysis of subsets of data, such as certain groups 
of states or certain time periods, it was found that there is considerable 
variation in the states' response to federal aid. Based on this analysis, 
it appeared that high federal matching share alone in federal aid programs 
is not an overwhelming stimulative factor--the effect of the matching share 
depends on a number of other variables including the amount of federal aid, 
the availability of state resources, public support for revenue 
increases, etc. Alternative contexts in which the federal matching share 
has different effects were examined. It was also concluded that the extent 
to which a federal program matches perceived highway needs by states is likely 
to be a significant factor in state allocative decisions. This explanation 
appears to have a bearing in the declining interest in the Interstate program 
in the 1970's, in all except the Southern states, and the high interest of 
the Industrial states in ABCD programs. 
For a variety of reasons, it was not possible in the statistical analyses 
reported here to sort out the individual effects on state capital expenditures 
of federal aid primary, secondary, and urban programs. It may be possible to 
examine these effects by analyzing data now available on the number, type, and 
dollar value of highway capital projects (classified according to federal aid 
programs) undertaken by each state. 
1
Federal aid primary (A), secondary (B), and Urban Extension (C) sys-
tems are the major non-Interstate highway aid designates. 
V 
I. Introduction  
This document describes an analysis of state highway expenditures, 
relating these to federal aid. The purpose of this analysis is to see 
what effects, if any, changes in structural parameters of federal-aid 
programs have had on state highway allocative decisions. The analysis 
data cover the time period 1957-1975 and include all 48 contiguous states. 
Within these data, three major instances provide opportunity for comparing 
state allocative decisions: 1 
(1) the establishment of the Highway Trust Fund and major 
financing of the Interstate System in 1956 
(2) the more favorable matching terms available to so-
called "Public Land" states for both Interstate and 
ABC programs. 
(3) the introduction of the Appalachian Highway aid to 
so-called "Appalachian" states in 1965. 
The response of the states to the ways in which federal aid becomes 
available in more favorable terms (such as higher federal matching shares, 
eligibility for special federal aid programs) in these three instances 
might provide clues as to how structural funding parameters of federal aid 
highway programs impact upon states. 
The document is organized as follows. The next chapter describes what 
is referred to as a base analysis. The attempt here is to describe state 
allocative decisions regarding capital and noncapital expenditures and user 
taxes used to finance highway programs as functions of independent variables 
1
While other rather significant changes in the funding structure of 
federal aid programs have occurred since 1973, the number of data points 
(observations) available is insufficient to examine the impacts of these 
changes. 
such as income, population density, federal aid available, etc. No attempt 
is made here to distinguish between states or time periods other than 
through the independent variables. 
Given that states differ markedly in a number of respects,including 
economic strength and rate of change therein, industrialization, population, 
terms of federal aid faced, etc., it appeared useful to conduct an analysis 
of federal aid impacts on certain groups of states. Division of the 1957-
1975 time period to subsets also appeared useful so that one could compare 
impacts of federal aid, say, ex-ante and ex-post the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA). These analyses are described in Chapter III. 
II. Base Analysis  
A. Introduction  
We have termed 1957-70 as the base period since analysis of 
the 48-state response over this period can be compared with the 
findings by Sherman
1 
(whose analysis is over the same period) and by 
the Rand study
2 
(which used data from 1959-70). Of greater interest is 
the response of particular groups of states (such as Public Land and 
Appalachian) over particular time periods (such as 1957-65, 1970-75, etc.). 
These responses are described in the next chapter after a description of 
the base analysis. 
The purpose of this analysis was to examine the impact of federal aid 
highway programs on state expenditures by function. State expenditures can be 
1Sherman, L. The Impacts of the Federal Aid Highway Program on  
State and Local Highway Expenditures, U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Washington, D.C., Feb. 1975. 
2Enns, J. H. The Response of State Highway Expenditures and Revenues  
to Federal Grants-in-Aid, The Rand Corporation, R-1233-FF, Santa Monica, 
Calif., Feb. 1974. 
categorized in several ways: 
- capital expenditures which include resources used for 
planning, engineering, and building roads (as well as for 
reconstruction or replacement of roads and bridges so long 
as such work is deemed capital improvement rather than 
maintenance) 
- maintenance expenditures including the subvention made to 
local jurisdictions for road maintenance purposes 
- administrative and traffic policing expenditures 
- noncapital expenditures which include all activities 
except capital improvements. 
The impact of federal aid on state highway revenues derived from fuel 
taxes, motor vehicle related fees, and other road user levies was also of 
interest. In this connection, one could think of federal aid being used 
to lower or maintain state user taxes or, alternately, federal aid could 
stimulate state highway expenditures necessitating increases in road user 
taxes. 
Federal aid was represented in the analysis by three-year moving 
averages of apportionments. The federal aid programs were characterized 
in several ways: 
- total federal aid 
- federal aid for the Interstate System 
- federal aid for the ABC System (or non-Interstate) 
- federal aid for the primary (A) System 
- federal aid for the secondary (B) System 
- federal aid for the urban extensions (C) System. 
4 
Efforts to disaggregate the impact of federal ABC aid by its system 
components were not usually successful. This was due to the confounding 
that results when states transfer available funds from one category to 
another, or when states transfer roads from one federal-aid system to 
another, and due to problems of multicollinearity. 
Multiple regression techniques were used in the analysis. A com-
parison of regression coefficients via ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and generalized least squares (GLS), where in the latter variables were 
transformed to account for serial correlation, did not show much difference 
in the base analysis. Hence in all subsequent analysis, reported in the 
next chapter, only OLS was employed. 
B. Total Highway Expenditure Analysis  
Initially, attention was focused on the impact of federal aid on total 
state highway expenditures, for both capital and noncapital (maintenance, 
administration, safety, and licensing, etc.) purposes. Sherman had per-
formed an analysis in this way and his work was thought to provide a starting 
point for this study. 
Two regression models were used in this analysis. The first was the 
one used by Sherman and consisted of the following independent variables: 
population (SPOP), capital stock (KSTK, a variable constructed by Sherman 
to represent the highway plant in each state and the dollar needs it generates 
for improvement and preservation), extent of local involvement,vis-a-vis 
state,in highway responsibilities (RLTOT), GINI index measuring distribution 
of income in each state (GINI),
1 
extent of toll financing (TOLPCT), degree 
1
The GINI index is a measure of the degree to which income is 
unequally distributed over the population. The index varies between 
zero and unity with higher values indicating greater degree of income 
inequality. 
5 
of urbanization (UFAC), per capita income (PCY), and federal aid terms. 
The federal aid was represented by two terms, Interstate (AVIGP) and non-
Interstate (AVNIGP). 
The second regression model consisted of population density (POPDEN), 
extent of bond financing (BIPTCX), and motor fuel consumption (MFC), as well 
as UFAC, PCY, AVIGP, and AVNIGP defined previously. In both models all 
dollar terms were deflated according to either the Consumer Price Index, the 
Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) construction price index, or the FHWA 
operation and maintenance price index, as applicable. Also, all terms except 
ratios were converted to per capita measures. 
Two dependent variables were used. The first was the total highway 
expenditure by states (TOTHWYX) and the second was state only total highway 
expenditures (STOTHX). The latter is simply the former less federal payments. 
Table 1 shows the results of three regression runs and, for comparative 
purposes, also lists Sherman's findings.
1 
In our analysis, all three 
regression equations yield results which are similar although the second 
regression model (with the fewer independent variables), shown in regression 
columns (1) and (2), performed slightly better with respect to R 2 , the propor-
tion of error variance explained by independent variables. Regression 
column (3) using Sherman's regression model terms is not too dissimilar from 




The Rand study's findings are not presented here because they (a) 
involved a different dependent variable and (b) employed different indepen-
dent variables. The study represented the federal aid by a single term--
total aid--and did not segregate the aid by system category. The Rand 
study's findings regarding the federal aid coefficient are discussed later. 
2
Differences in the coefficient estimates of KSTK and TOLPCT are 
likely due to the use of different dimensions. For example, KSTK in our 
analysis is in dollar terms while in Sherman's analysis it is probably in 
thousands of dollars. 
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AVIGP 1.2398 	0.0704 0.3905 	0.0531 0.1114 	0.0717 0.642 	0.045 
AVNIGP 1.5440 	0.1965 0.5561 	0.1483 0.5532 	0.1453 - 1.103 	0.092 
UFAC - 0.4562 	0.0560 - 0.4521 	0.0422 - 	0.3052 	0.0465 - 0.738 	0.040 
PCY 0.0119 	0.0019 0.0120 	0.0014 0.0103 	0.0016 0.022 	0.001 
POPDEN - 0.0268 	0.0052 - 0.0262 	0.0014 
BIPTCX 0.3595 	0.0242 0.3839 	0.0182 





 -8.6x10 7 9'.4x10-8 
KSTK 0.0005 	0.003 8.028 	1.050 
RLTOT - 	0.7578 	0.0857 - 0.430 	0.046 
GINI 0.1463 	0.1006 0.771 	0.159 
TOLPCT 631.7749 51.6233 0.598 	0.089 
Constant 37.4440 	3.8897 38.7541 	2.9344 72.8581 	5.9645 12.12 7.16 
R2 0.73 0.56 0.51 0.77 
a
Source: Sherman, L. op. 	cit., 	p. 	264. 
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The coefficients of the federal aid terms are consistent in our analy-
sis in all three regression runs. The first run with total state highway 
expenditures as the dependent variable yields coefficient estimates of 1.24 
for Interstate aid and 1.54 for ABC aid. This indicates that, on the average, 
one dollar of Interstate aid per capita was associated with an increase in 
total state highway expenditure (including the federal aid) by $1.24 per 
capita, or an additional state expenditure of 24 cents per capita. Similarly, 
one dollar of ABC aid per capita is associated with a state-own expenditure 
of 54 cents per capita for all highway purposes. This result for the ABC aid 
holds in the second and third regressions where the dependent variable is 
state-only total highway expenditures, i.e., the state expenditures for all 
highway purposes but excluding federal payments. Results are slightly differ-
ent for the effect of Interstate aid. 
The most puzzling result in Table 1 is the difference in coefficients 
of federal aid terms between our and Sherman's analyses. This difference 
is marked in the case of ABC aid. Sherman's coefficient of -1.103 (which 
is statistically not different from -1) implies that one dollar of ABC 
aid per capita leads to a reduction in state highway expenditures of one 
dollar per capita so that total state highway expenditures (including federal 
aid) would not change at all. 1 Our results show that one dollar of ABC aid 
per capita would increase state highway expenditures by 55 cents per capita 
for a total increase of $1.55 per capita. 
There are some differences between our analysis as represented by 
regression column (3) and Sherman's analysis. First, Sherman deflated all 
dollar terms according to the Consumer Price Index and expressed them in 
constant 1970 dollars. We used 1967 as base and three different price 
1lnterpretation of the negative coefficient is addressed by Porter, 
A. L. and Park, C. Y. in their companion paper on the Appalachian Development 
Highway System (Appendix D). 
8 
deflators as explained previously. Sherman also introduced certain 
variables (population and degree of urbanization) with a one year lag while 
we did not. These differences in the treatment of the independent variables 
might be expected to cause some variation in the findings, although we 
would not have expected such profound differences in the federal aid terms. 
In subsequent analyses we abandoned the use of total state highway 
expenditures as the dependent variable. Instead, we used state capital 
outlay as the variable to be explained. The idea here is that while it is 
interesting to look at the effects of federal aid on total highway expendi-
ture, objectives of federal aid programs are generally expressed in terms 
of highway capital programs. For example, the purpose of the Interstate 
program was to induce and accelerate state construction of these Interstate 
highways. The question to ask then is to what extent did this occur? To 
be sure, federal aid programs will also affect other state programs--
maintenance expenditures can be expected to increase as more highways are 
built and administrative expenses may also go up with federal aid. But 
the primary stimulative, substitutive,or other type of effect of federal 
aid can most meaningfully be discussed in terms of state capital programs. 
We also decided not to subtract federal payments from state (capital) 
expenditures. Federal payments are generally reimbursements for state 
costs incurred in the past. Although such payments may affect cash flow 
(however, states can address this through short term notes), by and large, 
state decisions on capital outlay in a given year can be expected to be 
based on perceived highway needs and anticipated federal aid (i.e., appor- 
tionments) and the terms of such aid (level of apportionment, matching ratio, 
etc.). Federal payments received for capital projects completed earlier may 
not be good indicators of the federal costs of capital projects anticipated 
to be undertaken in the future. 
9 
C. Disaggregate Expenditure Analysis  
In addition to looking at the impact of federal aid on state capital 
programs, we also did separate analyses of state allocative decisions 
regarding expenditures for maintenance, administration, and noncapital 
purposes in general, and also regarding revenues derived from highway user 
charges. Several regression models were tested here and the seven models 
ultimately used are described below with error terms omitted for clarity: 
CAPOUT = a 0 + a l * UFAC + a 2 * PCY + a 3* POPDEN + a4 * BIPTCX 
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USERREV = g 0 + g l * NONCAPX + g2 * PCY + g 3 * SOCONSTX 





CAPOUT = per capita state capital outlay 
MN&LOCX = per capita state maintenance expenditures and 
grants-in-aid to local jurisdictions 
ADMINX = per capita state administrative and traffic police 
expenditures 
NONCAPX = per capita noncapital state highway expenditures 
USERREV = per capita state highway revenues from road user 
taxes and fees 
UFAC 	= urbanization factor--the percentage of population 
residing in urban areas 
PCY 	= per capital income 
POPDEN = population density 
BIPTCX = expenses for bond interest and retirement as a 
percentage of total capital expenditures 
MFC 	= per capital motor fuel consumption 
AVIGP 	= per capita federal interstate apportionment (moving 
average) 
AVNIGP = per capita federal noninterstate apportionment 
(moving average) 
AVAGP 	= per capita federal primary apportionment (moving 
average) 
11 
AVBGP 	= per capita federal secondary apportionment (moving 
average) 
AVCGP 	= per capita federal urban extension apportionment 
(moving average) 
AVTGP 	= per capita federal total apportionment (moving average) 
RLTOT 	= local governments' general expenditure as a percentage 
of general expenditure by state and local governments 
SNOW 	= average annual snowfall in inches 
SOCONSTX = per capita state capital outlay exclusive of federal aid 
The form of the regression models (the seven equations and the vari-
ables) were influenced by the Rand Study while the disaggregation of federal 
aid terms was suggested by Sherman's analysis. All dollar terms were deflated 
according to either the Consumer Price Index, Federal Highway Administration's 
(FHWA) construction price index, or FHWA operation and maintenance price 
index as appropriate. 
The seven regression equation results in the base analysis are shown 
in Table 2. The standard error is shown in parentheses beneath each 
regression coefficient. 
Turning first to the impact of federal aid on state capital outlay, 
the coefficients suggest that the overall effect of one dollar per capita 
of federal aid is to elicit a matching expenditure of eight cents for a 
total increase in state capital outlay of $1.08 per capita. This is con-
sistent with the Rand Study's finding of $1.01 to $1.05 while Sherman found 
that state total highway expenditure would increase by $1.04 per capita 
from a one dollar increase in federal aid. 
The magnitude of the induced effect on state capital expenditures is 
the same in absolute terms with the Interstate and ABC programs; the increase 
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in state capital outlay per unit increase in federal aid is $1.08 and $1.07, 
respectively. With the Interstate program, given the statutory matching 
ratio of 90:10 federal to state, one might expect one dollar of federal aid 
to lead to an increase in expenditure of $1.11 (found as 100+90). However, 
it should be noted that since the matching ratio is more favorable to the 
Public Land States--as high as 95:5 federal to state--the overall average 
increase in expenditure to be expected should be less than $1.11 but greater 
than $1.05 (found as 100+95). With the ABC programs where the statutory 
matching ratio was generally 50:50, one dollar of federal aid should increase 
state expenditure by two dollars. ' 
If the point estimates for the Interstate and ABC terms are taken at 
face value, this suggests that states responded to the Interstate aid in 
the statutorily expected manner, increasing the expenditure from their own 
sources in proportion to the required matching share. With the ABC programs, 
on the other hand, it would appear that states were engaged in a substantial 
substitution of the federal aid for own resources which might have been 
spent in the absence of the federal aid. (While these interpretations are 
interesting, it should be cautioned that with neither the Interstate nor 
the ABC terms are the regression coefficients statistically different from 
one.) Sherman, on the other hand, found that one dollar of Interstate aid 
would induce an increase of $1.60 in the total state highway expenditure 
(i.e., would draw 60 cents from state's own resources) while one dollar of 
ABC aid would not lead to any increase in total state highway expenditure 
at all (i.e., would lead states to reduce their own expenditure by one 
dollar). Therefore, Sherman concluded that the Interstate program had a 
1
With the exception of Public Land States--they receive more favorable 
terms. 
substantial stimulative effect on the total highway expenditures of states 
and that the ABC program led to a perfect (one for one) substitution response. 
If the point estimates in our analysis are taken at face value, they would 
suggest that the Interstate program had a stimulative effect on state 
capital expenditures,but by no more than the statutorily mandated amounts 
and that the ABC program had a mixed (somewhat stimulative and somewhat 
substitutive) effect in the sense that state capital outlay (including 
federal aid) increased but by nowhere near the statutorily mandated 
ratios.
1 
The third regression model attempted to disaggregate the impact of ABC 
aid. The primary system coefficient had a point estimate of 1.902, close 
to the statutorily mandated ratio, although it was not statistically 
different from one. The secondary system coefficient was puzzling with a 
point estimate of -0.234 but with such a large standard error that the 
95 percent confidence interval ranges from -$2.78 to $2.31. Such a large 
interval precludes drawing useful conclusions. The urban extensions 
system coefficient behaved in the same way. These problems are due to 
multicollinearity, a condition which arises when some of the independent 
variables are closely related.
2 In this case, the federal apportionments 
1One possibility for reconciling these differences is the hypothesis 
that the Interstate program also led to a stimulative effect on noncapital 
expenditures and that the ABC program had a depressive effect on noncapital 
expenditures. This hypothesis has not been tested here and may be worth 
future exploration. 
2One indicator of this problem is the determinant of the correlation 
matrix of independent variables. A value of one indicates perfect orthog-
onality while a value of zero indicates perfect multicollinearity. This 
determinant had a value of 0.08, 0.03, and 0.0002 in the third, first, and 
second regressions respectively. When the determinant gets very small, the 
precision involved in inverting the correlation matrix becomes small. This 
leads to large standard errors for the regression coefficients. When some 
of the independent variables are perfectly correlated, the correlation 
matrix cannot be inverted at all and statistical regression becomes 
infeasible. This condition is referred to as perfect multicollinearity. 
for the A, B, and C systems are highly correlated with each other since 
they were often authorized by Congress in fixed proportions (such as 45, 
30, 25 percent of the total ABC authorization for A, B, and C systems, 
respectively). 
The coefficients of the other independent variables in the capital 
outlay regressions had the expected signs and were comparable to the esti-
mates obtained by the Rand Study. The urbanization factor was highly signi-
ficant, and its negative sign indicates that the per capita capital outlay 
is relatively lower in the urbanized states, ceteris paribus. Population 
density was not statistically significant, probably because the presence of the 
urbanization factor makes it redundant. BIPTCX, which indicates the relative 
magnitude of the highway debt retirement and interest expenses, had a minus 
sign indicating that the higher this debt, the lower the propensity to 
further increase it by bond- financed construction. Motor fuel consumption 
had a positive sign; high fuel consumption implying increased vehicle miles 
of travel leads to increases in fuel tax revenues available and to greater 
demand for new and improved roads. 
The fourth regression equation examined state outlays for maintenance 
purposes. All of the independent variables were highly significant. 
Urbanization factor and population density had the expected negative signs 
suggesting economies of scale in larger, more concentrated operations. The 
amount of snowfall had the expected positive sign--maintenance costs are 
higher in the "snow-belt" states due both to snow removal and ice prevention 
costs and to the increased rate of road deterioration. Per capita income had 
a positive sign and so did RLTOT, the ratio of local to state and local 
expenditures. The RLTOT variable was put in to account for the differences 
among states in the division of state versus local responsibilities regarding 
the provision of general services. The positive coefficient can be inter-
preted to mean that where local governments have considerable responsibilities, 
increased aid from state to local jurisdictions can be expected. The positive 
sign might also suggest that where local governments have relatively greater 
responsibilities, the state is able to spend more for maintenance on state-
owned roads. BIPTCX also had a positive sign. There are a number of forces 
at act here. On the one hand large highway debts might be expected to drain 
current revenues leading to lower maintenance expenditures. On the other 
hand, funding highway capital programs through bonds (especially revenue 
bonds) would spare current revenues for maintenance (and lead to increased 
maintenance responsibilities in the long run as the highway systems are 
expanded). On balance, it appears that incurrence of higher debt had a 
positive effect on maintenance expenditures. However, this relationship 
may change in the future as more and more of the debt (incurred largely in 
the 1960's and 1970's) must be retired in the near future. 
The fifth regression equation examined state outlays for administration 
and traffic police services. All of the independent variables were again 
highly significant. Urbanization factor and population density as before 
had negative signs suggesting certain economies of scale. Per capita income 
and BIPTCX had positive signs as before. RLTOT, however, had a minus sign 
indicating lower administrative expenses when local governments assume 
larger roles in the provision of public services. Finally, one dollar of 
federal aid per capita (for capital improvements) had a positive effect on 
administrative and policing expenses increasing them by about 7 cents per 
capita. Greater federal aid makes for more administrative work in processing 
/ 
grants, administering them, and complying with the regulations.
1 
The sixth regression equation examined state outlays for noncapital 
purposes. The results here are generally similar to what would be expected 
by examining the fourth and fifth regressions together.
2 
The federal aid 
term has a coefficient of 0.098 indicating that one dollar of federal aid 
for capital purposes is associated with an increase in state outlay for 
noncapital purposes of about 10 cents per capita. 
The final regression equation examined state highway revenues derived 
from user taxes and fees. All of the independent variables were highly 
significant and had the expected signs. User revenues increased with income, 
noncapital highway expenditures, and capital expenditures from own resources. 
However, user revenues decreased as greater reliance was placed on funding 
capital programs from bonds. As in the case of the maintenance regression 
equation, this relationship may change in the future as increasing revenues 
are required for retiring highway debt. 
D. Summary  
In summary, this base analysis indicates that over the 1957-70 period, 
the response of the 48 states in their highway capital program can be 
characterized as stimulative in the case of federal Interstate aid and mixed 
1
Note that all of the dollar terms in these regressions are in 1967 
constant dollars. In today's- dollars, the impact of federal aid on admini-
strative and policing expenses would be considerably higher than indicated. 
2
It should be cautioned that NONCAPX was constructed by subtracting 
CAPOUT (state capital outlay) from TOTHWYX (state total highway expenditure) 
after both variables had been deflated. The first variable, CAPOUT, had 
been deflated according to the construction price index while the second 
variable, TOTHWYX, had been deflated according to the operation and main-
tenance price index. Thus the NONCAPX obtained is different from what would 
be obtained if CAPOUT had been subtracted from TOTHWYX before deflating and 
then deflating the result by the operation and maintenance index. 
with the federal ABC aid. Overall, federal aid appears to have had a mildly 
stimulative effect on state capital programs. In addition, federal aid for 
capital purposes has also led to an increase in noncapital expenditures and 
highway user tax revenues.
1 
The next chapter undertakes an analysis of federal aid impacts on 
different groups of states and in different time periods. This analysis 
shows that the state highway programs are quite heterogeneous and have 
responded in different ways to the terms of federal aid made available 
under the differing prevailing circumstances of the times. 
III. Analysis of Data Subsets  
A. Introduction  
In this chapter we undertake an analysis of certain subsets of data. 
The entire data base includes all 48 contiguous states and covers the time 
period 1957-75. It was thought that by separating this data base into 
subsets and by comparing the analytical results on appropriate subsets, 
it might be possible to infer the differential impacts of funding structures 
of federal aid programs. 
In the formulation of data subsets to achieve this purpose we account 
for the fact that: 
1
0ne dollar of federal aid would induce an 8 cent increase in state 
capital outlay from own sources. The latter in turn leads to a 22 percent 
increase in state user tax revenues. The net effect of one dollar of 
federal aid on user revenues is thus an increase of about two cents per 
capita. 
ly 
- the policy variables of interest--terms of federal aid--have 
been different for certain groups of states (for example, 
Public Land and Appalachian States) 
- certain other external variables such as the economic recession 
in the late 1950s and early 1970s, the environmental movement 
in the 1970s, etc., are potential confounding factors. 
One dimension in the formulation of data subsets was state grouping--
identification of distinct groups of states with each group having some 
common element. Considering first the terms of federal aid, we identified 
four state groups as follows: 
Diminutive States: In order to assure that all states would be 
guaranteed certain minimum sums of federal aid in undertaking 
capital projects, Congress decreed that for certain types of 
federal aid, no state shall receive less than 1/2 of 1 percent 
of the annual appropriation. States qualifying for this 
provision, Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont, 
are thdrefore eligible for much more federal aid than they 
would receive under the conventional apportionment formula. 
Public Land States: Many of the large western states have 
considerable amounts of publicly-owned lands (e.g., Indian lands) 
which are nontaxable. To compensate for this, Congress decreed 
more favorable terms of federal aid (higher federal share of 
project costs) for these states than apply to the rest of the 
states. Of the 48 contiguous states, 12 are classified as Public 
Land States. 
Appalachian States: In 1965 Congress established the Appalachian 
Regional Commission. The commission administers the funding of 
L V 
the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS) and the 
Appalachian Local Access Roads Program.
1 
Thirteen states in 
the Appalachian corridor are eligible for these programs which 
are financed out of general funds. The federal-state matching 
share provisions in these programs have generally been the same 
as in the ABC programs.
2 
Core Appalachian States: The five Appalachian states with 
substantial participation in the ADHS Program are termed "core." 
Their behavior may differ substantially from that of the rest 
of the Appalachian states. 
Noncore Appalachian States: The eight Appalachian States not 
included above constitute this group. Some of these states 
were late comers into the ADHS Program and some such as 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York are industrial states where 
the ADHS Program may be a relatively small part of the total 
highway capital program. 
Other States: The remaining 19 states not included in the 
above five categories were treated as a single group for 
comparison purposes. 
In order to develop a better appreciation for the effects of external 
factors, the 48 states were subdivided into three different groups following 
Luttbeg.
3 
These were as follows:
4 
1
0f the two programs, ADHS accounts for about 95 percent of the funds. 
2
Except that for two-lane road projects, the federal matching share had 
been set at a maximum of 70 percent from the outset. 
3Luttbeg, N. R., "Classifying the American States: An Empirical Attempt 
to Identify Internal Variations," The Midwest Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. XV, Nov. 1971, pp. 703-721. 
4Luttbeg's fourth grouping called Frontier States, and consisting of 
Alaska (not in our data base) and Nevada, did not provide enough observations 
for regression analysis on this group. 
- Industrial States 
- Sparsely Populated States 
- Southern States. 
The second dimension used in the formulation of data subsets was time 
period--data for selected years were pooled together. The idea here was to 
divide the 19-year time period represented in the data (1957-1975) into 
subsets which when compared could provide some useful inferences about how 
certain major events, such as the introduction of the ADHS Program or the 
environmental movement,affected state allocative decisions. In order to 
assist in defining these time periods, an analysis was carried out year by 
year. In this analysis, state capital outlay per capita was regressed 
on a number of variables with the federal aid represented by a single grant 
variable (the regression model used was the third equation described in 
Chapter II). l The regression coefficient estimates of the federal grant 
term, AVTGP, are shown plotted in Figure 1. The results show at least 
three distinct time periods: (1) the second half of the fifties; (2) the 
first half of the sixties; and (3) the years following the mid-sixties. Based 
on these results as well as those from regression equations with multiple 
grant terms (which were generally,but not always,plagued with problems of 
collinearity), four time periods were selected: (1) 1957-1961; (2) 1962- 
1966; (3) 1967-1970; and (4) 1971-1975. 
Thus, nine groups of states, displayed in Table 3 and four time periods 
yielded a total of 36 data subsets for analysis. In order to provide a 
base for comparing the results of these 36 data subsets, another series of 
analyses was carried on all 48 states over each of the four time periods. 
1
Since this analysis included only cross-sectional data and no time 
series, the problem of collinearity became acute when the federal aid was 
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Figure 1. Federal Aid Coefficients in Capital Outlay Regressions by Year 
Table 3. State Groupings 
Dimunitive 	: DE, NH, RI, VT 
Public Land 	: AZ, CA, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, SD, UT, WA, WY 
Appalachian 	: AL, GA, KY, MD, MS, NY, NC, OH, PA, SC, TN, VA, WV 
Core Appalachian 	: KY, NC, TN, VA, WV 
Noncore Appalachian: AL, GA, MD, MS, NY, OH, PA, SC 
Other 	 : AR, CT, FL, IL, IN, IA, KS, LA, ME, MA, MI, MN, MO, NE, NJ, ND, OK, TX, WI 
Industrial 	: CA, CT, DE, IL, IN, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, WA, WI 
Sparsely Populated : CO, ID, IA, KS, MT, NE, NH, ND, OR, SD, UT, VT, WY 
Southern 	 : AL, AZ, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, MO, NM, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV 
24 
In each of these analyses, the regression equations described in the previous 
chapter were estimated, although the second equation attempting to disaggregate 
ABC federal aid impacts is not reported here since it encountered problems of 
multi-collinearity. In the following sections we discuss those results which 
appeared to be interesting. 
B. Capital Outlay Regressions  
The two capital outlay regressions, one with federal aid represented 
by a single grant term (AVTGP) and the other with federal aid separated 
into an Interstate term (AVIGP) and an ABC term (AVNIGP) are shown in 
Table 4. Only the coefficients of the federal aid terms in the 80 regressions 
(2 regressions on 40 data subsets) are shown since these are of primary 
interest and since showing the complete results would occupy immense space.
1 
Coefficients which are statistically different from zero at 95 percent 
significance are noted in the table by asterisks. Coefficients which are 
not statistically different from zero tend to occur more often when the 
number of observations (i.e., sample size) is small such as with the 
Diminutive States data subsets. In these cases, the coefficients are also 
usually not statistically different from other values such as 1 or 2 so that 
nothing meaningful can be said here about the relationship between federal 
aid and state capital outlay decisions. 
One of the interesting results in Table 4 is the size of the federal 
aid terms, particularly Interstate, in the 1957-61 regressions. Practically 
all of these coefficients are less than one. It might have been thought 
that state capital outlays would have been strongly stimulated by the 
accelerated financing of the Interstate System in 1956. However, the results 
1
However, the complete results are available upon request. 
Table 4. Federal Aid Coefficients in Capital Outlay Regressions in Analysis of Data Subsets 






57-61 62-66 67-70 71-75 57-61 62-66 67-70 71-75 57-61 62-66 b/-70 71-75 
48 States 0.7013* 1.3249* 1.2966* 1.0408* 0.7370* 1.1984* 1.3321* 1.2085* 0.5725* 1.9361* 1.1026* 0.1710 
Dimunitive 0.6065* 1.4744* -0.0312 1.2153* 1.0829* 0.6126 -1.4610 0.4493* -6.3858* 6.5535 13.8119* 8.8193* 
Public Land 0.3243* 1.1501* 1.4178* 1.0005* 0.3497 1.1675* 1.2979* 0.6964* 0.1185 1.0505 1.9008* 2.5189* 
Appalachian 0.7732* 1.5281* 1.3096* 1.8612* 0.7255* 1.4985* 1.3054* 1.8046* 1.1673 3.7982 4.3174 4.0690 
- Core 0.9206* 0.4823 1.4156* 1.7351* 0.7617 0.4948 1.3398* 1.5046* 2.4874 2.6435 - 3.7766 9.5782 
- Noncore 0.5574* 1.1494* 0.7865 1.2510* 0.3913 0.8396* 0.4613 0.7406* 1.6234 4.9373* 6.8983* 7.6753* 
Other 0.8922* 0.9230* 0.9463* 0.7499* 0.9193* 0.9693* 1.0150* 0.6612* 0.8053 0.6680 0.6585 1.1632* 
Industrial 0.6509* 2.1185* 1.3097* 1.2370* 0.2562 1.8333* 0.9987* 0.8939* 2.2920* 3.4629* 4.3749* 4.6531* 
Sparsely Populated 0.9432* 1.2622* 1.4418* 0.8205* 0.6987* 1.1818* 1.4220* 0.6619* 2.1550* 1.7547* 1.6211* 1.9147* 
Southern 0.6462* 1.3154* 1.1822* 1.6219* 0.4766* 1.4773* 1.2520* 1.7811* 1.5275 0.4224 0.3487 -1.5745 
Asterisk indicates statistically different from zero at 95 percent significance. For the rest of the coefficients the 
standard errors are so large that it is not possible to reject the hypotheses that either they are zero or that they 
equal one. 
Lb 
show that for the 48 states as a whole, one dollar of Interstate aid per 
capita during 1957-61 increased state capital outlay (including federal aid) 
by only about 74 cents per capita. It is possible that the true impact of 
the Interstate program in this period is confounded in the regressions by 
a number of external factors such as the recessions in 1959-60 and the 
decline in Interstate apportionments in 1961 (of about 28 percent from the 
previous year in current dollars). A potentially more serious problem 
concerns the lead time involved in completing highway projects. It may 
well be that the Interstate program stimulated considerable highway projects 
in 1957-61, but in, say 1957 or 1958, state capital outlay only reflects a 
portion of the total costs of these projects--that paid to contractors for 
completed project phases--and for large Interstate projects which involve 
four or more years to complete, this lag between the true effect and its 
manifesehtion in data can be very important. If this lag indeed occurred, 
it has implications which go beyond just these regressions. It may mean, 
for example, that state capital outlays in 1974 and 1975 do not fully reflect 
the fiscal austerity reported by many states. 
For ease of interpretation, some of the results in Table 4 are plotted 
in Figures 2, 3, and 4. In Figure 2,which shows the profile of total federal 
aid coefficients (AVTGP), we can see that: 
- the response of the Public Land and Appalachian states is 
quite different from that of the Other states 
- the response of the Public Land states is different from 
(in fact, opposite to) that of the Appalachian states over 
both the late 1960s and early 1970s 
- the response of the Appalachian states is quite similar 
to that of the Southern states and, over a limited time 
period, to that of the Industrial states 
b 2.-4 
Figure 2. Total Federal Aid Coefficients in Capital Outlay Regressions 
b2-4‘. 





Figure 4. ABCD Aid Coefficients in Capital Outlay Regressions 
- the response of the Public Land states is similar to that 
of the Sparsely Populated states.
1 
In Figure 3 we see that the profile of Interstate aid coefficients 
(AVIGP) is similar to that of the total federal aid coefficients. From 
Figure 4, however, the profile of ABCD aid coefficients is different from 
that of the Interstate aid; we hasten to add that few of the ABCD coefficients 
were statistically significant and hence it would be prudent not to draw any 
strong conclusions on the basis of Figure 4. 
On the basis of these results, it would appear that high federal matching 
shares alone do not appear to be an overwhelming stimulative factor in state 
response. If they were, one would expect the response of the Public Land 
states,which had better terms of federal aid than the rest of the states, to 
exhibit higher federal aid coefficients. 
To clarify this discussion, consider a state which initially has 
$5 million in own resources for capital spending in a particular program 
(say, the secondary road program). Assume further that the federal aid 
available is $24 million of which $16 million would lapse at the end of the 
current year if not obligated. Now consider two scenarios, one in which 
the program carries considerable public support and the other where it does 
not. Public support is here defined as the willingness to bear additional  
state highway taxes (or alternately, permission to use bonds) and thereby 
make available additional resources. Assume that on both engineering and 
economic grounds deficiencies exist on the secondary road system, and that 
road improvements within available resources are deemed desirable. 
1Note that these groups are not mutually exclusive sets of states. 
For example, many of the Public Land states also fall into the Sparsely 
Populated group of states. 
Table 5 is a simple assessment of what the total capital outlay (state 
and federal) might be under two scenarios of federal matching shares: 50 
and 80 percent (80 percent is selected to allow easy arithmetic). 
Table 5. Total Capital Outlay Under Different Scenarios 
(Millions) in a Hypothetical Example 
Federal Share 
State Scenarios 50% 80% 
Public Support $ >10 $ >25 
No Public Support <32 <25 
Consider first the scenario where the program carries public support. 
If the federal share is 50 percent, total capital outlay will be at least 
$10 million ($5 million state resources plus matching federal aid) and as 
great as $32 million if lapsing of federal funds is deemed undesirable. 
If the federal share is 80 percent, total capital outlay will be at least 
$25 million ($5 million state resources plus $20 million matching federal 
aid). 
If the program does not carry public support, then the total capital 
outlay will be no more than $32 million under a 50 percent federal share 
(minimum sum necessary to prevent lapsing of $16 million federal aid) and 
may be considerably less if lapsing is tolerated. When the federal share 
is 80 percent, the maximum limit on total capital outlay becomes $25 million. 
It is interesting to carry this analysis further and assume two scenarios 
of public support: willingness of public to make additional state resources 
available in the amounts of (1) $15 million and (2) $20 million. Further, 
let the absence of public support be characterized in two ways: (1) no 
additional resources made available and lapsing of federal aid permitted 
to occur; (2) additional resources made available in an amount sufficient 
to prevent lapsing of federal aid. The assessment of what the total capital 
outlay on the secondary program might be under these assumptions is shown 
in Table 6. 
Table 6. Further Analysis of Total Capital Outlay 
in Hypothetical Example (Millions) 
Federal Share 
State Scenarios 50% 80% 
Public Support 
$15 additional resources $40 $44 
$20 additional resources,  49 49 
No Public Support 
Permit lapsing 10 25 
Do not permit lapsing 32 25 
If $15 million additional resources are made available so that a state's 
own resources become $20 million, then the total capital outlay would be 
$40 million with 50 percent federal share ($20 million each from state and 
federal sources) and $44 million with 80 percent federal share ($24 million 
federal aid plus $6 million matching state funds plus $14 million additional 
state funds). if $20 million additional resources are made available so 
that state-own resources become $25 million, then the total capital outlay 
would be $49 million with both 50 percent federal share ($24 million federal 
aid plus $24 million matching state funds plus $1 million additional state 
funds) and 80 percent federal share ($24 million federal aid plus $6 million 
matching state funds plus $19 million additional state funds). 
If there is no support for additional highway taxes (or for use of 
bonds) even at the risk of lapsing federal aid, the total capital outlay 
would be $10 million with 50 percent federal share ($5 million each from 
state and federal sources) and $25 million with 80 percent federal share 
($5 million state funds plus $20 million matching federal aid). If sufficient 
resources are made available to prevent lapsing of federal aid, the total 
capital outlay becomes $32 million with 50 percent federal share ($16 million 
each from state and federal funds) and $25 million with 80 percent federal 
share ($5 million state funds plus $20 million matching federal aid). 
Although this hypothetical example is simplistic and the numbers regarding 
total capital outlay can come out differently depending upon the assumptions 
made regarding federal matching shares, amount of federal aid available and 
the portion which would lapse at the end of the year, etc., some basic 
relationships hold. When state-own resources are plentiful so that matching 
federal aid is not a problem, incremental changes in the federal matching 
share will have no effect (subject to qualifications described below). That 
is, the total capital outlay will remain the same. Thus, in Table 6, when 
the state has $25 million available for the secondary program and when the 
amount of federal aid available is $24 million, changing the federal matching 
share from 50 percent to 80 percent or vice versa has no effect. This type 
of a situation (federal matching share becoming irrelevant over a certain 
range) occurs when (a) state-own resources are so plentiful that matching 
federal aid is not a problem; and (b) the state objective is to maximize 
highway program activity. 
1 
However, states may wish to reduce highway expenditure from own resources 
because of the availability of federal aid. In this situation, it is worth 
noting that very high federal matching shares create greater opportunity for 
1
For further discussion of these issues see the companion paper by 
Rees, L. P. on "Highway Matching Requirements and Funding Levels: A Model 
of State Response" (Appendix B). 
reducing state expenditure from own resources than lower matching shares. 
Using the hypothetical example, when state-own resources are $25 million, 
$24 million of these (96 percent) are required to match federal aid when the 
federal share is 50 percent, and $6 million (24 percent) is required to match 
federal aid when the federal share is 80 percent. Obviously, the federal 
matching share is critical here in determining the extent of substitution 
which takes place. 
When state-own resources are not so plentiful and matching federal aid 
becomes a potential problem, the matching share becomes a critical factor 
in state allocative decisions. Looking at Table 6, when the state own 
resources are initially $5 million and lapsing of federal aid is not tolerable, 
$11 million additional state resources must be found when the federal matching 
share is 50 percent while no additional state resources need to be found (to 
prevent lapsing) if the federal matching share is 80 percent. If the secondary 
program activity has sufficiently high priority and/or lapsing federal aid is 
sufficiently unattractive, the lower federal matching share (in this example 
50 percent) has the effect of making total capital outlay higher (by inducing 
additional state resources) than under the higher federal matching share. 
There is opportunity for gamesmanship here between attempting to induce 
increased program activity by low federal matching shares on the one hand 
and attempting to increase the federal matching share in order to relieve 
pressure on state finances. 
Extrapolating this result to the proposed expansion of the federal aid 
program for bridge replacement and improvement, one could argue that if bridge 
deficiencies are truly critical and extensive, then in order to induce a 
massive corrective program, the federal aid should be large but involve medium 
federal matching shares. On the one hand, a high federal matching share might 
be in order if it is believed that significant incentives are required to 
induce state participation or if equity is a primary issue (not place a 
state in an unduly burdensome financial situation in terms of difficulty in 
matching federal aid). 
It would appear that the extent to which a federal aid program matches 
with the perceived highway needs of a state may well be the most critical 
factor in state allocative decisions. The Interstate program stimulated all 
states in the 1960s but its stimulative effect fades in the 1970s for all 
except the Southern states (including such "sun-belt" states as Arizona and 
Texas). The latter have, of course, been experiencing significant increases 
in population, economic activity, and presumably therefore highway needs in 
recent years. The ABCD highway projects are the bread-and-butter variety, 
especially for the Industrial states and this is reflected in the results. 
The ABCD federal aid coefficients for the Industrial and Sparsely Populated 
states are all highly significant and the profile of the coefficients between 
these two groups is in marked contrast. 
C. Noncapital Regressions  
Selected findings from the administrative expenditure (ADMINX) and 
state highway user revenue (USERREV) regressions are shown in Figure 5. 
Only the coefficients of the federal aid term (AVTGP) in the administrative 
expenditure regressions and of the state own resources for capital outlay 
(SOCONSTX) in the user revenue regressions are shown in the figure. 
The profile of the AVTGP coefficients in the ADMINX regressions shows 
that federal aid has seemingly increased state administrative and policing 
expenditures and that the amount of the increase has itself increased over 
time. In the 1957-61 time period, one dollar of federal aid related to addi-






Figure 5. Coefficients of AVTGP in Administration Expenditure Regressions 
and of SOCONSTX in User Revenues Regressions 
37 
1971-75 period, this increase had risen to about 14 cents. (These results 
are in constant dollars as are all results in this paper.) 
The profile of the SOCONSTX coefficients in the USERREV regressions 
shows that the increase in user revenues (and thus highway user taxes) 
associated with increased state-own expenditures for capital outlay has 
decreased over time. This might be attributed to increased use of toll 
road and bond financing. This practice is also more prevalent in the 
Industrial states (particularly eastern states) and less so in the western 
and midwestern states which largely make up the Public Land and Sparsely 
Populated categories. ' 
10ne might have thought that the decrease in the coefficient of 
SOCONSTX might also be due to a substitution over time of federal aid 
projects for 100 percent state financed projects. However, this explana-
tion is not supported by the data. The proportion of total capital outlay 
devoted to road projects ineligible for federal aid is higher in the 1970s 
than in the 1960s. 
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Summary  
The Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS) involves a multi-
billion dollar categorical aid program established in 1965. It is intended 
to further mobility and economic development in the thirteen state 
Appalachian Region, and it is contributing toward those aims according to 
the Appalachian Regional Commission. 
The ADHS is of special analytical interest because it represents a 
substantial Federal transportation aid venture, but one that is limited to 
selected states. Because of this restriction, it is possible to compare 
the effects of Federal aid policies between the ADHS and other highway pro-
grams, and between the involved Appalachian states and other states not 
participating in the program. To establish sharp contrasts, we formulate 
a group of five core ADHS states most affected by the program and a compari-
son group of nine states similar in highway and socio-economic character, 
but without ADHS activity. 
Results of comparisons between these groups of states on time series 
of highway expenditures are interesting in several regards. The ADHS, a 
program of Federal aid and also of strong state commitments, is associated 
with the stimulation of overall state highway effort. In particular, it is 
notable that state funds were raised, at least in part to meet ADHS needs, 
by substantial increases in bonded indebtedness and gas tax rate increases. 
While the ADHS appears to have stimulated increased state highway 
investments, the amount of that increase is somewhat less than the amount 
invested in the ADHS. Hence, it is useful to see what has happened to 
capital investment in other highway programs during the period of ADHS 
development. The Interstate system has suffered no significant decrement 
in investments because it is supported to the tune of 90% by Federal aid. 
While there are analytical difficulties in separating Federal-aid Primary 
(A), Secondary (B), and Urban Extensions (C) data, results are strongly 
suggestive. Excluding the ADHS investments (which are tallied with the A 
system), total (state, including Federal aid) investments have been some-
what constricted on the B and A systems relative to non-ADHS states. This 
is not the case with either the C or non-Federal-aid road programs, wherein 
the core ADHS states have outspent the comparison group. On the whole, the 
ADHS program has been undertaken without serious reductions in other highway 
efforts despite some dampening in specific program areas. 
In analytical terms, an interesting question is raised concerning the 
interpretation of regression findings. Regressions on state highway expen-
ditures have focused on the implications of the Federal aid terms. These 
have been studied to decide to what extent Federal funding has stimulated 
state effort. Observation of time series data on the ABC system usefully 
augments the regression analyses. In particular, the time series show a 
distinctive period in which constant. dollar (i.e., corrected for inflation) 
Federal aid for ABC highways decreased while state expenditures increased. 
This suggests two plausible explanations for a negative coefficient observed 
between Federal ABC aid and state expenditures. For one, states may have 
invested more to make up for the reduced Federal funds for ABC programs the 
states perceived as needing higher levels of investment (i.e., "reverse 
substitution"). Alternatively, one might surmise that the observed nega-
tive coefficient reflects the complex interworkings of a number of influ-
ences not well-accounted for in the regression formulations. 
Turning back to the ADHS, it has progressed well in comparison with 
the Interstate program - despite a lower Federal aid share and less-
forceful funding demands on the states. The ADHS, in conjunction with 
Interstate highways in the Region, appears to be contributing to its objec-
tives of reducing isolation and fostering industrial development. 
The ADHS seems to be highly compatible with state priorities. These 
state priorities surface in several cases. For one, some states indicated 
a willingness to forego a more favorable Federal matching share unless it 
were linked with increased funding levels so that total ADHS construction 
effort would not be cut back. Furthermore, states largely decided to build 
4-lane ADHS instead of 2-lane, despite a 50% versus 70% Federal matching 
share. Other responses to funding provisions, such as not taking advantage 
of a "bonus" match possible by combined ADHS and ABC funding on a segment, 
indicate that the ABC program acts like a block grant, subsidizing states 
but not exerting substantial leverage on their investment patterns. When 
state resource availability is very limited, programs are likely to behave 
more "categorically," i.e., exerting leverage on state priorities. 
All-in-all, the analysis supports the viability of categorical Federal 
aid programs such as the ADHS, particularly where they coincide with per-
ceived state priorities. 
vi 
I. Introduction  
This study concerns the effects of Federal transportation funding 
policies, as reflected in the Appalachian Development Highway System 
(ADHS). 1 The ADHS, as the major component of the thirteen-state Appalachian 
Regional Commission's (ARC) transportation program, is particularly signifi-
cant in several regards. It is a large venture - $3 billion in Federal and 
state funds have already been obligated. And, considerable work remains 
to be done, as only some 1300 of the authorized 2900 miles requiring con- 
struction are improved to standards and open to traffic.
2 
 Appalachian high-
ways are becoming a timely topic as consideration of a special coal-haul 
roads program continues. Furthermore, the ARC and other regional commissions 
are presently under review. 
One might surmise that the best way to understand the implications of 
Federal funding structures would be through study of national programs. 
Quite to the contrary, analysis of regional programs such as the ADHS is 
potentially more informative. One must somehow sort out the effects due 
to Federal policies from those attributable to confounding forces such as 
environmental initiatives, energy crises, and impoundment practices. The 
ADHS is especially interesting in that only some states were involved, 
thereby offering a basis for comparison with other states who, to a sub-
stantial degree, were subject to similar external forces. 
1This report is based upon the analytical work performed in the 
Master's thesis of C. Y. Park entitled, "Analysis of the Appalachian 
Development Highway System as a Policy Intervention," Georgia Institute 
of Technology, Atlanta, 1978. It is part of a broader study for the 
Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation that addresses 
the effects of funding structures in highways, airports, and public transit 
(Contract DOT-05-70036; P. J. Barbato, monitor). We deeply appreciate the 
insights offered on current and future policy issues by the many knowledge-
able transportation professionals acknowledged in our overview report. 
2Federal Highway Administration, News Release, Washington, D.C. 
FHWA 15-77, March 21, 1977. 
The special funding provisions for the ARC states provide an oppor-
tunity for analysis of the effects of changing Federal transportation fund-
ing structures. This study focuses on the ADHS to raise a series of ques-
tions concerning the effects of a special categorical program: 
1) Did the ADHS stimulate total state highway investments? 
2) Did states reduce their level of effort on other highways to 
meet the demands of this new program? If so, which other pro-
grams were affected? 
3) What have been the direct and secondary effects of the ADHS? Is 
it fulfilling its objectives of providing mobility and spurring 
economic development? 
4) How does the ADHS program compare with the Interstate (I) Highway 
program? 
5) What have been the effects of differences in Federal matching 
share within the ADHS (two-lane and four-lane road differences) 
and between the ADHS and the Federal-aid Primary (A), Secondary 
(B), and Urban (C and D) programs? 
6) What have been the results of the levels of assurance of ADHS 
funding and lapse of aid conditions on program effort? 
The following section provides the necessary background for considera-
tion of these questions. The third section deals with the effects of the 
categorical ADHS program (Questions 1-4), while the fourth addresses the 
implications of particular funding parameters (Questions 5-6). It should 
be noted that the emphasis is on understanding the implications of particu-
lar Federal funding strategies, not upon evaluation of the ARC's highway 
program (hence, question 3 is of secondary concern). 
II. Background  
A. The Appalachian Regional Commission and Its Highway Program  
By the early 1960's, Appalachia was seriously lagging behind the rest of 
the country in several regards. While heavily populated (18,000,000 in 195,000 
square miles in 1965), the population growth rate was a low 1%, compared to the 
U.S. average of 5%, for 1965-70.
1 
Of most concern, was its poor economic sta-
tus. Per capita income in central Appalachia was only 52% of the U.S. average 
in 1965, (78% for Appalachia as a whole).
2 
In response, the Appalachian 
governors proposed an effort to attack the critical social and economic 
problems. President John F. Kennedy appointed a President's Appalachian 
Regional Commission in 1963 to formulate a program. Acting on that Commis-
sion's recommendations, Congress adopted the Appalachian Regional Develop- 
ment Act of 1965. 
The Appalachian Regional Development Act set up the Appalachian 
Regional Commission (ARC) and authorized a range of social, as well as 
transportation, programs. The Act established the ARC to consist of a 
Federal co-chairman and the governor (or his representative) from eleven 
states: Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
The Act permitted inclusion of certain New York counties, a step soon 
taken by the Commission. Amendments to the Act in 1967 added Mississippi 
counties. Thus, the 195,000 square mile Appalachian region consists of 
all of West Virginia and portions of twelve other states (Figure 1). 
A major feature of the Act was its highway program. Isolation was 
1
The Appalachian Regional Commission, 1975 Annual Report, 
Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 12. 
2
Ibid., p. 23. 
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Figure 1. Appalachian Development Highway System. (From Appalachian Regional 
Commission, The Appalachian Highway Program: Progress, Impacts, and  
Planning for the Future, Washington, D.C., December, 1975, p. 26.) 
identified as a major factor contributing to Appalachia's relative economic 
stagnation. This isolation resulted primarily from the difficulties of 
transport in a rugged region. Narrow, winding roads followed the terrain, 
increasing travel distance and time. This, in turn, inhibited potential 
industrial developers because of the problems in getting products to market. 
Poor roads also made it difficult for Appalachians to reach jobs, schools, 
and health facilities. Yet better roads were prohibitively expensive - 
double and often triple the average, national, per-mile construction costs. ' 
Even the few Interstate routes that crossed the region tended to follow 
the topography, not crossing from east to west over the mountain ridges. 
In response to these conditions, Congress authorized 
construction of the Appalachian Development Highway system as 
a framework to connect the major federal highway arteries and 
to give areas of dense population ignored by Interstate routes 
better access to jobs and services. 
The Act further authorized..."access road(s) that will 
serve specific recreational, residential, commercial, indus-
trial, or other like facilities..." 2 
The ARC transportation program consisted of the ADHS, the access 
roads, and supplemental grants to enable local participation in other 
Federal aid programs (e.g., airport construction and improvement). These 
transportation endeavors take place in the context of the total ARC pro-
gram. For instance, through September, 1976, highway project costs 
amounted to $2.9 billion ($1.7 billion Federal aid) while eligible non-
highway project costs were $3.7 billion ($2.1 billion Federal).
3 
We chose to focus on the ADHS separately from the other programs. Of 
lIbid., p. 6. 
2
Ibid., p. 29. 
3Appalachian Regional Commission, 1976 Annual Report, 
Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 33. 
0 
most concern in this regard was leaving out the access road program. How-
ever, as of December, 1976, 95% of the Federal funds obligated for 
Appalachian highways went to the ADHS.
1 
The ADHS can be characterized as a categorical program with a desig-
nated system of roads and a mileage ceiling (currently, 2900 miles for 
construction assistance). In these respects it is similar to the Inter-
state program. However, its 24 designated corridors are restricted to the 
Appalachian region (Figure 1), and the program is supported by general 
fund revenues, not the highway trust fund. All of the states had to agree 
to the funding priorities involved.
2 
The ADHS program is administered by 
the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) for the ARC. It utilizes the tra-
ditional partnership arrangement between FHWA and the state highway depart-
ments under which nearly all Federal-aid highway programs are carried out. 
The objectives of the ADHS, broadly speaking, are to increase mobility 
and, thereby, foster economic development. Some of the operational objec-
tives that have been advanced are: 3 
• to fill in gaps in the Interstate system (generally following a 
Federal-aid Primary Route) so as to maximize the percentage of 
the population within 30 minutes (20 miles) of an ADHS or I 
highway; 
• design to the extent practicable to standards adequate for 1990 
traffic (now for 20 years); 
1
Federal Highway Administration, op. cit., p. 1. 
2
For priorities, see Appalachian Regional Commission, The Appalachian  
Highway Program: Progress, Impacts, and Planning the Future, Washington, D.C., 
December, 1975. 
3
Appalachian Regional Commission, Highway Policy Issues Report, 
Washington, D.C., June, 1974, p. 27-28. 
- design and construction to achieve continuity and reasonable uni-
formity throughout the system, and to provide for an average travel 
speed of approximately 50 miles per hour between major termini; 
• provision for partial or full control of access, where justified. 
Given our interest in Federal funding parameters, a critical dimension 
of the ADHS program is the relative Federal and state contribution. Figure 
2 profiles the matching ratios for the ADHS over time. Two ways of con-
sidering these will be used. First, the ADHS can be thought of as compet-
ing for scarce state resources with all other governmental programs, but 
particularly with other highway programs. In this light, the Interstate 
provides "10Q" dollars (each 90Q of Federal aid required 10Q state match). 
Through fiscal year (FY) 1973, the "ABCD" program used a 50:50 matching 
ratio, since then, 70:30, Federal to state. (This change is the stimulus 
for the increase in ADHS Federal share to 70%.)
1 
Lastly, there are the 
state-administered roads not eligible for Federal aid. The second considera-
tion about matching ratios is internal to the ADHS. Note that from August, 
1966 through February, 1974, construction of 4-lane roadway received only 
a 50% contribution, whereas 2-lane construction was eligible for 70% 
Federal share. These differences in matching ratio - both between the ADHS 
and other highway programs, and within the ADHS - provide a chance to ana-
lyze the importance of higher Federal shares. 
B. Analytical Considerations  
Our intent is to analyze the implications of the ADHS as a special 
categorical program, with particular funding structures (e.g., matching 
ratios). Before undertaking that analysis, it is important to take 
1The 1978 Surface Transportation Act increased the Federal share on 
ABCD roads to 75% and permitted increase on ADHS highways to 80% (approved 
by the ARC). 
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Note: For 4-lane ADHS roads, acquisition of right-of-way and 
preliminary engineering could receive 70% Federal aid, even 
while construction was limited to 50%. 
Figure 2. ADHS Federal/State Matching Requirements  
7 
a look at the complicating factors that must be taken into account.
1 
The first group of factors are those that affect all the states, more 
or less. These include: 
• the drain on state resources, attendant to the major Interstate 
effort, especially in the 1960's; 
• the shifting political demands toward environmental preservation, 
urban transportation alternatives, etc., especially in the 1970's; 
• state highway budgetary constraints, peaking after the 1973 oil 
embargo; 
• socio-economic factors and their rates of change - population, 
income, and unemployment. 
We deal with these primarily through observation of trends over time for 
both a group of ARC states and a comparison group. Where inflation is a 
concern, we deflate expenditures using national highway construction cost 
factors (this does not guard against relative shifts in costs between ARC 
and other states). 
Other threats to clear interpretation of ADHS effects bear chiefly 
on the ARC states. ARC programs other than the ADHS could affect the 
availability of state funds (more Federal aid, but more programs placing 
demands). Access road efforts could contribute to state highway expendi-
tures and mobility gains. ARC programs could well encourage economic 
development. Furthermore, the ARC programs do not meet a homogeneous group 
of states. In particular, New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio are heavily 
industrialized, northern states. The Appalachian region extends into 
1A more detailed consideration of the confounding factors, the 
selection of a comparison group, and the statistical methodology appears 
in Park, C. Y., op. cit. 
10 
thirteen states, but while it includes all of West Virginia, it repre-
sents only 5.3% of Maryland's population and 15.6% of its land area, for 
example.
1 
ARC expenditures reflect varying proportions of the state 
budgets. For instance, average ARC expenditures per year for 1965 -70 as 
a proportion of total 1969 state expenditures amount to 4.9% for West 
Virginia versus 0.5% for Maryland.
2 
Because of such differences as those just mentioned, we must be cau-
tious in interpreting effects, such as on state highway expenditures, 
realizing that the ADHS exerts only limited effects. To take into account 
the great variability among ARC states, we focus on a "core group," as des-
cribed in Section II.C. 
Another important dimension is time. Figure 2 presents a profile of 
ADHS matching requirements over time. For many purposes, we stop our analy-
ses at FY1973 because of the changes that follow in Federal-aid provisions, 
though our data run through 1975. An even more difficult matter is the 
start of the ADHS. On the one hand, the states had the highway program 
plan from the 1963 President's Appalachian Regional Commission to use in 
preparing to get underway, and then the ARC provided for "quick start" 
construction projects. The Commission approved 87 miles of these and 
construction began in June, 1965.
3 
On the other hand, the overall start 
was not so quick. Despite an initial appropriation of $200 million 
through FY1966 for the highway program (including access roads), only $104 
1 
Appalachian Regional Commission, The Appalachian Experiment 1965- 
1970, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 88. 
2
Ibid., p. 88. 
3
ARC, The Appalachian Highway Program: Progress, Impacts and Planning  
for the Future, Washington, D.C., December, 1975, p. 7. 
million was obligated. )  In FY1967, $68 million more was obligated, fol-
lowed by about $140 million per year for the next two years, gradually 
increasing thereafter. Actual expenditures lag considerably:
2 
FY1966 	$ 9 million 
FY1967 40 million 
FY1968 	 65 million 
FY1969 113 million 
FY1970 	 130 million 
Time series analyses attempt to reflect this gradual start-up of ADHS 
activities. 
Finally, we mention the difficulty in accounting of highway expendi-
tures (outlays), specifically: 
• Due to a change in FHWA reporting practices (in Highway Statistics)
3 
there is a discontinuity in total state A and B system outlays 
from calendar 1973 to 1974. 
• Any disaggregation among A, B, C, and D systems for state-only 
outlays (exclusive of Federal aid) is somewhat in error because 
total state outlays are reported on the basis of where funds were 
spent while the Federal aid is reported on the basis of the system 
for which the funds were designated. Transfers among the systems 
can be substantial, causing the accounting problem. 
• Our data include toll road expenditures in total state outlays, 
1Legislation authorizes funding; a separate appropriations bill makes 
this available during a given FY. The ARC allocates these appropriations to 
the states (resulting in their entitlements). An obligational ceiling is the 
maximum amount of funds a state can commit in a FY. Obligated funds are those 
actually approved to be expended for specific work. Lastly, actual outlays  
or expenditures result to pay for that work. (Based on ARC, Highway Policy  
Issues Report, Washington, D.C., June, 1974, p. 11-12. 
2These figures for the ADHS and access roads are from Brinley Lewis 
of the ARC. 
3Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, Washington, D.C., 
annually. 
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outlays on Interstate, and outlays on non-Federal-aid roads (all 
from Table SF-21 of Highway Statistics), but not on A, B, and C 
outlays (from Table SF-11). 
• Our total (but not separate) A, B, C, and D outlay data are com-
patible before and after 1973; however, they include toll outlays 
to the order of 1%-3% of the total. 
• Tallies for "state-only, exclusive of Federal aid" outlays are 
imperfect because Federal aid reflects reimbursement for work 
completed, and this could often be work reflected in state 
outlays for an earlier year. 
• Based on advice of ARC and FHWA professionals, plus some statistical 
detective work, we concluded that ADHS outlays are included in 
Highway Statistics reporting for the A (primary) system. [After 




Preliminary analyses on the thirteen ARC states indicated their hetero-
geneity, prompting us to seek a more homogeneous core group likely to most 
feel the impact of the ADHS program. First off, Alabama, Mississippi, and 
South Carolina were eliminated because none had received any Federal ADHS 
funds through FY1972, and they have negligible construction complete as of 
1975. Secondly, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania were set apart because of 
their socio-economic characteristics (often taken as explanatory variables 
in accounting for state highway expenditures)
2
. These three are heavily 
1The selection procedure is detailed in Park, C. Y., op. cit. 
2c.f., Dye, T. R., Politics, Economics and the Public, Rand McNally, 
Chicago, 1966. 
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industrialized and urbanized, quite in contrast to the other Appalachian 
states. Of the seven remaining ARC states, Georgia and Maryland have rela-
tively small ADHS programs (85.7 and 81.9 participating miles, respectively, 
vs. 193.6 miles for the next smallest of the seven, Virginia).
1  Interviews 
further substantiate the case for the remaining five as having active ADHS 
programs. They represent central and southern portions of Appalachia. The 






As mentioned previously, a major tactic to control for the variety of 
external factors influencing highway efforts is to compare different states. 
To the extent that they are affected by the same forces, this achieves our 
purpose. For instance, if a group of states with relatively similar high-
way programs, socio-economic characteristics, and geographical factors act 
differently than the core ADHS states during the late 1960's, it may be 
plausible that the ADHS accounts for the differences. Toward the goal of 
securing the most suitable group for comparison with the core states, we 
examined the remaining states. 
Drawing upon previous studies indicating relationships of several 
factors to state highway behavior, we performed a detailed discriminant 
analysis to identify a comparison group. Factors considered included: 
• area; 
• urban population; 
1Federal Highway Administration, News Release, Washington, D.C., 
FHWA 15-77, March 21, 1977. 
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• state-only capital expenditure (excluding Federal-aid) in relation 
to total state and Federal capital expenditure; 
• state capital expenditure for non-Federal-aid systems as a per-
centage of total highway capital expenditures; 
• a composite socio-economic and political behavior factor identi-
fied as "Southern."
1 
Using several statistical procedures, we identified nine states most similar 
to the core ADHS states (ruling out Georgia and Maryland because they had 










Naturally, this group represents compromise on any one factor to obtain the 
best match on the composite factors. In particular, note that three of the 
comparison states (Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina) are ARC states. 
This was carefully considered as desirable given their lack of ADHS activity 
over the period of analysis and their sharing in other ARC programs that 
we were not investigating. For some purposes, however, we have eliminated 
these three states to provide a non-ARC comparison. 
D. Analytical Methods
2 
Four analytical approaches went into producing the study results. The 
most basic is the presentation of straightforward descriptive statistics. 
1
Luttbeg, N. R., "Classifying the American States: An Empirical Attempt 
to Identify Internal Variations," Midwestern Journal of Political Science, 
15, 1971. The Luttbeg scale draws on 118 variables with values for 1961-1963. 
The other data were 1961 values; 1970 data yield similar conclusions. 
2
Discussed in detail in Park, C. Y., op. cit. 
These usually involve a comparison between the core ADHS and comparison 
states over time. Second is the consideration of these time series in a 
more rigorous fashion. Going under the label "interrupted time series 
analysis," this provides relatively strong inferences as to the relation-
ship between a policy implementation (e.g., creation of the ADHS, or a 
changed matching ratio) and observed measures (e.g., state expenditures on 
a given highway system).
1 The third complementary approach entailed multi-





applied this in the context of categorizing states and time periods, then 
comparing key coefficients across the categories to see if significant 
changes took place. Lastly, the statistical findings were weighed against 
and interfaced with the insights gained in interviews with professionals in 
the ARC, FHWA, and state transportation agencies. The blending of these 
different sources of information is reflected in the following sections. 
III. The Effects of the Appalachian Development Highway System  
This section addresses a number of factors affected by the implementa-
tion of the ADHS. The main group of factors concern expenditure patterns - 
overall state expenditures and expenditures on particular highway programs.
4 
The interest is to better understand the repercussions of the ADHS program 
1
Glass, G. V., Willson, V. L., and Gottman, J. M., Design and Analysis  
of Time-Series Experiments, Colorado Associated Universities Press, 
Boulder, 1975. 
2
Sherman, L., The Impacts of the Federal Aid Highway Program on State  
and Local Highway Expenditures, Office of Transportation Planning Analysis, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., 1975. 
3Enns, J. H., The Response of State Highway Expenditures and Revenues to  
Federal Grants-In-Aid, Rand Corp., Santa Monica, R-1233-FF, February, 1974. 
4For present purposes, per capita analyses appear less appropriate. 
We are concerned with state investment decisions, drawing comparisons over 
time and between the two groups of states. Relative population levels of 
the two groups do not shift substantially over this period. 
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on other highway efforts. In particular, a detailed look is taken at the 
state ABCD program from several vantage points. Following this, the socio-
economic impacts of the ADHS are briefly explored, and that program is con-
trasted with another categorical program - the Interstate Highway System. 
A. Stimulation of State Highway Construction  
We had anticipated that the Appalachian states, as represented by the 
five core ADHS states (Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and 
West Virginia) would have used the newfound source of highway funds (the 
ADHS) to partially substitute for their own expenditures. Given the eco-
nomic strains on the region, this would appear a likely response to the 
ADHS initiative. Not so, the five ADHS states appear to have increased, 
not only the total capital outlay (state and Federal funds), but also state 
only (exclusive of Federal aid) highway outlays. Figure 3 shows a widening 
gap between the ADHS states and the comparison group from essentially equal 
capital outlays on all roads (1955-1959) to about 65% greater outlay in 
1972.
1 
This is partly attributable to larger Interstate expenditures 
(Figure 4), but it also reflects higher outlay on the other Federal-aid roads 
(ABC Systems) (Table 1 and Figure 7) and on non-Federal-aid roads as well (Fig-
ure 10). Furthermore, contrary to our initial suspicions, maintenance efforts 
1Note the importance to contrast the patterns with a comparison group, 
given the real and inflationary increases in most of these series over 
time (c.f., Figures 3 and 4). [Figure 9 is shown in constant dollars to 
remove the highway construction inflation.] The rationale for inference 
as to the relationship between the inception of the ADHS program and 
observed changes in other series entails: 1) similarity of core ADHS and 
comparison states before the onset of the ADHS [FY66 for obligation data; 
about FY67/68 (calendar year 1967) for expenditure (i.e., outlay) data], 
2) difference between the groups beginning soon after the change, and 
3) absence of other logical explanations for the emergence of a difference. 
For several critical analyses, other comparisons were also made (e.g., with 
the five comparison states excluding New Mexico for lagging in ABCD expendi-
tures and Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina for being in the ARC; or 
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Table 1. State-only ABC Outlays 
($ million) 
1963 1964 1965 1970 1971 1972 
Experimental 
Group 
ABC and ADHS (1) 36.2 38.0 44.6 62.9 74.9 76.7 
ABC only (2) a 36.2 38.0 44.6 51.4 63.4 62.6 
Comparison 
Group (3) 31.2 31.5 31.2 53.3 65.3 64.8 
Difference 
(1) - (3) 5.0 6.5 13.4 9.6 9.6 11.9 
(2)-(3) 5.0 6.5 13.4 -1.9 -1.9 -2.4 
aFor 1970-72, estimated on the basis of a state share for the ADHS of 
42.5% of total ADHS expenditures. 
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Figure 7. Total Capital Outlay for the ABC Systems 





Figure 8. Federal Aid Expenditure for the 
ABC System, Excluding ADHS 
150 
110 
Figure 9. State Only (Exclusive of Federal 
ABCD Aid) Expenditures for the 
ABCD Systems in Constant 1967 
Dollars, Including ADHS 





055 	59 	63 	67 
YERR 



















































Legend (See Fig. 3) 
DIFFERENCE (CORE ADHS 







55 	59 71 75 








































were not shortchanged. Figure 14 even suggests a considerable increase in 
maintenance expenditures for the core ADHS states relative to the comparison 
group. 
One possible reason for the maintenance of state highway effort was 
the 1965 Appalachian Regional Development Act itself - Section 221 requires 
states to maintain expenditures at not less than the average of the previous 
two years. "Earmarking" of highway user revenues (i.e., legal restrictions 
on the uses to which they can be put) does not appear to be highly relevant 
to the ADHS outlay patterns. Although earmarking is a possible influence on 
state expenditure patterns,
1 
the percentage of user revenues diverted from 
1956-1970 by the five core ADHS states (mean = 3%, median < 1%) is very 
similar to that of the nine comparison states (mean = 7%, median < 1%). 2 
Recognizing an increased core ADHS state highway outlay, we wondered 
how it could have been supported. The answer appears to be from multiple 
sources. First, Federal highway aid increased to the amount of the ADHS 
program (average about $20 million annually in 1971) and the Interstate 
program (Figure 5), but not much for the ABC program until 1973 (Figure 8). 
Moreover, ADHS state general outlays for all purposes outpaced the compari-
son group (Figure 15 - note a substantial divergence in annual outlays), 
assisted by an increase in total Federal aid (Figure 16 - note here also 
that the annual outlays significantly diverge, presumably due in large 
measure to the ARC programs). 
Perhaps, the most striking testimonial to the stimulation of the high-
way effort in the five core ADHS states is the increase in their bonded 
1
Enns, J. H., "The Impact of Federal Grants-in-Aid on State Highway 
Expenditures and Revenues: An Econometric Study," Department of Economics, 
University of California at Los Angeles, 1973. 
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indebtedness (Table 2) and gas tax rates (Table 3) relative to the compari-
son states. 1 The ADHS program is associated with a general boost in the 
state highway effort. (This does not demonstrate that the ADHS program 
was the only cause of this increase, but it obviously contributed. Recall 
that the ARC initiative involved the states in the first place, so it would 
be improper to assume the enhanced state highway effort was just a response 
to a Federal ADHS program.) Observations by ARC and FHWA personnel support 
the premise that the level of construction activity would decline in the 
absence of the ADHS program. 2 
55 	59 	63 	67 	71 	75 
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(b) Excluding ADHS Outlay 
Figure 11. Total Capital Outlay for the Federal-Aid Primary (A) System 
1 Inspection on a state-by-state basis indicates that the response is 
rather general, not peculiar to one or two of these five states. 
2Appalachian Regional Commission, Highway Policy Issues Report, 
Washington, D.C., June 1974, p. 31; W. Aldridge, FHWA, personal observation. 
50 




M 	10 - 
0 
55 	59 	63 	67 	71 	75 
YERR 
Figure 12. Total State (Inclusive of 
Federal Aid) Capital Outlay 
for the Federal Aid Secondary 
System (B) 
55 63 	67 	71 	75 
YFAR 
100 --- 	 








































































100, 	  
1 Legend (See Fig. 3) 
0
55 	59 	63 	67 	 75 
YERR 
Figure 13. Total State (Inclusive of 
Federal Aid) Capital Outlay for 
the Urban Extensions of the 
Primary System (C) 
0
55 59 63 	67 	71 
YEAR 
3000 
































































    
    






0 	t 	I 	1 	r 	t 	 
55 59 63 67 
YEAR 
Figure 16. Total Federal Aid to State 




Table 2. State Highway Bonds - Outstanding Debt 
at the End of Year ($ Million) 
Year 
Mean 1961 1965 1969 1972 
Experimental 
States 216.6 254.6 348.2 488.2 
Comparison 
States 97.1 144.9 171.3 224.3 
Difference 119.5 109.7 176.9 263.9 
Source: U.S. DOT, Highway Statistics; Summary to 1975, 
Washington, D.C. 
Table 3. State and Federal Gasoline Tax Rates 
(Cents per Gallon) 
Year 
Mean 1961 1965 1969 1972 1975 
Experimental 
States 7.0 7.0 7.4 8.2 8.5 
Comparison 
States 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.4 7.6 
Difference 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.9 
Source: U.S. DOT, Highway Statistics, Summary to 1975, 
Washington, D.C. 
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B. Relationship Between the ADHS and Other Highway Programs  
We will now look at the expenditure profiles for the Interstate, ABC, 
and non-Federal-aid roads to see if any changes therein correspond with 
the emergence of the ADHS program. For each system it is potentially 
interesting to consider: 
• total outlay (that is, state outlay inclusive of Federal aid 
received - this is the indicator of total level of effort on a 
program); 
• Federal aid (Federal expenditures by system); 
• state-only outlay (that is, state outlay exclusive of Federal 
aid received - this is the indicator of the state's level of 
commitment to a program).
1 
1. Interstate. Given the highly favorable Federal matching share and the 
time-limited nature of the Interstate program, we anticipated that the ADHS • 
program would not seriously impede Interstate activity. Figures 4, 5, and 
6 confirm this conclusion. Note the strong correspondence between total capi-
tal outlay and Federal aid reimbursements (Figures 4 and 5) - not surprising 
given the 90% Federal matching share. From about 1960 on, the core ADHS 
states maintained an Interstate effort consistently greater than that of 
the comparison states. However, Figure 6, state-only outlay, hints at a 
relative suppression of core ADHS state Interstate activities for 1968-70 
and 74-75. The 1968-70 slowdown is consistent with the upsurge of ADHS 
building, however these series are so inherently noisy that this is surely not 
statistically significant. Even if state Interstate outlays were temporarily 
1State-only data are not ideally calculated in the sense that Federal 
disbursements reimburse the states for their expenditures; hence, a Federal 
aid expenditure in 1978 may relate to a state outlay in 1977. See Section 
II.B. for discussion of computational niceties. 
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restricted, Federal aid remained high, and, consequently, so did Interstate 
investment relative to the comparison states. 
2. ABC. We suspected that the ADHS effort would cause states to cut back 
on their ABC capital investment. Figure 7 indicates that total ABC capi-
tal outlay: 
• increased relative to the comparison states after 1966, reflective 
of the additional ADHS activity going on (and included in A system 
1 
outlays) ; 
• decreased relative to the comparison states when ADHS outlays are 
excluded.
2 
In other words, overall effort on these Federal aid roads increased, but 
the ADHS activity apparently induced some decrement in other ABC system 
work. (State-only ABC outlays, including ADHS, increased for the core group 
relative to the comparison states after 1965. State-only ABC outlays, exclud-
ing ADHS outlays, decreased slightly, but abruptly from 1966 to 1967. Onset 
of the ADHS program is the most plausible explanation, but the data are 
estimates.) 
Figure 8 shows the Federal aid for the ABC system (exclusive of ADHS 
support). This is remarkably constant over time, and, were it plotted in 
constant dollars (corrected for highway construction cost increases) would 
show a severe drop from 1958 to 1971 (54% cost increases). This is a criti-
cal observation when taken in conjunction with the increase in state-only 
1 
See Section II.B. 
2Federal ADHS expenditures are available only from 1970; state ADHS 
expenditures from 1970 are estimated in proportion to the Federal expenditures 
(0.425:0.575), based on obligation records. ADHS amounts from 1967 to 1969 
are based on annual obligations. 
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ABCD outlays over this period (Figure 9 displays on a constant dollar 
basis).
1 
These time series on ABC Federal aid and state-only ABC outlay help 





. Sherman reported a negative coefficient (-1.10, not 
significantly different from -1) for 1957-70 in a constant dollar regression 
on total state-only highway expenditures for 	the 48 continental states. 
Rao likewise reported a negative coefficient (-3.78, not significantly dif-
ferent from zero) for the period 1967-70 in a constant dollar regression 
on total capital outlay by state for the five core ADHS states.
4 In a 
"causal" sense, these coefficients are awkward to interpret. For total 
state outlay to drop more than $1 for every additional $1 of Federal ABC 
aid (appropriation), one must assume that each additional Federal dollar 
not only is used to substitute for a state dollar (ignoring the matching 
requirement of an additional dollar, given the 50:50 matching ratio at that 
time), but induces even further reduction in state support! But the catch 
is the dual assumption of a causal relationship and the inevitable increas-
ing nature of Federal aid. Simply put, what we had in constant dollars, 
was a period of decreasing Federal aid and increasing state-only outlay  
(refer to Figure 8, actual dollars; and Figure 9, constant dollars). Thus, 
1The D (urban) system was not instigated until 1972; it thus has no 
bearing on this part of the analysis. It is included to give a consistent 
series over time - see Section II.B. 
2
Sherman, L. R., p. cit., p. 264. 
3Rao, S., Statistical Analysis of the Impact of Federal Highway Aid  
on State Allocative Decisions, a companion paper (Appendix C). 
4We note that Rao did not obtain a negative coefficient on a 48-state 
basis (as did Sherman) - his value was (+)0.55. 
a negative coefficient reflects that while Federal aid was decreasing, 
state outlay was increasing. If one wishes to postulate a causal connec-
tion (which may not be correct), the reduced availability of Federal aid 
could have induced the states to invest more of their own funds to meet 
ABC needs.1 
Interestingly enough, indications of this fact were observed by Enns 
in regression analyses (1956-1970) on 48 individual states, but left unre-
solved. To cite him,
2 
"One puzzling result concerns the influence of Federal aid 
authorizations. In almost every state a negative relationship 
between the rate of increase in aid and (state) expenditure was 
obtained. In many cases the aid coefficient proved significant 
in either the current or lagged form of the model...the exis-
tence of a negative relationship does not seem plausible since 
it suggests that the states are out of phase with federal aid 
policy, increasing expenditures most rapidly when the rate of 
increase in aid authorization is lowest. 
The observation that state-only ABC outlays increased with the begin-
ning of the ADHS program is based upon several confirmatory sources of 
information. Inspection of Figure 9 suggests this to be likely. Both 
statistical tests of the interrupted time series assuming a linear model 
(Mood tests and Walker-Lev tests) and tests based upon a serial correla-
tion model lend support to the notion that the ADHS may have stimulated ABC 
(including ADHS) investment. Examination of structural equations (regres-
sion models) for the core ADHS and comparison groups, before and after the 
ADHS beginning also indicates a changed ABC situation. These analyses are 
presented in detail elsewhere. 3 
1
This discussion is based on Park, C. Y., op. cit. 
2
Enns, J. H., op. cit., pp. 73-74. 
3
Park, C. Y., op. cit. 
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Despite the problems in separating A, B, and C data (see Section II.B.), 
it is instructive to glance at the respective time series. Overall for the 
ABC systems, we have concluded that state-only and total effort increased 
when one includes ADHS outlays, but decreased when ADHS outlays are 
removed (Figure 7). The question of concern, then, is which of the systems 
(A, B, and/or C) suffered a decline at the expense of the ADHS? Figure 11 
suggests a contraction in the Federal aid Primary (A) program, when the 
ADHS is excluded. Figure 12 implies a significant contraction in the 
Secondary (B) program (from 1967 on, the core ADHS group actually crosses 
back under the curve for the comparison group). In contrast, the Urban 
Extensions (C) program grows substantially faster in the ADHS states! So, 
the competition of the ADHS seems to have taken its greatest toll on the 
B program, less on the A, and none on the C. The assumption is that state 
programming priorities adapted to the ADHS and increasing urban concerns 
in this manner, but the evidence is limited. 
3. Non-Federal-Aid Roads. Under the stress of coming up with the funds 
for the ADHS program, the states would have seemed to be pressured heavily 
on their non-Federal-aid construction program. Again, the results are sur-
prising. As indicated in Figure 10, capital outlay on roads ineligible for 
Federal aid increased in the core ADHS states relative to the comparison 
group.
1 There is no indication that the ADHS program detracted from the 
non-Federal aid road effort. 
1The explanation does not lie in inclusion of ARC access road expen-
ditures (some of which could so appear). As of December, 1976, the total 
access road obligations came to only $36.6 million for the 5 core ADHS 
states (an average of only $7.3 million in over 11 years). This is less 
than $1 million annually, and, furthermore, very similar to the $62.7 
million for the eligible comparison states - Alabama, Mississippi, and 
South Carolina (yielding an average of $7 million per state for the 9 
states of the comparison group). 
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We have seen that overall highway effort increased and that states gener-
ated higher highway revenues by increasing gas taxes and issuing more bonds. 
It is plausible that, spurred by ADHS needs, states went an extra step to 
generate additional revenues that could be used on non-Federal-aid roads 
and to meet matching requirements on the expanding urban Federal aid road-
ways. In any event, while the ADHS program appears to have constricted 
the B and A programs a bit, it has not so affected other highway programs. 
C. Socio-Economic Impacts of the ADHS  
While socio-economic impacts are not a primary focus, it is interest-
ing to gauge the ADHS program in light of such effects. At this time the 
ADHS is about 50% open to service (1300 miles). Hence, evaluation of its 
effects is partially based on analogies and forecasts, and partially on 
actual observed effects. 
Appalachia has made useful gains since the onset of the ARC 
programs: 1 
• the emigration of the early '60's has been reversed to an average 
immigration; 
• between 1960 and 1970 the Region's poverty level people declined 
by 41%, vs. 30% nationally; 
between 1965 and 1973, Appalachia gained more than one million 
industrial jobs; 
per capita income rose by 89% from 1965 to 1973, versus 81% 
nationally; 
• the percentage of adults with a high school education and the 
number of doctors per capita have both increased significantly. 
lARC, 1975 Annual Report, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 1-2. 
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While these gains cannot be simply attributed to the ADHS, the highway 
program has been viewed by the ARC as the cornerstone of development in the 
Region.
1 
 When completed, the ADHS and Interstate will be within 30 minutes 
of 85% of the Region's people.
2 
Travel times between twenty major combina-
tions of Appalachian centers and major trading centers should be reduced 
by 20-50% upon completion of the ADHS.
3 
Some 65% of the ADHS mileage 
passes through or is adjacent to major coal fields
4 
- a point conducive 
to emerging Regional development and national energy concerns. 
Various economic benefits appear traceable to the ADHS. Most 
directly, some 7000 direct jobs and 7000 indirect ones are attributable 
to construction in 1975 alone (based on general highway construction 
estimates).
5 Public and private investments have taken place in highway-
related businesses and highway-dependent industries. Employment gains from 
1962-68 in counties on completed ADHS or Interstate segments outstripped 
those in other counties.
6 Correspondingly, a survey of 1354 new industrial 
plant locations in Appalachia found 56% located within 10 minutes of an 
Interstate or ADHS segment.7 Another implication of the improved roads 
is an increase in commuting to work outside the county of residence.
8 In 
lIbid., p. 2. 
2
ARC, The Appalachian Highway Program: Progress, Impacts and Planning  
for the Future, Washington, D.C., December, 1975, p. 25. 
3ARC, Highway Transportation and Appalachian Development,  Research 
Report No. 13, Washington, D.C., September, 1970, p. 36. 
4
ARC, 1976 Annual Report, Washington, D.C., p. 7. 
5
ARC, The Appalachian Highway Program, op. cit. 
6
ARC, Highway Transportation and Appalachian Development, op. cit., 
p. 48. 
7 ARC, The Appalachian Highway Program, op.  cit., p. 27. 
8 Ibid., p. 31. 
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sum, there is support for the assertion that the combined Interstate-ADHS 
program will provide mobility and economic gains. 
D. Comparison of the ADHS and Interstate Programs  
As evidenced in the previous section, the ADHS and Interstate programs 
are intended to be complementary in Appalachia. On a broader front, the 
two programs present some interesting comparisons. Both are defined net-
works, with established routes and mileages. They differ in that the 
Interstate has been funded at a higher Federal share, drawing Federal sup-
port from the Highway Trust Fund instead of general funds. 
In terms of accomplishment, the ADHS stacks up almost equally with 
the Interstate. After ten years of program existence, 40% of the ADHS was 
constructed versus 42% for the Interstate. ) 
Cost to completion estimates rose steeply on both - 92% on the ADHS 
from 1965-74 versus 86% on the Interstate from 1956-74 (72% during the 
1966-74 period).
2 
These figures are reasonably comparable given a larger 
percentage mileage increase on the ADHS, stricter social and environmental 
concerns, and higher construction cost escalation during the 1965-74 period 
when the ADHS was getting underway. 
Most impressive is the ADHS achievement given the fiscal and other 
pressures. It has been accomplished while the Interstate development con-
tinued at a high level. It has endured the 1973 oil embargo and attendant 
state financial crunch. And it has taken place without seriously jeopar-
dizing other highway programs (albeit, the B and A capital investments have 
l Ibid., p. 24. 
2
Ibid., Appendix A. 
slipped somewhat). The achievements of the ADHS program support the via-
bility of special categorical transportation programs possessing character-
istics similar to the ADHS (e.g., high state priority). 
IV. Implications of the ADHS Funding Parameters  
The previous discussion has focused on the impacts of the categorical 
nature of the ADHS program. That is, we inquired as to the effectiveness 
and effects of this special designated program being fit into the ongoing 
state highway activities. In this section, we attempt to unravel the 
implications of the Federal funding structures set up for the ADHS program. 
In particular, we treat the matching requirements and the nature of Federal 
funding procedures. 
A. Differential Matching Ratios  
One of the favorite funding levers for Federal manipulation in trans-
portation aid programs is the matching requirement. The states and local 
governments actually face a full gamut of matching demands - from zero on 
certain Federal programs to total cost on non-Federal-aid programs. In 
between, the range seems to extend from 50% to 95% Federal share, depending 
on the program and the recipient. Our interest in observing the ADHS is 
to detect the effects of different Federal shares. This points us toward: 
• differential 2-lane and 4-lane ratios; 
a way to obtain a more favorable Federal share by combining ADHS 
and Federal-aid ABC support; and 
• a change in ADHS and ABC ratios in FY74. 
1. 2-lane vs. 4-lane. As displayed in Figure 2, there has been a fas-
cinating series of changes in the relationship between 2-lane and 4-lane 
ADHS construction matching requirements. The Appalachian Regional Develop- 
J L 
ment Act authorized and the ARC initially implemented a 70% Federal share 
(i.e., 30% state match requirement). In 1966, however, due to a perceived 
shortfall in available funds to construct the ADHS, the 4-lane share was 
reduced to 50% (although preliminary engineering and right of way remained 
at 70%). In 1974, all ADHS construction was again authorized at 70% 
Federal share because the ABC system was so set. Thus, for the main ADHS 
construction effort to date - August, 1966 through February, 1974 - there 
was a substantial inducement to construct 2-lane instead of 4-lane ADHS 
roads. 
Rather to our surprise, the evidence indicates that the states roundly 
ignored this matching differential and predominantly built 4-lane roads. 
Table 4 presents the best information available on this topic - namely the 
estimates of projected 2-lane and 4-lane construction at various times, 
compared with actual construction. From this it is clear that states were 
not seriously swayed by the matching ratio in determining the number of 
lanes to construct. Our interviews support this interpretation. For 
instance, J. Chiles, of Penn DOT, noted that Pennsylvania was moving to 
high design standards not appropriate for 2-lane roads and set policy to 
build 4-lanes whenever average daily travel exceeded 5000 vehicles. 
2. Non-Use of the Bonus Match. Given states' preference for 4-lane roads, 
another intriguing option was available to them. To quote, 
"the States are encouraged to finance the remaining half of 
total project costs with state funds but may elect to finance 
such remaining portions with a combination of state and other 
Federal-aid highway funds."' 
An example is then given that shows how ABC funds can be used to defray 
another 14% of the costs. The result would be a Federal share of 64% (50% 
1ARC, Highway Policy Issues Report, Washington, D.C., June 1974, p. 29. 









1963 Estimatea 1227 570 1777 69% 
1966 Estimate
b 
687 1573 2260 30% 
1969 Estimate s 553 1729 2282 24% 
1972 Estimate
d 
264 2505 2769 10% 
1976 Estimate
d 
294 2476 2770 11% 
Actual Construc-
tion Through 
June 30, 1972e 140 941 1081 13% 
aComputation derived from Figures 21 and 22 in ARC, Highway Transportation  
and Appalachian Development, Research Report No. 13, Washington, D.C., 
September, 1970. 
bAlso from that source, Figure 27. 
cSame source, Figure 32. 
dCalculated from the individual state estimates of cost to completion of 
the ADHS for 1972 and 1976 as indicated. Figures exclude corridor W 
in North Carolina and corridors T and U in Pennsylvania (total mileage 
about 84) because these were late additions to the ADHS. 
eARC, tabulation dated 10/31/72 (obtained from B. Lewis of the ARC). 
ARC, 14% other Federal-aid highway funds). According to W. Aldridge of 
FHWA and, formerly, the New York Department of Transportation, New York had 
used the composite ADHS/Federal ABC aid funding scheme once in 1967, but 
found the red tape to be too oppressive, and from then on, kept projects 
separate. J. Chiles of Penn DOT amplified the observation that red tape 
was a nuisance, noting that Pennsylvania often used state-only funds for 
right-of-way acquisition and preliminary engineering. ) 
This lack of pursuit of available Federal aid needs to be seen in the 
context of the overall state highway programs. In this time period (1966-
73), most states maintained substantial state capital investment levels 
over and above those required to match available Federal ABC aid. (No 
Federal aid was allowed to lapse.) Federal aid provided a nice piece of 
the overall pie, but, by-and-large, it did not alter state ABC highway 
priorities. That is, Federal aid did not affect the marginal allocation 
of state effort. It acted as a block grant, helping to meet state needs, 
not as a categorical program that influenced state priorities. From this 
perspective, it is quite understandable why states would not care to strain 
after ABC supplement on the ADHS program - they had plenty of other uses 
for that available pool of Federal ABC allocations. 
In contrast, the Interstate program at 90% Federal share was clearly 
driven as a categorical program. States invested at the level set by 
available Federal monies - they put in very little excess (overmatch) 
state-only funds.
2,3,4 
What then about the ADHS? The answer appears to 
1
In 1965 Pennsylvania embarked on a 10-year, $10 billion highway 
program intended to maximize highway construction activity. 
2Sherman, L. R., op. cit. 
3Enns, J. H., op. cit. 
4Rao, S.,op. cit. 
.i/ 
lie intermediate between the "block grant" character of the ABC program and 
the Federally-driven "categorical" Interstate program. Clearly, the ADHS 
is a categorical program (see Section III). However, it is one in which 
the participating states see a strong self-interest. Hence, we see indi-
cations that states were willing to invest state funds above those needed 
to secure available Federal aid. Some segments were constructed at state 
expense, and, as noted by Chiles, some expenses were borne voluntarily by 
the states to expedite system development. The following section lends 
further support to the high priority given the ADHS by the states themselves. 
3. Changing ADHS and ABC Ratios. The FY74 increase in ABC Federal match- 
ing share from 50% to 70% was viewed as a threat to the progress on the 
1 
ADHS. In response to ARC query, states indicated: 
• All states favored an increase to a 70:30 ratio for 4-lane ADHS 
construction. However, due to the fact that this would reduce 
the amount of construction, four states indicated they favored 
the higher Federal share only if Federal fund authorizations were 
increased to complete the system.
2 
• A change in funding policy would have very little impact on the 
priority assigned by the States to Appalachian highways. Most 
States now assign a high priority to the program and are com-
mitted to completion of the system at the earliest date possible 
consistent with available funding. Only one State had a lower 
1
ARC, Highway Policy Issues Report, Washington, D.C., June 1974, 
pp. 30-31. 
2
As discussed in the companion paper by L. P. Rees, Highway Matching 
Requirements and Funding Levels: A Preliminary Model of State Response, 
an increase in Federal share implies a decrease in effort on a given pro-
gram for states who meet (rather than exceed) their required matching 
requirements. 
J25 
priority assigned to this program than to regular Federal-aid 
despite the 70-30 ratio on the regular Federal-aid program. 
• The States reported no alternative Federal funds to be used on 
the system or to supplement Appalachian funds. Demands for 
regular Federal-aid funds far exceed their availability for 
improvements on other portions of the Federal-aid systems. 
The ARC Federal Co-chairman did secure a resolution providing for states 
to maintain at least the same level of effort as the average for 1969-73, 
in boosting the Federal ADHS share to 70%. 
Table 5 shows the annual total ADHS obligations (not expenditures). 
The concern is over a potential drop in program effort due to the increased 
Federal share after February, 1974 and the increased Federal ABC share 
from FY1974 on. This table and Figure 7 indicate a possible slight damp-
ening of effort on the ADHS, and also on the ABC in the core ADHS states. 
However, these findings are virtually impossible to interpret because of 
confounding influences: 
• as the ADHS proceeds toward completion, there is less to be done; 
• inflation exerts a counter-pressure toward annual cost increases; 
• the matching change occurs at the same time as the oil embargo 
which put a financial squeeze on state highway funds. 
It seems most fruitful to consider these recent changes and responses 
qualitatively. Commitment to the ADHS program appears high (more so in 
some states), and effort is not solely dependent on Federal actions. 
Indeed, because of this, the matching ratio is not a critical determinant 
of program effort, although neither is it irrelevant given the states' 
financial needs. 1 The states' concern over ADHS system completion, rather 
1
As states come under fiscal difficulty, matching ratio can become 
critical. 
Table 5. Annual Total (State and Federal) ADHS Obligations ($ Million) 
Fiscal Year Kentucky North Carolina Tennessee Virginia West Virginia 
Total - 5 Core 
ADHS States 
Total - 13 
ARC States 
66 40 9 10 30 12 101 142 
67 16 11 3 21 13 64 117 
68 40 9 26 9 58 142 253 
69 27 13 15 4 96 155 243 
70 58 18 16 9 76 177 318 
71 28 9 6 6 114 163 283 
72 63 32 30 7 64 196 355 
73 69 10 18 10 102 209 301 
74 49 5 28 20 48 150 276 
75 45 28 20 8 83 185 245 
76 37 32 33 22 29 153 208 
4U 
than just obtaining favorable Federal ratios, is noteworthy. 
B. Time Constraints on the Availability of Federal Funds  
The procedures for provision of ARC funds to the states underwent a 
series of changes. From 1969, the ARC allocated funds in proportion to 
estimated state costs to completion. Initially, the ARC lacked contract 
authority (present in other Federal-aid highway programs), so they could 
only allocate appropriated funds - usually several months after the start 
of a fiscal year. The Commission adopted a policy of reallocation of 
unobligated funds among the states during the fiscal year to maximize 
1 
utilization of these funds. 	The 1967 Amendments to the Act permitted 
states to expedite the work beyond their allocation of appropriated funds 
(pre-financing authority), with assurance that the costs would be reim-
bursed when funds were appropriated and available for obligation, The 
1969 Amendments provided contract authority - states could obligate funds 
as soon as they were allocated by the Commission (six months prior to the 
FY). The Commission therefore eliminated reallocations but provided for 
obligational ceilings to be adjusted among states to take advantage of 
funds available. Throughout this time, there was no effective lapsing 
of a state's ARC funds - amounts were reallocated based on remaining costs 
to completion. With FY76 this was changed so that a state could lose up to 
30% of its allocation if it did not use it. Those states using all their 
allocations would be in position to get extra Federal funds. 
Two interesting features emerge from this procedural situation. First, 
the ARC adopted "borrowing" tactics to speed up ADHS construction. States 
1
The series of developments in allocation procedures are described 
in ARC, Highway Policy Issues Report, Washington, D.C., June 1974, 
pp. 18-24. 
which were obligating all their available funds were given access to the 
unused allocations (after 1969, obligational authority) of other states. 
Reportedly, this enabled Virginia, Kentucky, and, sometimes, other states 
to press ahead, while others, especially Pennsylvania, lagged. The result 
is a maximal overall ADHS completion rate within the available funding 
levels, overcoming the slowness of some participants. Indeed, as of 
December, 1976, Virginia had 65% of its participating ADHS mileage improved 
to standards; Kentucky, 57%; but Pennsylvania, only 30%.
1 
The second interesting feature is the absence of pressure to get on 
with the work under threat of losing your Federal allocation (until FY76). 
This combined with the realization that the full system was authorized, 
so a state could expect to get Federal funds eventually.
2 The latter point 
implies that a state might as well wait for Federal ADHS funds, rather than 
substitute state money. The former point implies no need to rush to 
use the Federal money; a state's share would "always" be there. Given 
this secure funding perspective, it is striking that the ADHS has been 
built so rapidly - a testimonial to the states' own commitments to the 
system. Some states, again Pennsylvania can be singled out, have lagged. 
The combination of environmental problems, shortages in matching funds, and 
the perceived lower priority due to the absence of a threat of loss of 
Federal funds (ABC funds faced such a threat) resulted in less ADHS 
activity there. 
1
Federal Highway Administration, News Release, Washington, D.C., 
FHWA 15-77, March 21, 1977. 
2
R. W. Duis points out (personal communication) that the states ini-
tially did not anticipate that the ADHS program, drawing on general funds, 
would be extended beyond FY1971. This, along with the already developed 
plans, prompted them to build as much as possible. Also, there was a 
threat of "loaning" states losing funds "borrowed" from them - an induce-
ment to proceed quickly. 
4Z 
V. Some Observations  
What has been wrought through the ADHS? As discussed, construction 
of a high quality road system has progressed at an admirable rate. This 
is attributable to the combination of the Federal ADHS categorical aid pro-
gram and state commitment to the system. One indication of the state com-
mitment is the state overmatch in ADHS investment (considerable 100% state 
work in the early years) despite the assured Federal aid. Another is the 
relative increase in ADHS states' bond indebtedness and gas tax rates. As 
a result of the road system, mobility gains and economic benefits have 
developed. Based on our information, the ARC highway programs did little 
to alter the established planning processes. 
As with the Interstate, going the final miles on ADHS completion 
appears more difficult. The ARC has prioritized segment construction based 
on need; they have worked on the worst segments first. Hence, the future 
ADHS investments will edge toward a point of diminished returns. ADHS 
authorizations extend through 1981, but much more Federal aid will be 
needed to complete the system. Without such aid the level of construction 
activity will diminish. Policy deliberations on the future of the ADHS 
will likely concern energy issues - both in terms of the wisdom of highway 
expenditures and the ways to promote Appalachian coal transportation (e.g., 
special Coal-Haul Roads). 
This paper has focused on the categorical nature of the ADHS and the 
efficacy of the Federal funding structures. It has restricted its purview 
largely to highway considerations. We recall that the ARC effort in trans-
portation is broader, with interests in waterways, railroads, and, air 
movements. Financially, these involve supplemental aid programs that are 
deserving of study in their own right. For instance, in the case of ARC 
supplements to Federal Aviation Administration airport aid and the special 
Appalachian airport safety funds, it would be useful to find out whether 
these induced extra investment and of what type. 
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Summary and Recommendations  
This report describes an analysis of state highway capital decisions based 
on examining highway project data obtained from the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA). The data include all state work undertaken with federal aid and exclude 
capital improvements on non-federal aid systems. (While project-level data on 
capital improvements to non-federal aid roads are not available, the associated 
gross expenditures are available from the FHWA and have been used in this report.) 
The project level analysis showed that states have dramatically shifted 
emphasis during the 1970 decade from building new roads to improvement of exist-
ing roads. Miles of new roads built annually have declined by 64 percent between 
1960 and 1977 while road improvements have increased by 98 percent over the same 
period. 
The states' capital investment on federal-aid roads has failed to keep up 
with inflation in recent years. Expenditures increased by 43 percent between 
1970 and 1977 while inflation increased during the same period by 72 percent. 
It is difficult to separate out the reasons for the lower capital invest-
ments (much of which is recapitalization) on the highway systems. Continued 
expectations for inflation and the very slow success of states in enacting higher 
highway taxes, suggests that federal funds will increasingly become a dominant 
factor in capital investment decisions. 
One can therefore expect that the 1978 Surface Transportation Act will 
further accelerate the states' current trends toward recapitalization of exist-
ing roads and bridges. The Act also gives incentives to those states wishing 
to accelerate completion of their Interstate systems while at the same time 
encouraging states with opposite interests to decertify unessential Interstate 
segments and use the equivalent of those earmarked funds towards other higher-
priority ends. The significant federal aid called for by the Act for the 
nation's deteriorated bridges should evoke a strong response from the states. 
Regarding terms of federal aid, since states had already shifted emphasis 
to road preservation and to bridge improvements in the 1970 decade, one can 
argue that the federal role, in these two programs at least, is one of providing 
financial relief as opposed to changing recipient's priorities. Adding the 
compelling national interest in the preservation of the Interstate System, one 
can make a good case for increasing the federal matching share, say to 90 percent, 
in the Interstate restoration and bridge programs. 
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I. Introduction 
This report is part of a second phase in a study aimed at examining 
effects on State allocative decisions of differences in terms of federal 
aid for highway programs. Differences include varying matching ratios 
offered to states, eligibility of only certain states for some federal 
programs, and categorical versus block nature of some grants. Earlier 
studies in the first phase have analyzed state expenditure decisions using 
both statistical multivariate techniques and experimental methods.
1 
These 
studies had used expenditure data classified by function (e.g. maintenance, 
capital outlay, administration, etc.) and federal system (Interstate, ABC, 
etc.). This study uses project data obtained from the Federal Highway 
Administration. These data report the number of projectsundertaken, 
dollar value, and miles of work involved, with classification according 
to both federal system and type of work, (building a new road, improving 
an existing road, etc.). 
The objective of this alternate approach using project data was to 
examine changes which have occurred in State allocative decisions over the 
type of highway work undertaken in the last two decades and of the role 
1 Porter, A.L., Park, C.Y., Rees, L.P., Connolly, T., Rao, S., and Larson, T.D. 
Effects of Federal Transportation Funding Policies and Structure, Office of 
the Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., 1980. 
Sherman, L. The Impacts of the Federal Aid Highway Program as a Policy In-
tervention, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Civil Engineering, Mass-
achusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 1975. 
Park, Y. Analysis of the Appalachian Development Highway System as a Policy  
Intervention. Unpublished Master of Science Thesis, School of Industrial 
and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, 
August 1978. 
federal aid terms may have played in these decisions. This report is also 
different from earlier studies in that it focuses only on decisions within  
the capital program for federal-aid systems. Since the data analyzed here 
exclude state capital expenditures on non-federal aid roads, it is not pos-
sible, on the basis of these data alone, to draw conclusions about overall 
state capital investment levels. However, one can infer changes in relative 
priorities among different federal aid systems and drawing upon earlier 
studies remark on the overall highway programs. 
Care must be exercised in interpreting expenditure data on federal aid 
system categories because of changes which have occurred in system defini-
tions. Based on extensive discussions with U.S. Department of Transportation 
personnel, allowance has been made for these changes in the findings reported 
here. Greater confidence is placed on the classification by type of work. 
The report is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
source of the data and the processing of these data. The following section 
describes the findings, first identifying certain national trends and then 
examining selected groups. The final section presents the conclusions. 
II. Input Data and Processing  
A. Data  
Data for this study came from the PR-37 Master file. The PR-37 is a 
collection of highway project information for all fifty states and five 
U.S. possessions. The data are arranged alphabetically by state name and 
include all projects from 1957 to present. 
The PR-37 Master file is compiled by the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion, Federal Highway Administration. The file is updated periodically as 
projects are undertaken and completed. Within the file are five different 
record formats that correspond to different uses of the Master file. The 
record formats and uses are as follows: 
Header Record. This is the first record for all project information. It 
includes the project location, character of proposed work, expenditures 
total to date. The header record serves as an overview of introduction to 
a highway project. 
Detail Record. 	The detail record is the most useful record type to categorize 
project information. Total project cost, federal funds, system classifica-
tions, and construction type are among the information contained in this 
record type. 
The detail record also lists stage 1 and stage 2 authorization, progress 
and completion dates for all projects. This analysis uses the stage 2 
authorization date to analyze project information over time. The authori-
zation date on the PR-37 is the date federal funds were obligated for a 
project. 
Summary Record. The summary record format is used to record projects authori-
zed prior to July, 1956. This is a listing of projects where federal funds 
were authorized, but the project was never started. Projects appearing on 
the summary record are part of the Department of Transportation's inactive 
file. 
Cost Estimate Record. This record type is used to record estimated costs 
before a project is undertaken. Any project appearing in this record format 
is simply a proposed project for which federal funds have not been authorized. 
For purposes of the analysis, any project appearing in a cost estimate record 
is ignored. The analysis is concerned only with projects where federal 
funds are authorized. 
Audit Trail. The audit trail record is used for accounting and control 
purposes. The record contains information on the number of projects, total 
cost, and subsidiary federal funds for each state. 
B. 	Classification of Data  
The analysis centers on two types of project classifications: type of 
improvement and federal aid system. The classification, according to type 
of improvement, was accomplished using the construction class from the detail 
record format. Five project type groups were formed as follows: 
5 
A New Road (construction code 0 and 1) is considered to be either: 1) 
construction of a traffic facility at a new location, or 2) relocation 
of an existing route that promises to carry all the through traffic of 
the old route. 
A Road Improvement (construction code 2,3,4, and 5) is construction on an 
existing route. This may include a minor relocation, resurfacing, widening, 
or combination. 
A New Bridge (construction code 6) is construction of a bridge where one 
did not previously exist. 
A Bridge Improvement (construction code 7,8, and 9) is any construction on 
an existing bridge. This may include major reconstruction, widening, or 
Raving. 
Unclassified (construction code blank) encompasses engineering, purchase of 
right-of-way, or miscellaneous construction. This category primarily consists 
of preliminary studies. 
A second dimension used for classifying projects was the federal-aid 
system of the road on which the improvement occurred. Projects are classi-
fied into ten different system classifications in the PR-37 file. However 
for the purpose of this study, these were reduced down into five groups: 
Primary, Secondary, Urban, Interstate, and Other. 
6 
The Federal Aid Primary System. The Primary System (A) was established in 
1921 and is the oldest of the federal aid systems. It was designated as a 
system of main highways not to exceed 7 percent of each state's total 
highway mileage. 
Authorizations for the Primary System are made every two years. 
Apportionment of the authorizations is based on the following factors: 
1) 2/9 land area 
2) 2/9 rural population 
3) 2/9 rural postage route mileage 
4) 1/3 urban population 
It is also provided that no state will receive less than .5 percent of the 
total apportionment in a given year. 
The Federal Aid Secondary System. The Secondary System (B) was intended to 
aid rural roads which link markets to urban centers. This system typically 
includes mail routes, public bus routes, and county and township roads, and 
the projects are generally of smaller scale than primary projects. 
Authorizations for the Secondary System are also made every two years. 
Apportionment of the authorizations is based on the following formula: 
1) 1/3 land area 
2) 1/3 rural population 
3) 1/3 rural postal route mileage 
The Federal Aid Urban System. The Urban System was established by the 
7 
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970. It was intended to be a new and separate 
system serving major centers of activity in urban areas. Apportionment of 
urban funds is based on urban population over 5,000. 
The Federal Aid Interstate System. The Interstate System is quite different 
from the systems discussed above. First, total mileage of the Interstate 
System has been specifically identified and constrained, initially at 41,000 
miles, and now at 42,500 miles. Also, completion of the Interstate System 
was scheduled for the end of 1979, but since has been extended. This is the 
only Federal Aid System that was established with a limit on the total mile-
age and with a target completion date. Apportionment of Interstate funds 
is based on the federal share of the estimated cost of completing the Inter-
state System and the federal matching share is very high, at 90 percent. 
Other. All other types of road systems including Offsystems and Highway 
Planning and Research (HPR) expenditures are grouped in this category. 
8 
III. Findings  
The findings of this study will be discussed in two parts. First, 
the national trends and then the trends for selected groups of states 
will be examined. 
A. National Trends  
Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the total number, dollar value, and miles of 
work respectively for highway projects in the PR-37 Master file. Projects 
are placed in the five improvement type categories described previously. 
The tables show that: 
o 	The total dollars devoted to highway construction and improve- 
ment have failed to keep up with inflation in the industry, 
especially in the 1970's. The expenditures increased from 
$6.7 billion in 1970 to $9.6 billion in 1977, an increase of 
43 percent, while inflation increased during the same period 
by 72 percent.
1 
o 	Emphasis in project type has shifted dramatically from the 
building of new roads to improvement of existing roads; for 
example, 1,959 miles of new roads were completed in 1977 com-
pared to 2,413 miles in 1975 and 5,199 miles in 1965. Road 
miles improved increased to 13,147 miles in 1977 from 8,629 
miles in 1965. 
1 Federal Highway Administration, Price Trends for Federal-Aid Highway  
Construction, highway composite index, various years, Washington, D.C. 
Table 1. Total Number of Projects by Type and Selected Years 
New Road 
Road 
Improvement New Bridge 
Bridge 
Improvement Subtotal Unclassified ) Total 
1960 2,474 2,334 3,137 338 8,283 15,604 23,887 
1965 2,098 2,368 3,319 311 8,096 16,666 24,762 
1970 1,623 1,440 2,145 224 5,432 16,131 21,563 
1975 1,285 3,577 1,918 656 7,436 28,521 35,957 
1977 1,179 5,768 2,206 1,069 10,222 34,535 44,757 
1 
Preliminary engineering, right-of-way acquisition, and miscellaneous 
construction--primarily preliminary studies. 
c.r 
Table 2. 	Total Dollar Value of Projects by Type and Selected Years (millions) 
Road 	 Bridge 
New Road 	Improvement New Bridge 	Improvement 	Subtotal 	Unclassified Total 
1960 $1,555.5 571.4 801.9 40.3 2,969.1 1,514.4 4,483.5 
1965 2,071.4 674.5 978.1 38.2 3,762.2 1,699.0 5,461.2 
1970 2,421.4 862.6 1,408.2 56.6 4,748.7 1,971.8 6,720.5 
1975 2,038.6 2,016.5 1,481.7 218.5 5,755.4 2,663.1 8,418.5 
1977 1,869.1 2,702.1 1,686.3 323.9 6,581.5 3,037.8 9,619.3 
Table 3. Road and Bridge Miles by Type and Selected Years 
Road Bridge 
New Road Improvement New Bridge Improvement Subtotal Unclassified Total 
1960 5,379.0 6,643.1 139.8 10.9 12,172.8 35,374.4 47,547.2 
1965 5,199.0 8,628.7 128.4 12.4 13,968.4 22,276.9 36,245.3 
1970 3,535.3 4,542.4 112.9 12.3 8,203.0 16,973.0 25,176.0 
1975 2,413.3 7,892.7 102.7 63.5 10,472.2 17,241.9 27,714.1 
1977 1,958.8 13,146.8 176.4 111.9 15,393.9 19,798.7 35,192.6 
11 
o Due to inflation, the current dollar amount of expenditure on 
new road construction has remained approximately constant 
despite the reduction in number of projects. 
o The bridges in the nation have begun to receive greater 
attention. Bridge improvement projects increased from 311 
in 1965 to 1,069 in 1977 with a concomitant increase in project 
value from $38.2 million to $323.9 million. 
o All categories of projects, in terms of road miles built and 
improved, declined after 1965 and fluctuated around a lower 
plateau of activity until 1975. Since 1975, improvement of 
existing roads and bridges has received greater resources. 
o The number of miles of project work underway in preliminary 
stages (engineering, right-of-way, etc.) has remained approxi-
mately constant since 1965 at about 20,000 miles. However, 
the number of projects in preliminary stages has increased 
from about 16,000 in 1965 and 1970 to 28,521 in 1975 and 
34,535 in 1977, suggesting that projects are now of smaller 
scope. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the total number and dollar value of highway 
projects by type of federal aid system. The Urban System, as described 
earlier, was not established until 1970 and prior to this time these roads 
were either part of the Primary and Secondary road systems or local non-
federal-aid systems. Table 6 compares road and bridge miles for 1965, 
Table 4. 
Interstate 
Number of Projects by System and Selected Years
1 
Primary 	Secondary 	Urban Other Total 
1960 3,219 3,931 994 1 138 8,283 
1965 3,631 2,740 1,659 0 66 8,096 
1970 2,387 2,109 856 0 80 5,432 
1975 1,741 2,607 1,879 860 349 7,436 
1977 1,939 3,492 1,850 1,443 1,498 10,222 
1
Excludes "Unclassified projects 
Table 5. 	Total Dollar Value of Projects by System and Selected Years 
Interstate 	Primary 	Secondary 	Urban 
(millions)
1 
 Other Total 
1960 $1,732.9 1,102.9 120.2 13.1 2,969.1 
1965 2,504.2 981.9 265.6 10.5 3,762.2 
1970 2,956.1 1,569.0 201.7 21.9 4,748.7 
1975 ,2,647.7 1,994.2 585.3 471.8 56.4 5,755.4 
1977 2,818.2 2,349.5 543.9 683.6 186.3 6,581.5 
1
Excludes "Unclassified" projects 









1965 3,317.2 744.0 78.4 2.3 4,142.0 7,212.1 11,354.1 
1975 1,175.8 970.2 33.6 21.5 2,201.1 3,633.9 5,835.0 
1977 791.4 1,626.2 51.9 21.1 2,490.6 4,127.7 6,618.3 
Primary 
1965 1,582.1 3,635.9 32.6 7.9 5,258.5 4,571.1 9,829.6 
1975 813.1 3,595.0 27.1 32.3 4,467.5 5,553.6 10,021.1 
1977 845.7 6,218.8 42.9 25.2 7,135.7 6,699.5 13,832.1 
Secondary 
1965 278.4 3,864.1 17.4 2.1 4,162.1 9,524.5 13,686.6 
1975 316.9 2,352.5 34.8 4.8 2,709.0 5,289.6 7,998.6 
1977 191.2 3,247.9 48.6 11.1 3,498.6 4,807.6 8,306.4 
Urban 
1965 - - - - - - 
1975 71.7 407.8 5.6 3.9 489.1 656.6 1,145.7 
1977 79.7 872.3 12.5 47.5 1,011.8 2,000.4 3,012.2 
Other 
1965 21.3 384.7 - - 405.8 969.2 1,375.0 
1975 35.8 567.2 1.6 1.0 605.5 2,108.2 2,713.7 
1977 50.8 1,181.6 20.5 7.0 1,257.2 2,163.5 3,423.6 
Total 
1965 5,199.0 8,628.7 128.4 12.4 13,968.4 22,276.9 36,245.3 
1975 2,413.3 7,892.7 102.7 63.5 10,472.2 17,241.9 27,714.1 
1977 1,958.8 13,146.8 176.4 111.9 15,393.9 19,798.7 35,192.6 
1975, and 1977 with projects classified by both type of work and federal-
aid system. These tables show that: 
o Over time, as the Interstate System has neared completion (it 
is now about 90 percent complete), the number of miles of project 
work involved has declined from 11,354 miles in 1965 to 5,835 
miles in 1975. However, the Interstate project work remains and 
will continue to be an important component of highway work in 
the nation because (1) the system is expensive with average 
project cost of $1.2 million per mile compared to $0.4 million 
per mile for a Primary project (in 1975); and (2) much of the 
Interstate System continues to require on-going improvement as 
many parts of the system near the end of their 20-year life. In 
1965, 744 miles were improved and this activity increased to 970 
miles in 1975 and 1,626 miles in 1977. 
o In comparison with the high point of the highway construction era 
in 1965, roads on the Primary and Urban Systems and the nation's 
bridges are receiving greater attention. This gain is afforded 
by drawing away some resources from the Interstate and Secondary 
System roads. 
o Examination of projects in the preliminary stages suggest that 
for the next few years, states will continue to give high priority 
to Primary and Urban routes. 
The above trends appear to be a natural outgrowth of several basic 
phenomena in the United States: (1) Slower population growth and a con-
centration in urban and suburban areas; (2) a national network of high-
speed corridors linking virtually every major activity center; (3) rapid 
increase in highway maintenance costs due both to inflation and the in-
crease in the size of the highway network, resulting in fewer resources 
available for new construction; (4) a highway network whose average age 
is increasing as many segments of system, built during or prior to the 1950's 
and early 60's reach their expected life and require rehabilitation or re-
construction; (5) higher environmental concerns and greater uncertainty in 
highway revenues (due to the move to lower energy consumption) leading to 
more difficulty in undertaking and greater reluctance to committing scarce 
resources to expensive, long-term projects. 
While the above are national phenomena, they have not affected all 
states equally. For example, the migration of people from the Northeast 
to the South and the Southwest has led to greater highway revenues and 
greater demand for highway services in the latter states. Therefore, one 
might expect differences in allocation of resources, with Southern and 
Southwestern states allocating relatively more resources to new road con-
struction. In the Appalachian states, the federal Appalachian Development 
Highway System (ADHS) is considered to have boosted highway programs.
1 
These suppositions are examined in the next section. 
1 
Park, C.Y., op. cit. 
16 
B. 	Analysis of Selected State Groups  
States were grouped into several different classifications following 
earlier work along similar lines.
1 Analysis of the following groups of 
states turned out interesting results. 
Public Land: Some states have a considerable amount of publicly-owned 
lands. These lands, which are non-taxable, have the effect of reducing 
state revenues. To compensate states for this reduced revenue, the Congress 
allowed higher federal matching ratios on several federal-aid programs. 
There are twelve continental states that qualify for more favorable match- 
ing shares under this provision: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming. 
Appalachian States: The Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS) 
was established by Congress in 1965. In broad terms, the objectives of 
the ADHS are to foster economic development through increased mobility. 
Highway projects on the ADHS are financed out of general funds. Thirteen 
states are eligible under this program: Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
Core Appalachian States: Five of the Appalachian states are termed 
"core" states. These states received substantial monies through their 
1 
Porter, A.L., Park, C.Y., Rees, L.P., Connolly, T., Rao, S., and 
Larson, T.D., 2E. cit. 
17 
early participation in the ADHS program. This group consists of: Kentucky, 
North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
1. New Road Construction  
New road construction in the nation has shown a dramatic decline as 
graphically depicted in Figure 1. However, construction in the Appalachian 
region has increased since 1973. In 1978, this program received over 37 
percent of the resources in the Appalachian region, compared to 20 percent 
in the nation as a whole. The proportion of projects involving new road 
construction in Appalachia is also higher; 4.8 percent in 1978 compared to 
2 percent for the nation. It should also be noted that of the various groups 
analyzed, the Core Appalachian States are the only group that can point to 
an increase in new road construction in the 1970's. 
The groups that exhibit the most noticeable turndown in new road con-
struction are Public Land States. In these states the proportion of total 
dollars going toward new road construction has fallen from 33 percent to 
9 percent in recent years. In contrast, Southern States exhibit a stable 
program of new road construction with about 30 percent of total project 
expenditures going toward this purpose. 
2. Highway Allocation in Appalachian States  
Nationally, there has been a trend to allocate more resources to non-
federal-aid systems as graphically shown in Figure 2. The expenditure on 


































































Figure 1. ALLOCATION OF HIGHWAY RESOURCES TO NEW ROAD CONSTRUCTION, 
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Source: Federal Highway Administration, 
Highway Statistics, various years, 
Washington, D.C. 






FIGURE 2. HIGHWAY RESOURCES DEVOTED TO NON FEDERAL AID SYSTEMS, 




markedly in the early seventies. This is most likely due to the increasing 
"red tape" perceived with major federally-aided projects as a result of 
the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969. The sub-
sequent stabilization in expenditures on the 100 percent state program 
may be due to the awakening of environmental concerns in state level 
legislation as well as increasing scarcity of resources. Recent federal 
action allowing states to obtain (in some cases borrow as in the ADHS 
program) unused federal apportionments have also created incentives to 
seek federal dollars to the maximum extent possible with matching state 
dollars. 
The Core Appalachian states also exhibit increasing expenditures on 
non-federal-aid roads, despite the drain upon highway resources of the 
ADHS program. It has been stated:
1 
	capital outlay on roads ineligible for Federal Aid 
increased in the core ADHS states relative to the comparison 
group. There is no indication that the ADHS program detracted 
from the non-federal-aid road effort. 
The data presented in this study confirm these findings. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the share of project funds allocated in the 
Appalachian states to Primary and Secondary road systems, respectively. 
The Primary System share doubled from 20 to 40 percent over the 1965-75 
decade, coinciding with the introduction of the federal ADHS program. 

































FIGURE 3. ALLOCATION OF HIGHWAY RESOURCES TO THE PRIMARY SYSTEM IN APPALACHIAN STATES 
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The Secondary System share shows a long-term decline in the Appal-
achian states. First, the Interstate program and then the ADHS program 
(as manifested in the Primary System) seem to have drawn higher priorities 
at the expense of the Secondary System. 
IV. Conclusions  
Analysis of project data for the past twenty years reveals several 
shifts in state allocative decisions over time. Perhaps the most impor-
tant of these shifts is that from the building of new roads to the improve-
ment of existing roads. The latter improvements include reconstruction as 
well as resurfacing and other betterment projects. 
New road construction was at its peak in the 1965-1968 period as the 
federal Interstate program poured massive resources at attractive matching 
terms. As the Interstate System nears completion, states have started 
giving greater attention to the Primary, Urban, and Non-Federal Aid Systems. 
Bridges are also receiving more funds as states perceive a critical problem 
with a system of structures which is old, deteriorated, and not built for 
today's traffic volumes and truck weights. 
As an exception to the national trend, new road construction continues 
at a high pace in the Appalachian states where the ADHS program is having 
a stimulative effect on highway construction similar to that which the 
Interstate program had on the nation as a whole in the 1960's. If the 
Interstate and Appalachian programs serve as examples, the federal expanded 
Bridge program, as authorized in the 1978 Surface Transportation Act, should 
accelerate the current attack on our bridge problems. 
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Summary  
This analysis concerns the manner in which the Airport Development Aid 
Program (ADAP) funding provisions have affected airport development. It 
focuses on the implications of changing federal shares as the act was revised 
for the fiscal year (FY) 1974-75 period, then again for FY76-78. The level 
of federal funding, the way in which funds are allocated, and the restric-
tions on their usage are also considered. 
This work is part of a broader study for the Office of the Secretary, 
U.S. Department of Transportation (P. J. Barbato, monitor) that addresses 
the effects of funding structures across the highway, transit, and airport 
modes. We deeply appreciate the insights offered on current and future 
policy issues by the many knowledgeable transportation professionals 
acknowledged in our overview report. 
The findings presented reflect a synthesis of statistical analysis, 
interview, and literature review. The statistical base is the record of 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) financial assistance projects under 
the ADAP program from FY71 through FY77. Interviews with a number of pro-
fessionals concerned with aviation from different perspectives augment this 
data base. Several analyses focused on different aspects of airport financ-
ing contribute to the present interpretations. 
ADAP had markedly increased the level of federal involvement. Total 
investment under ADAP has grown to some $700 million in FY77, but sponsor 
contributions actually declined from well over $200 million in FY72 to about 
$150 million in FY77. We have reason to believe that large airports (large 
and most medium hubs) invest considerably beyond ADAP, but that smaller ones 
do not. Since FY74 the share going to general aviation airports has declined 
from about 21% to 12% in FY77, with the actual dollar amount for general 
aviation about constant as the ADAP program has grown. Just within the air 
carrier airports, proportionately more funds per enplanement have gone to 
the smaller airports to a striking degree. 
The federal aid share for ADAP from FY71-73 was 50%; for FY74-75 it 
increased to 75% for the medium hub and smaller airports. 	For FY76-78 it 
increased to 75% for the large hubs, with no change for the medium hubs, 
but an increase to 90% for smaller airports. We investigated the effects 
of these changes, comparing among large, medium, and smaller hubs for the 
three time periods. No general pattern emerged to suggest that federal 
share was a dominant influence on investments. 
Almost 98% of the ADAP funds have gone to improvement of existing air-
ports rather than construction of new ones (for a variety of reasons). 
Almost 75% of the funds have been used for landing area construction, other 
land, and site preparation. A category that includes relocation costs, 
safety and security, and environmental land has increased dramatically 
(most sharply for medium hubs - from 8% in FY71-73 to 27% in FY76-77). 
We consider federal funding intent to be critical in assessing a 
federal aid program. A program of compelling national interest, for 
instance, may warrant a high federal aid share in a tightly categorical 
program. If one wants to stimulate local investment, a lower federal share 
to maximize leverage in a categorical program would be appropriate. If the 
intent is to reduce the financial burden on a local transportation unit, 
more flexible block grants with high federal shares are in order. From 
this perspective, ADAP has increased investment, especially for safety pur-
poses (a national interest). However, one could question whether the sharp 
growth in capital costs per enplanement at small airports, at Trust Fund 
expense, is fully warranted. If ADAP is viewed largely as a mechanism to 
effect user funding, it has worked, although changes are now under consider-
ation. The analysis concludes with a brief discussion of currently proposed 
legislative changes. 
We generally conclude that flexibility is desirable in federal aid pro-
grams. This implies a preference for block grants over categorical programs 
in the absence of strong counter-arguments. It also argues for discretionary 




For many years, and particularly in the past decade, the federal 
government has made efforts to shape the growth and development of the 
nation's airport system. In large part, these efforts have involved the 
provision of various forms and amounts of financial aid for airport con-
struction by local sponsors. Two large federal programs have provided 
such aid: the Federal Aid to Airports Program (FAAP), extending from 1947 
to 1970; and the Airport Development Aid Program (ADAP), instituted with 
fiscal year (FY) 1971 and since extensively modified in 1973 and 1976. 
Under both programs, but especially under ADAP, a number of 'policy levers' 
have been manipulated: the total amount of federal aid provided; require-
ments for recipients to contribute; eligibility of different categories of 
recipients; restrictions on categories of investment; and the form of aid 
provided. The objective of this study is to assess the effects of these 
funding policies and changes therein on actual airport construction activity. 
Given the large dollar amounts involved in airport congftetction, and 
the important role played by airports in the national transportation system, 
an assessment of the impact of federal government interventions in this area 
is clearly of interest in its own right. Further, the examination of these 
issues promises insights into larger questions of federal intervention in 
transportation funding decisions. The airport funding area provides an 
interesting opportunity to assess the impact of the various financial 'policy 
levers' noted on such 'output variables' as total construction activity; 
distribution of expenditures across different categories of construction, 
and across different categories of airports; and so on. A particular focus 
of interest is the effect of increasing the federal share of project cost: 
Has this led to broader participation by smaller airports? Has it increased 
total capital investment in all, or any, airport categories? Or has it 
served to substitute federal dollars for investments that would otherwise 
have been made at the local level? 
Before we examine these issues, we must first review briefly the set-
ting and history of federal involvement in the airport construction area. 
II. Airports and the Federal Government  
The United States has some 12,700 landing areas of which 4,527 have 
runways between 3,000 and 20,000 feet. Of these, 772 airports are certified 
for air carrier (i.e., paying passenger) service.
1 
Air carrier airports 
are classified in terms of the number of enplanements per year as large  
hubs (enplaning over 1% of the nation's total enplanements - over 205,000,000 
in 1973); medium hubs (.25-1.0%); small hubs (.05-.25%); and non-hubs (less 
than .05%). Commuter airports (i.e., those serving commuter air carriers) 
are now defined as a separate air carrier airport category. In addition 
there are the general aviation airports (i.e. those serving private planes), 
and reliever airports (i.e., those able to relieve congestion at an air 
carrier airport by diverting general aviation activity to the smaller air-
port). The large hubs account for some 68% of the passenger enplanements.
2 
Total passenger enplanements in the U.S. doubled between 1967 and 1977, des-
pite two periods of essentially zero growth, from 1969-1971, and 1973-1975 
(Figure 1). 
Until recently, the role of the federal government in airport 
1U.S. Department of Transportation, National Transportation Report, 
Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 312. Fewer are regularly served by certifi-
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construction has been quite small.
1 
The FAAP program never provided more 
than $75 million per year, while state and local authorities invested close 
to $1 billion in 1970, for instance.
2 
However, the picture is changing. 
As shown in Figure 2, ADAP has drastically increased the level of federal 
involvement. The 1974 National Transportation Report showed anticipated 
capital investments through 1980 being attributed 25% to federal aid, 46% 
to airport authority revenues, with the remainder deriving from state, 
local, user taxes, and private funds, etc. 3 Another estimate placed the 
federal share of capital investments at about 50%.
4 
A sense of the perva-
siveness of federal involvement comes from a survey of airport improvement 
projects in Minnesota from 1963 through 1973. Of 124 such projects, 70 
involved federal aid (all through the Federal Aviation Administration - 
FAA - except for two Economic Development Administration projects); all of 
the projects involved local funds; 115, state aid as well. In short, the 
federal government plays a large role in airport capital investments - a 
role which, as we shall see, has increased sharply in recent years. 
III. ADAP  
Perceiving a need to stimulate development of the airport and airway 
system, the Congress passed the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 
(P.L. 91-258). The Act established: 
- a national airport system plan, with airports in the plan eligible 
1
D. V. Harper, Transportation in America: Users, Carriers, Government  




U.S. Department of Transportation, op. cit., Table XII-R-1. 
4
U.S. Department of Transportation, National Transportation Trends  
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Figure 2. Federal-Aid authorized for Airports 
Source: U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, Eighth Annual Report 
of Operations under the Airport and Airway Development Act,  
Washington, D.C., 1977. 
for federal aid; 
- a revised tax structure and an Airport and Airway Trust Fund that 
dedicated these user revenues for use on airport and airway improve-
ments; 
- the Planning Grants Program (PGP) to aid airport planning agencies; 
- the Airport Development Aid Program (ADAP). 
Establishment of the ADAP program, which provided a four-fold expan-
sion of the federal funds previously available, was motivated largely by a 
federal interest in relieving congestion at major airports. Indeed, testi-
mony by the FAA administrator predicted 900 new airports would be needed in 
the 1970's.
1 Explicitly stated goals of ADAP include:
2 
- encourage the development and implementation of airport develop-
ment programs consistent with national transportation goals and 
with goals determined locally through areawide planning programs. 
- assist investments of airport sponsors in airport facilities. 
- improve the safety and economic efficiency of the system by 
encouraging uniformity in development within appropriate safety 
and design standards. 
- promote the timely development of airport facilities needed to 
minimize delays due to congestion in the system. 
- assure consistency of airport development with other aviation 
facility installations programmed under the Facilities and 
Equipment Program for the Federal Aviation Administration. 
1J. E. Milch, "Feasible and Prudent Alternatives: Airport Develop-
ment in the Age of Public Protest," Public Policy 24, Winter 1976, p. 93. 
2
Federal Aviation Administration, 8th Annual Report of Operations  
Under the Airport and Airway Development Act Washington, D.C., U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1977, p. 17. 
- assist in the acquisition of non-public-owned airports where communi-
ties have committed themselves to public ownership and maintenance 
of the airport. 
- mitigate, to the extent practical, adverse environmental effects of 
aircraft operations. 
Amendments to the Act began right away. In 1971, P.L. 92-174 detailed 
provisions for the expenditure of funds from the trust fund. More interest-
ingly, P.L. 93-44 in 1973 increased annual authorization for FY1974 and 1975 
and increased the federal share for grants at most (but not all) airports. 
And again in 1976, P.L. 94-353 made a number of major changes, in particular 
increasing the funding levels and again altering the percentage of the fed-
eral contribution for most projects. (The several changes in Federal share 
are summarized in Table 1.) FAA personnel (personal communication) per-
ceived the main objectives of the 1976 changes to be (1) to reach more 
sponsors; and (2) to guarantee funding amounts to all air carrier airports. 
In addition, thanks to strident feedback from potential aid recipients con-
cerning the 105-step grant approval process, there was an attempt to expe-
dite the process and cut red tape. 
The focus of this paper is on the changing nature of the funding struc-
tures involved in the ADAP program. We have noted the general thrust of 
the increase in federal funding level (Figure 1), and will have much more 
to say about the changing federal shares (reflected in Table 1). It is also 
important to take note of two features of the funding structures: the way 
in which funds are allocated and the restrictions on their usage. Whereas 
the old FAAP program was set up on a purely discretionary basis (i.e., each 
project application was evaluated individually by FAA), ADAP was set up with 
only one-third of its funds to be allocated on a discretionary basis, with 
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b
Matching ratio based on enplanement of the airport undertaking the project. 
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Includes small hubs, non-hubs, and undesignated. 
d
Equipment necessary for snow removal and noise suppression. 
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the other two-thirds made available on a formula apportionment basis. The 
1976 amendments shifted the air carrier apportionment from one-third on the 
basis of sponsor enplanements and one-third on a state basis to two-thirds 
on an airport enplanement basis (i.e., removing the state-based share). A 
certain amount of the discretionary funds were set aside for use by commuter 
service airports (previously for reliever airports). As shown in Table 2, 
general aviation airports have received sizeable federal funds totalling some 
$337 million, or about 15% of the $2.25 billion granted during FY1971-77. 
Since FY1974, the dollar amounts going to general aviation airports have 
remained roughly constant, so that their fraction of the total has declined 
from about 21% in FY1974 to about 12% in FY1977, as the overall program has 
grown. Sponsor contribution to these projects is shown in Figure 3; the 
sharp decline in general aviation sponsor contributions since FY1975 should 
be noted. 
We will concentrate upon the air carrier airports, relegating the gen-
eral aviation airports to a well-deserved secondary status. While there are 
doubts about the "national interest" in the Airport Aid Program in general, 1 
 it is even harder to see significant national interest in the private plane 
arena. Some would argue that general aviation airports constitute the 
"grass roots" of the system and they are in the most unfavorable position 
to finance capital investment -, hence federal support is justified. Others 
note that general aviation airports contribute to the economic welfare, are 
used by the Postal Service, and, in any event, merit FAA safety provisions. 
Rather compelling arguments support aid for reliever airports as a cost-
effective way to reduce congestion at hub airports. Within the air carrier 
1
T. P. Messier, "Discussion," Transportation Research Board Special 
Report 157, Transportation Programming Process, Washington, D.C., National 
Academy of Sciences, 1975. 
10 
Table 2. Capital Improvement Expenditures under ADAP 
FY 	1971 	1972 	1973 	1974 	1975 	1976 	1977 
+TQ 
Federal ACA 145.3 227.7 172.3 239.2 278.0 373.4 479.3 
Funds 
($ Million) GAA 10.3 32.2 36.5 62.0 70.2 59.4 66.0 
Total 155.6 259.9 208.8 301.2 348.2 432.8 545.3 
Sponsor ACA 158.6 204.2 133.7 119.1 145.7 106.6 131.1 
Funds 
($ Million) GAA 10.0 31.4 22.8 18.9 23.6 6.6 7.4 
Total 168.6 235.6 156.5 138.0 169.3 113.2 138.5 
Total ACA 303.9 431.9 306.0 358.3 423.7 480.1 610.4 
Funds 
($ Million) GAA 20.3 63.7 59.3 80.9 93.8 66.1 73.4 
Total 324.2 495.6 365.3 439.2 517.5 546.2 683.8 
ACA 47.8% 52.7% 56.3% 66.8% 65.6% 77.8% 78.5% 
Federal/Total 
GAA 50.7% 50.5% 61.6% 76.6% 74.8% 90.0% 89.9% 
Total 48.0% 52.4% 57.2% 68.6% 67.3% 79.2% 79.7% 
Note: ACA stands for air carrier airports; 
GAA for general aviation airports. 
1 1 
airport classification, we will focus upon the large, medium, and small 
hubs, as these dominate the passenger enplanement statistics.
1 
Decision making authority for airport investment resides with the air-
port 'sponsor,' typically a municipality or county, occasionally a local 
special authority. In addition, a number of states operate airports, but 
usually these are smaller airports. Privately owned airports are not eli-
gible for ADAP aid. Airport sponsors pay no taxes, and many can issue tax 
exempt bonds.
2 
Commercial airlines generally underwrite bonds floated by 
airport sponsors for major new construction.
3 
This can produce tensions at 
times. For instance, airlines may prefer to see reliever airports developed 
(diverting private craft away from a major airport) rather than construc-
tion of a brand new major facility. Such preference would be especially 
strong under fiscal constraints and non-growth conditions such as prevailed 
in the early 1970's. Airport size (as reflected in passenger enplanements) 
is a critical factor in sponsors' investment decisions. Both FAA personnel 
and representatives of the Airport Operators Council International suggested 
that only the larger airports (the large hubs and the largest ten or so of 
the medium hubs) can break even financially. So, backed by airline support 
for a capital investment, a large air carrier airport basically can decide 
on its own to proceed with a project, treating federal aid as a nice, but 
1However, we do appreciate a real "system" character that makes air 
transportation largely a function of good access to a wide range of places. 
For instance, as pointed out to us, Pennsylvania has only eight air carrier 
airports and does not consider only those as constituting the system. 
2
E. J. Feldman, "Air Transportation Infrastructure as a Problem of 
Public Policy," Policy Studies Journal 6 (1), 1977, p. 21. 
3




auxiliary aid. In contrast, the smaller airports essentially 
cannot pursue construction without significant federal aid. Insofar as air-
line deregulation weakens the linkage between an airline and a small airport, 
the ability of such airports to undertake capital improvements may be further 
weakened. 
Against this background, we now turn to the empirical evidence bearing 
on the effects of changes in federal funding policy, particularly those 
under ADAP, on actual airport capital improvement expenditures. We con-
sider first the effects of the overall increase in available federal funds, 
and second, the effects of policy efforts to steer these funds in some 
directions rather than in others. 
IV. Effects of Overall Increase in Federal Funds  
The most obvious change in federal funding policy for airport invest-
ment is the very large increase in the total funds made available since 
1970 under ADAP. Authorized levels were shown earlier in Figure 2; actual 
grant totals in Table 2. A comparison of the totals shows that actual 
grants have been close to the authorized totals for all years except FY1973, 
in which a shortfall due to impoundment may be seen. In current dollars 
then (Figure 3), the trend has been a steady increase over time in the 
federal funding used, with a roughly constant (or even declining) total 
provided by airport sponsors. Total development funds spent on ADAP- 
1
A similar inference may be drawn from J. A. Neiss, Final Report: 
Study of the Effect of Head Taxes (The Aerospace Corporation, prepared for 
Office of Aviation Economics, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Washington, D.C., 1974, DOT-FA 74WA-3438). His data clearly suggest 
that only the larger hubs are able to support capital improvements on 
their own. The share of capital improvement costs borne by federal and 
state funds increases sharply in his data as one moves from larger to 
smaller airports. 
Note: Deflated dollars are 
obtained using highway 
construction index, 
1972 base 
Total (Current Dollars) 
Federal ,(Current Dollars) 
Total (Deflated Dollars) 
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supported projects have increased, even in deflated dollars. Investments 
respond to perceived needs, plus increased costs associated with such fed-
eral requirements as relocation assistance and environmental protection. 
(The higher proportion of federal funds might be partly justified as a way 
to offset some of the costs associated with these federal requirements, 
rather than an increase in the federal share of actual development.) 
We noted earlier that the trend in enplanements over this period has 
been generally upward, doubling from 1967 to 1977; and that large needs for 
airport improvement were identified.
1 
Under ADAP a large and growing frac- 
tion of the necessary capital investment has been provided by federal funds. 
The strong implication is that a major consequence of ADAP aid has been the 
substitution of federal for sponsor investment. The effect is not clear in 
the early years of the program, when the large rise in federal funding from 
1971 to 1972 was matched by a similar increase in sponsor funds, and the 
decline in sponsor investment. From 1973 onwards, however, the pattern 
becomes quite clear: sponsor investment has stayed roughly constant, fed-
eral funds have risen sharply. To the extent that these investments were 
justified by genuine need, the need has been largely met by the federal 
government rather than by airport sponsors. 
We must add a strong caveat to this conclusion, however. Our data are 
restricted to the ADAP-aided projects. We do not know what airport sponsors 
may have invested in non-federally-aided projects. A number of factors 
enter into this "guess" about the extent of capital investment without any 
federal aid. Other sources of revenue exist (states, sponsor-issued bonds, 
airline support through landing fee and terminal rental adjustments). There 
1
U.S. Department of Transportation, National Transportation Report, 
Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. 
is some advantage in avoiding federal aid because of its red tape delays 
and more stringent construction standards. Also, much of the investment 
in the terminal area, such as parking facilities, cargo buildings, and 
about half of the cost of passenger terminal buildings, is not eligible 
for federal aid. On the other hand, the availability of discretionary fed-
eral funds suggests that one might as well apply when substantial sums are 
involved. As mentioned, expert opinion agrees that, other than the large 
hubs and some, or maybe all, of the medium hubs (i.e., 35-65 airports in 
all), airports cannot afford significant capital investments without aid. 
Most compellingly, Neiss' detailed financial analysis of selected airports 
confirms the pattern of little investment without federal aid.
1 
V. Uses of Funds  
A. Improvement Versus New Airport Construction  
One very clear finding in our analyses is that most of the ADAP funds 
went to improvement of existing airports, rather than development of new 
ones. For FY71 through FY77, the share of ADAP funds going to new airports 
construction averaged 2.4%; the share going to improvement of existing air-
ports never dipped below 96.2% in any one year (Table 3). This flies in 
the face of the initial claims of hundreds of new airports needed during 
the 1970's. Dallas-Fort Worth is the only major airport constructed under 
ADAP.
2  Various reasons can be put forth for this lack of new airport 
development, including: Section 16 of the 1970 Act mandating public 
1 
Neiss, op. cit. 
2
Through FY75, some 1000 airports were improved while 85 new ones 
(mostly small general aviation) were built according to Federal Aviation 
Administration, FAA Airports Programs - Developing the National Airport  
System, Washington, D.C., 1977, p. 2. 
hearings,
1 
environmental concerns, urban planning issues, and general slug-
gishness of the airline industry in the early 1970's. Of course, the cost 
of building a major new airport is enormous - Dallas-Fort Worth shows the 
largest investment cost, debt, and continuing construction cost in a sample 
of 17 large hubs.
2 
Most of the new airports included in the National Air-
port System Plan were small general aviation facilities that were not built 
for reasons including a lack of local sponsorship and a shortage of ADAP 
funds for such airports. Nonetheless, the data clearly contradict the 
rhetoric, if not the actual expectation, of the ADAP legislation: it has 
proved in practice to be a program for airport improvement, not for new 
airport construction. 
Table 3. Total Funds Used for Improvement of Existing 
Airports and New Airport Construction 
(in percent) 
FY 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976+TQ 1977 
Improvement 98.2 96.8 96.2 97.4 97.6 98.3 98.7 
New Airport 1.8 3.2 3.8 2.6 2.4 1.7 1.3 
B. Categories of Use, and Categories of Users  
A breakdown of average annual investment by use category and hub type 
is shown in Table 4 for the three phases of ADAP legislation. In current 
dollars, total investment has steadily increased over time. For period 1 
(FY1971-73), average annual investment ran a little under $400 million per 
year. During Period 2 (FY1974-75), the rate was some 21% higher (around 
1Milch, op. cit. 
2
J. A. Neiss, "Terminal Economics & Financing," Airports International, 
October/November 1975. 
1 I 
Table 4; Average Total Investment per Tear 
by Hub Type and Expenditure Category 










Period 3 Periods Periods 
Category FY 1971-73 FY 1974-75 FY 1976-77 %b 1-2 2-3 
Large 
71.25 41 65.55 39 69.56 35 -8% 6% 
Landing Area Medium 
Construction 29.42 39 32.92 40 48.76 37 12% 48% 
Other • 
77.27 53 113.06 50 151.46 53 46% 34% 
Total 177.94 45 211.53 44' 269.78 44 19% 28% 
Large 43.05 25 30.48 18 28.88 15 -29% -5% 
Other Land Medium 23.77 32 14.25 18 18.89 14 -40% 33% 
Other 21.66 15 25.38 11 33.00 12 17% 32% 
Total 88.48 22 70.11 15 81.37 13 -21% 16% 
Large 14.56 8 26.01 15 18.41 9 79% -29% 
Site 
Preparation Medium 11.51 15 10.86 13 19.18 14 -12% 90% 
Other 22.83 16 34.87 15 35.31 12 53% 1% 
Total 48.90 12 71.74 15 72.90 12 47% 2% 
Large 8.99 5 7.13 4 11.51 6 -21% 61% 
Landing Aids Medium 3.59 5 7.01 9 8.70 7 95% 24% 
Other 9.52 7 18.02 8 21.27 8 89% 18% 
Total 22.10 6 32.16 7 41.48 7 46% 29% 
Large 0.56 0 5.18 3. 0.72 0 820% -86% 
Building Medium 0.85 1 0.81 1 1.86 1 -4% 130% 
Other 2.44 2 7.53 3 6.19 2 209% -18% 
Total 3.85 1 13.52 3 8.77 1 251% -35% 
Large 36.58 21 35.04 21 68.56 35 -4% 96% 
Other Medium 6.17 8 15.56 19 35.18 27 152% 126% 
Other 11.01 8 28.71 13 36.91 13 161% 29% 
Total 53.76 16 79.31 17 140.65 21 48% 77% 
Large 174.99 44 169.39 35 197.64 32 -3% 17% 
All Medium 75.31 19 81.41 17 132.57 22 87. 63% 
Categories 
Other 144.73 37 227.57 48 284.74 46 57% 25% 
Total 395.03 100 478.37 100 614.95 100 21% 29% 
a ..($ /year in period (i+1) - $/year in period ( ))  -1-- * 100, for i = 1, 2, 
$/year in period i 
b% of appropriate column sum (e.g., 71.25 is 417. of 174.99). 
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$480 million annually), while in Period 3 (FY1976-77, part of FY78), it 
averaged about $615 million, a further growth of 29% over Period 2. As 
noted earlier, however, the effects of inflation have been sufficient to 
keep these rates roughly constant in real dollar terms. 
A surprising proportion of these funds have been invested in smaller 
airports - those designated as 'small hubs,' or 'non-hubs,' or not desig-
nated. In Period 1, these airports accounted for over one-third of all 
investment, a figure close to one-half in Periods 2 and 3. Given the 
highly skewed distribution of enplanements across airports, with a very 
few large airports accounting for a huge percentage of enplanements, this 
represents a relatively much larger investment per passenger enplaned in 
small airports than in large ones. 1  We shall return to this point in more 
detail later in the paper. 
For all categories of airport, the largest single expense category 
is Landing Area Construction, which accounts for close to one-half of over-
all annual investment. When Landing Area Construction is added to two 
other expenditure categories - Other Land, and Site Preparation - roughly 
three-quarters of all investment funds are accounted for. The remaining 
monies go to Landing Aids (approach aids, land for lighting systems, and 
airport lighting), running around 6% of the total budget; Building (around 
1-3% of the total); and a significant category here labeled "Other," which 
includes relocation costs, safety and security equipment, and other costs, 
and, in Period 3, environmental land. This last category has grown with 
time for all hubs between Periods 1 and 3 (from 21% to 35% for large hubs, 
from 8% to 27% for medium hubs, and from 8% to 13% for smaller hubs). 
1
We do not address the related consideration of freight transport. 
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The data in Table 4 provide some indication of the extent to which 
airport capital expenditure is sensitive to changes in the matching ratio. 
Referring back to Table 1, we recall that for large hubs, the federal share 
of improvement costs moved from 50% (periods 1 and 2) to 75% (Period 3). 
Total investment in large hubs increased in Period 3, from $169.4m annually 
to $197.6m annually, a 17% jump. The boost in federal share of safety pro-
jects between Periods 1 and 2 (from 50% to 82%) should be reflected in an 
increase in the "Other" category for all airport types. The data do, 
indeed, show such an increase in expenditures in this category of 48% from 
Period 1 to 2 - but they show an even larger increase, of 77%, between 
Periods 2 and 3, when no change in matching ratio occurred. The shift in 
matching ratio for medium hubs between Periods 1 and 2 (from 50% to 75%) is 
not reflected in any large increase in total expenditures: they grew only 
8% in this period, as against a 63% growth from Periods 2 to 3, when there 
was no overall change in matching ratio for medium hubs. 
In short the evidence, in this crude breakdown, that matching ratio 
has a direct effect on expenditure is mixed. In some cases, such a connec-
tion can be argued, in others there is no evidence, and in some cases the 
evidence is negative. We are attempting to tease out this relationship 
with other, more sophisticated, analyses, the results of which will be 
reported elsewhere. For the moment, however, we conclude that there is 
certainly no clear, unambiguous linkage. Increase in federal matching 
ratio may, in some cases, influence the expenditure category to which it 
is aimed. In other cases, it may not. The present data argue strongly 
against any assumption that this particular policy lever operates power-
fully, directly, and in every case. Indeed, there is no compelling evi-
dence here that it works in a consistent manner. 
Z U 
A parallel breakdown of expenditures by category for Air Carrier ver-
sus General Aviation Airports is shown in Table 5. Bearing in mind that 
General Aviation Airports tend to be quite small, the distribution of funds 
largely parallels that shown in Table 3. Perhaps the sharpest difference 
between these two classes of airport is seen in the "Other" category (which 
includes safety equipment, amongst other things). General Aviation Airports 
typically obtain less than half the percentage of funds that Air Carrier 
Airports do in this area. 
C. Investments Versus Enplanements  
We noted earlier some indication that relatively larger investments 
have been made by smaller airports than by larger ones. This suspicion is 
sharply reinforced by the data in Table 6, which show (in constant dollars) 
the average federal, sponsor, and total investment per passenger enplaned 
at large, medium, and small hubs across the three periods of ADAP funding. 
The data here are quite clear. Comparing Period 1 with Period 3, 
total expenditure per passenger has declined at large hubs, primarily as a 
result of falling sponsor investments - federal investment has remained 
roughly constant in deflated dollars. For medium hubs, total investment 
per passenger has remained roughly constant, with sponsors contributing 
less, and federal funds contributing more. For small hubs, total funds per 
passenger have increased, despite a sharp decline in sponsor investment; 
the balance has been made up by a huge growth in federal funds. Comparing 
large to small hubs, the latter consumed about twice as many dollars per 
passenger in Period 1; by Period 3, this figure was close to four times as 
much. The federal share of this expanded from about 2:1 in Period 1 to 
about 5:1 in Period 3. 
Table 5. Fund Distribution by Activity Category 
(as Percent of Period Total by Airport Type) 
LI 
Period 1 	 Period 	2 
1971-73) it 	(FY 1974-75) (FY 
Landing Area 
Construction 
Other Land a 
Site 
Preparation 
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Total 	1,100 % 	100 % • 100 % 1100 % 	100 % 	100 % 
aFAA category of "other land," excludes approach lighting 
system land. 
b Sum of approach lighting system land, airport lighting, and 
approach aids. 
cIncludes relocation, safety and security equipment, environmental 
land (in Period 3), and other costs. 
Note: Same as Table 2. 
TABLE 6 - FUNDS USED PER ENPLANEMENT 
(IN CONSTANT DOLLARS)a 
Mean of annual funds per enplane- 
ment (in 1,000) per airport t-valuesb 
Period Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 1-2 Period 2-3 Period 1-3 
Number of 
Airports 
Large hubs 1,302 1,028 885 -1.747+ -0.939 -2.537* 20 
Total 
funds Medium hubs 1,920 1,267 1,840 -2.034+ 1.863+ -0.278 30 
* * 
Small hubs 2,514 2,193 3,463 -0.676 3.464 2.079 71 














funds * + * 
Small hubs 1,180 532 417 -3.229 -1.852 -3.967 71 
Large hubs 646 512 608 -1.649 1.158 -0.441 20 
+ * 
Federal Medium hubs 1,012 966 1,394 -0.217 1.796 2.121 30 
funds * * 
Small hubs 1,334 1,660 3,045 1.126 4.497 5.521 71 
aDeflated using the highway construction index (1972 base). 
b
Used paired t-tests to assess statistical significance. 
cOnly airports which remained in the same category for all three periods are included in this tabulation. 
Indicates that change between the two phases is significantly different from zero at a = 0.05 (two-sided test). 
Indicates that change between the two phases is significantly different from zero at a = 0.10 (tow-sided test). 
In short, under ADAP, small hubs have increased their investment per 
passenger enplaned, while significantly reducing their own contribution to 
the process. Where in Period 1 the relatively higher cost per passenger 
at small hubs (about twice that of large hubs) was evenly borne by sponsor 
and federal funds, the ratio has now expanded to four to one, with the load 
falling almost entirely on the federal government. Given the relatively 
tiny fraction of the total passenger load carried by these small hubs, we 
question the large capital improvements expense at them, particularly when 
this extra cost is virtually all borne by the federal government. Of 
course, the federal ADAP expenditures distribute user tax revenues, not 
general treasury funds. Hence, the issue boils down to the extent that 
aviation system users should subsidize the users of the smaller facilities 
that are higher cost per enplanement. Some such subsidy appears warranted 
to maintain a viable, safe large-scale air transportation system, but the 
issue is how much, for what sorts of improvements. 
VI. Concluding Observations  
Our analysis has been on the expenditure of ADAP funds; we now briefly 
consider the source of those funds. We have noted that the source of these 
funds is a user tax. The user taxes going into the Trust Fund include an 
aviation fuel tax (7c/gal.), a passenger ticket tax (8%), an international 
passenger travel fee ($3), an airfreight tax (5% on waybills), tire and 
tube taxes, and an annual aircraft registration tax ($25 plus 201b. for 
piston craft over 2,500 lbs. and 3.501b. for turbine craft). A concern 
noted in the original act that has continued to this day is the allocation 
of aviation system costs to the various users (air carrier, general avia-
tion, government) and equitable recovery of those costs. A 1973 study con-
cluded that costs of the Federal Airport and Airway System should be 
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allocated 50% to air carriers, 30% to general aviation, and 20% to the 
public sector to support military and government flying.
1 
The largest 
inequity was found to lie in the general aviation sector - found to be pay-
ing only 20% of their share (through user taxes). It should also be noted 
that while airport development (ADAP) funds derive from trust fund user 
fees, the preponderance of federal expenditures to operate and maintain the 
system derive from general funds (i.e., FAA operation of the airway system 
and such other expenses as maintenance of the D.C. airports). Indeed, only 
32.1% of federal aviation expenditures projected for FY77-80 were from the 
Trust Fund; 67.9% were from the General Fund.
2 
These considerations raise 
two concerns: the subsidy by the public at large of the general aviation 
sector, and the subsidy by air carrier users of air carrier and general 
aviation services to small communities. 
A. Implications of the Analysis  
As we turn to consider the overall implications of airport funding 
strategies, we would like to draw upon findings reached in our broader 
study. In brief, sensible evaluation of any funding strategy must be made 
on the basis of the programmatic funding intent. By this we do not mean 
only the substantive intent of the program (e.g., to provide safe, eco-
nomical, and rapid intercity transportation), but rather the reason for 
federal involvement in funding the program. We distinguish four basic 
intents for such funding: 
1
U.S. Department of Transportation, Airport and Airway Cost Allocation  
Study, Part I, Washington, D.C., September 1973 (a new study has recently 
been completed). 
2
U.S. Department of Transportation, National Transportation Trends  
and Choices (To the Year 2000), Washington, D.C., January 1977. 
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1) national interest in promoting the program (e.g., the Interstate 
Highway System); 
2) regional development aims (e.g., the Appalachian Development 
Highway System intended to promote economic development); 
3) "stimulation" of the recipient government to expend more of 
its own money than it would otherwise do; 
4) "subsidy" of the recipient in a program of local interest, 
where recipient fiscal means are limited. 
Different programmatic funding intents suggest different funding stra-
tegies. For instance, a program of true national interest may well warrant 
a high federal share in a tightly categorical program. If one's aim is to 
stimulate recipient investment, one again would use a categorical program, 
but one with a low federal share to maximize leverage on the recipient's 
investment. On the other hand, if the intent is basically to subsidize 
recipient transportation efforts, a more flexible block grant program would 
seem to be in order. 
A separate reason to involve the federal government in airport funding 
is to provide an equitable mechanism by which users can aid in financing 
the development of the system. However, we differentiate this from the 
four funding intents by noting that this pertains to revenue collection. 
If one wanted the federal government to be involved solely as collection 
agent, several avenues other than federally funded development programs 
exist to distribute the funds collected. For instance, one option would 
be return of the funds to airports on the basis of amounts attributable to 
them, with no programmatic strings attached. Other options might involve 
different redistributions (e.g., to subsidize smaller airports). 
Against this background, let us summarize the major findings presented 
here. Under ADAP, there has certainly been a significant increase in air-
port investment, an investment that was most likely a response to genuine 
need. Despite the rhetoric about need for new airports, few have appeared; 
ADAP has been almost entirely an airport improvement, not a new airport, 
program. 
With the large growth in federal input, and a constant or declining 
airport sponsor contribution, airport improvement in this country has moved 
from a 50/50 split between sponsors' and federal funds to more of an 80/20 
split (90/10 for General Aviation Airports for Period 3) with the federal 
government providing the lion's share. There is some evidence that this 
large federal investment may have shifted construction quality in the 
direction of improvements in safety equipment. There is little evidence 
that the manipulation of matching ratio has induced strong or consistent 
changes (other than increased federal share). In contrast to highways, 
the increase in federal share does not seem to "free up" sponsor funds 
that then get invested in other capital improvements. 
Finally, there has, under ADAP, been a sharp growth in capital costs 
per passenger enplanement at small airports, with the federal share accel-
erating still more rapidly as the sponsor share has declined. We are left 
with a picture that ADAP has clearly promoted airport development as a 
whole. If it is, indeed, a program of direct national interest, increasing 
outlay and federal share of same are appropriate. Another plausible inter-
pretation is that ADAP mainly amounts to fiscal relief; if that is the 
intent, ADAP is on target. ADAP may well have "stimulated" sponsor invest-
ment in certain categories (e.g., safety-related), but it does not appear to 
have led to increased total sponsor investments. As long as "stimulation" of 
that sort is not a major intent of federal funding (and we see no justification 
that it is), ADAP appears to be performing appropriately. 
This leads us to underline the question of national interest in air-
port development. It is clear that the airway system is of national inter-
est. One might argue that certain categories of airport investment, such 
as required safety equipment, development aimed at providing uniformity of 
facilities, and capacity development, fall within this national purview. 
The rationale of a "national" airport system is less compelling. Again, 
it is hard to judge the success of ADAP' - s air carrier airport development 
inducements when the intended pattern is not clearly set forth. If the 
intent was to establish "hundreds" of new airports, clearly ADAP has not 
succeeded. If the intent was to divert the concentration of air carrier 
traffic from the largest hubs to smaller air carrier airports, the jury is 
still out. It will simply take time to see the effects of any enhanced 
development at the smaller hubs, complicated by interactions in airline 
routing patterns largely determined by airline decisions and CAB regula-
tions. The recent movement toward CAB deregulation appears to have boosted 
enplanements, but also promises to alter the distribution of passengers 
among the airports. It is not clear how this fits with ADAP and a national 
interest in airports. A strategic alternative to increased airport capital 
investment would be to make better use of existing capacity.
1 
If one wants 
to raise this set of national interest concerns further, the whole general 
aviation airport support program can be called into serious 
1U.S. Department of Transportation, National Transportation Report, 




Two general conclusions seem well-supported. The first is that in 
the absence of strong reasons otherwise, federal aid programs should be as 
flexible as possible. This suggests that one would prefer block grant pro-
grams to set categorical programs, in the absence of a good rationale. One 
might even prefer to leave the funding entirely to lower governmental levels 
that have the interest and capability to accomplish it. This also suggests 
discretionary rather than formula programs. However, formula programs have 
an advantage in being easier to administer, typically implying less program-
ming delay, and less vulnerability to potential political influence (of 
course, noting that setting an apportionment and allocation formula is 
political too). If one prefers a formula program, allowing an airport 
sponsor to carry over obligational authority over several years is advan-
tageous in providing the flexibility to plan for larger expenditure items. 
The second, and closely related, principle would be to minimally dis-
tort recipient investment decisions. In particular, very high federal 
matching shares make almost any investment under those terms appear advan-
tageous. For ten cents on the dollar (or even less, if one takes into 
account state matches as well and higher federal shares in Public Land 
states), any airport construction project might be deemed desirable just in 
1
This is based upon logical consideration of funding intents, not 
empirical examination of the performance of general aviation airport per-
formance. It is interesting to note that Administration proposals in 1975 
favored leaving general aviation airport financing to the states and air-
port owners (it was not approved) (see Federal Aviation Administration, 
Op. Cit., p. 3). In addition, the 1976 Act provided for a demonstration 
project to determine how effectively states could take over the general 
aviation program. Results were encouraging, but not conclusive (see 
Federal Aviation Administration, State Demonstration Program for General  
Aviation Airport Development, Washington, D.C., June 1978). 
terms of providing employment and other secondary benefits. As another 
example, high federal shares for capital investments are an inducement to 
sponsors to forego maintenance and simply come back at an early date for a 
"construction" project such as a runway overlay. This is particularly true 
when the annual cost of maintaining a facility exceeds the amortized annual 
cost of financing the local share of developing it. Any program with high 
percentages of federal aid could entice sponsors to develop facilities that 
they may not be able to afford to operate and maintain. In essence then, 
the principle would appear to be to minimize influence on state and local 
investment decisions assuming that those parties best know their own needs 
(again, unless there is a clear national interest in a particular program 
area). All in all, the ADAP program does not stack up too badly on these 
counts. As a final recommendation, any attempt to reformulate the ADAP 
funding structures ought to begin with a careful consideration of the 
national interests involved in airports. 
B. Some Observations on 1980 Legislative Proposals  
Debate on the provisions of the 1980 airport legislation promises to 
be interesting. The ADAP legislation expires at the end of June, 1980 and 
requires renewal of both expenditure authorizations and taxing provisions. 
An Administration proposal (Senate bills S. 1581 and 1582, also House bill 
HR 3745) basically maintains the structuring of the ADAP program, increases 
funding level, enhances the state role, and opens Trust Funds for some 
maintenance and operations uses. More intriguing, a proposal by Senator 
Cannon (S. 1648 and S. 1649) would remove the large and medium hubs from 
the ADAP program while reducing the passenger user tax from 8% to 2%. It 
would draw down the Trust Fund surplus (in the $3 billion range) to fund 
30 
the remaining ADAP program at an effectively increased level. It would 
provide greater flexibility in funding from a large discretionary fund for 
all categories of airports together (with 5-year minimum amounts to reliever, 
general aviation, and air carrier airports). The philosophy is to "defed-
eralize" development of the major hubs and increase aid for the smaller air-
ports. It is expected to result in increased development at the large and 
medium hubs due to reduced red tape and an actual increase in available 
funds (over 90% of the capital improvement investments are supported by 
airport charges for landing fees and such; reducing ticket taxes and ADAP 
allows airlines to increase the amount contributed more efficiently and 
directly to airport facility improvements - and to guarantee more bonds).
1 
Drawing upon our analyses, we offer a few comments on the proposals. 
Our starting point is to inquire about the national stake in ADAP. We 
agree with Senator Cannon's argument that if the large airports can manage 
(better) without federal funding, they should be allowed to do. This is 
consistent with our stance that decision-making is best handled at the low-
est sensible governmental level, with the fewest economic distortions and 
constraints. Likewise, we concur with the notion of greater discretion for 
FAA to determine worthy projects with less constraint as to amounts allo-
cated to various types of facilities. We raise a concern over the appro-
priate amount of subsidy to be provided by aviation users and by the 
general public to the smaller airports. Distinctions between general avia-
tion airports and air carrier or reliever airports seem desirable. Estab-
lishment of fair user contributions is an important issue deserving 
1
Statement of Paul R. Ignatius, Air Transportation Association of 
America before the Aviation Subcommittee, Commerce, Science and Transpor-
tation Committee, U.S. Senate, September 10, 1979. 
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consideration, but one largely beyond our scope. Insofar as remaining ADAP 
funding would be intended largely to relieve the financial burden on the 
smaller airports, we feel that a high federal aid share with minimal strings 
attached is best. 
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